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SUMMARY 
The study aims to explore how Islamist parties mobilize citizens in electoral authoritarian 
systems. Specifically, I analyze how Islamist parties develop identity, outreach, structure, and 
linkages to wide sections of the population, so that when the political opportunity presents itself, 
people are informed of their existence, goals, and representatives, and hence, primed to vote for 
them. The study adopts and expands the Political Process Theory, and adapts it to address North 
Africa, a region in which such theoretical scholarship has until now not been conducted. In-
depth case studies focus on two Islamist parties in North Africa — Tunisia’s Ennahda and 
Algeria’s HMS, which both adopted the Muslim Brotherhood model, had charismatic leaders, 
and were both active on the political scene from 1989-2014, the period between their first 
electoral trial and their electoral participation after taking part in governance.  
On the supply side, this study’s main focus, are the key dimensions concerning the mobilizers 
— Islamist parties: their capacity to accumulate resources, and their approaches to ensure 
Islamic discourse is part of the political process. I analyze how these two elements interact with 
each other at those times when political opportunity is made available by those in government, 
whether through division among elites or in attempts to play party blocs off each other. The 
demand side looks at the parties’ political appeal to citizen sensibilities through various Islamist 
agendas. By presenting Islamic discourse as a means to gather large numbers to their cause, the 
parties seek to show themselves capable of incorporating popular views into their agendas, and 
thus to give voters alternatives when the opportunity presents itself for them to vote against the 
government. I contend that in North African political contexts characterized by electoral 
authoritarian or resilient authoritarian systems, demand is largely guided by cautious party 
calculation of benefits and costs. Benefits represent a rejection of the regime and the potential to 
change the status quo (through economic improvement, citizen engagement); costs involve the 
potential loss of citizen rights and of social stability.  
The cases of Ennahda and Hamas/Harakat Mujtami’a al-Silm (HMS) reveal that in responding 
to the constraints of electoral authoritarianism, which include controlled inclusion and informal 
tolerance as well as outright repression, the parties demonstrated efficiency in supplying Islamic 
debate, political locations of Islamic activism, and an alternative discourse to that of the regime. 
However, in doing so, they often failed to meet specific voter demands or expectations, or even 
to garner a protest vote. The study suggests that mobilizing Islamic politics served to engage the 
population and make the political realm culturally credible. Yet, the costs were very high, 
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affecting the parties’ organizational strength, credibility, and capacity to create cooperative 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
 
Almost three decades after the start of the Third Wave of Democratization (Huntington, 1991), 
North Africa experienced tremendous difficulties in getting rid of authoritarian systems. 
Interestingly, each time when the region experienced a real weakening in authoritarianism, 
whether in the form of top-down liberalization reform or bottom-up protest waves, Islamist 
parties rose concomitantly and seized strong positions to capitalize on political change. Such 
scenes took place in the 1980s and early 1990s as Tunisia’s Ennahda, Algeria’s Front Islamique 
du Salut (FIS), and Yemen’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) each cut a striking figure in elections. 
After a short collapse in the late 1990s when most Islamist groups in the Muslim world 
witnessed what Schwedler (1998, p. 27) called “modest changes” or even sharp declines in vote 
share, the rise of the “Islamist vote” seemed to reappear in 2011 as the Arab Spring brought to 
power Islamist parties at the ballot box in several North African countries. North Africa thus 
appeared to be a region in constant flux struggling with democratization, with little opportunity 
to experience over time the role of Islamists in democratization. This thesis adopts the definition 
of democracy proposed by the American and Italian political scientists, Diamond and Morlino 
(2016, p. 21): a form of government which protects citizens’ human rights, rule of law, free and 
fair elections, and citizens’ participation in political and civic life.  
To unveil the role of the “Islamist vote”, I explore what Islamist parties really mean to the 
electorate and opposition parties accustomed to living in authoritarianism where lack of 
democracy is highly politicized (Lust-Okar, 2003, p. 1). Observation of party politics and 
elections in North Africa cannot be based upon the common assumption that they “are integrally 
associated with democratic political systems” (Tachau, 1994, p. xiv). Though superficially 
sharing institutions called “elections”, the structure of rules in electoral authoritarianism differs 
dramatically from that in a democratic system where elections are freer because they are 
protected by the rule of law and pluralistic media. Yet, in the former systems where elections are 
controlled and manipulated, citizens can still reject the authoritarian regime whose 
misgovernment brings socio-economic and psychological grievances, and opposition parties 
including Islamist parties can cater to such demands by providing Islamic debate, political 
locations of Islamic activism, and an alternative discourse to that of the regime. This leads me to 
examine how citizens’ demands and Islamist parties’ interaction with each other in electoral 
authoritarianism change in different political settings.  
 
The Questions Posed 
The central question is: How do Islamist parties mobilize citizens in electoral authoritarian 
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systems? In unraveling the answer, two sets of questions arise regarding the two sides involved 
in elections, the mobilized, meaning the citizens, and the mobilizer, referring to the Islamist 
parties. The first is: What are the concerns of citizens in the particular political contexts of North 
Africa? Regarding the mobilizer, here lies the second question: How do Islamist parties mobilize 
people to vote for them in elections? As discussed above, Islamist parties often become the 
forces most likely to offer a substitute for an autocratic regime at the polls in North Africa. The 
study further examines the mobilization strategies adopted by Islamist parties, and analyzes their 
effectiveness and costs.  
  I address these questions through an in-depth comparative study of two parties, Tunisia’s 
Ennahda and Algeria’s Hamas/Harakat Mujtami’a al-Silm (HMS). The central question of my 
research can thus be broken down into more specific sub-questions: How did Ennahda and the 
HMS survive and develop in responding to the constraints of electoral authoritarianism? How 
did Ennahda and the HMS adjust their programs and incorporate popular views into their 
agendas? Why and how did Ennahda and the HMS demonstrate different mobilization capacities 
in different time periods? Why and how did Ennahda become the biggest winner in the 2011 
election after being excluded from the political scene for two decades, whilst the HMS, which 
had always been included in formal political institutions, lose much of its base around the same 
time? To analyze these questions, the research adopts the Political Process Theory, and 
addresses these theories in a North African setting.  
The issue being addressed here is whether the successful mobilization of an Islamist party is 
dependent on what it supplies to voters and what role it plays in society. The research is of value 
because it offers analysis of the importance of Islamist parties in North Africa specifically and 
critical theoretical insights about confessional party politics in general. Three main points 
emerge: 
First, the study sheds light on Ennahda’s and the HMS’ historical evolution, which forms the 
basis for comprehending their legacies of success and failure, as well as their current 
organizational dynamics, ideological orientations, and political agendas.  
Second, understanding the voting and mobilization in electoral authoritarian systems helps 
elucidate important theoretical concerns regarding elections and party politics. Until we explore 
the questions of whether citizens’ voting decisions are outcomes of emotional sensibilities or 
meticulous calculation, and what exactly Islamist parties supply to get citizens to support them, 
we remain unable to fully understand the elections and the religious marketplace in electoral 
authoritarian contexts, and the democratization predicament in the region.  
Third, the research provides insights for policy-making regarding political reform in North 
Africa. By exploring “How do Islamist parties mobilize citizens?”, and “Do Islamist parties 
always demonstrate strong mobilization capacity and why?”, the study offers nuanced analysis 
around the institution of the Islamist vote, and its mythical power. It argues that Islamist parties 
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do not always demonstrate stronger mobilization capacity than more secular parties, because 
although Islamist parties often demonstrate efficiency in supplying Islamic debates, they often 
fail to meet specific voter demands or expectations due to their inability to strike a balance 
between party consistency and compromise.  
In the following sections, definitions of the terms used in this thesis will be elaborated, 
followed by a justification as to why Ennahda and HMS were chosen as case studies, and an 
overview of the data collection method. A review of the literature addressing the region’s party 
politics and the theories chosen, wraps up the chapter. 
 
Clarification of Definitions:  
Islamism and Institutionalized Islamism 
While there are many definitions of the term “Islamism”, many scholars agree that the term 
represents the interwining of religion and politics (Ayoob, 2005, p. 955; Roy, 2007, p. 57).    
In this study, I define Islamism as an Islam-inspired ideology which reflects and infuses 
Islamic norms into politics and society. In the main, this research involves a particular section of 
Islamism which is termed institutionalized Islamism, referring to groups that embrace 
participation in formal political institutions such as elections. The other branches of Islamism, 
that adopt other methods, such as violent action, are not the focus of this study.  
 
Social Movement Mobilization and Islamist Parties 
Political mobilization is defined by Bealey (1999, p. 214) as “rousing masses of people 
both to express themselves politically and to undertake political action”. The topic of political 
mobilization has mostly been explored by social movement theorists (Gamson, 1990; 
Obserschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). However, as McAdam et al. (1996, pp. 
35-36) note, one important deficiency of many social movement works is they avoid looking at 
mobilization through institutional means including elections. Like Wilson (1973, p. 8) who 
describes a social movement as “a conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or 
resist large scale change in the social order by non-institutional means”, many social movement 
theorists focus their research on the movements’ activities via informal participation (Gamson, 
1990; Klandermans, 1995; Piven & Cloward, 1977).  
Yet, it is not uncommon to see social movements, especially Islamist movements, utilize both 
institutional (e.g. elections, political parties) and non-institutional means (e.g. strikes, 
demonstrations) to realize their goals of Islamizing society. To grasp the essence of the 
phenomenon of Islamist parties, this thesis broadens the range of study about social movement 
mobilization while focusing on Islamist movements’ mobilization through institutional means. 
In the research, I argue that Islamist parties have originated from Islamist movements; their 
creation and participation in institutional systems are key components of Islamist movements; 
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and the voting share they gain in elections is an important indication of Islamist movements’ 
mobilization capacity. It is worth noting that Islamist parties derived from the Muslim 
Brotherhood tradition are characterized by the “party dualities” as described by Joffé (2017), 
meaning that a political movement or party focusing more on political action is often wedded to 
an original social movement that emphasized Islamic preaching and social engagement. 
Consequently, Islamist parties often demonstrate features of both political parties and social 
movements (e.g. using charity service as a means of electoral mobilization), especially when 
they are first created.   
 
Political Parties and Islamist Parties 
“Political parties” are a modern phenomenon, and intimately linked to other modern 
institutions such as elections, citizenship and rule of law. In general, reasons for political party 
formation can be classified into two types: (1) citizens’ cleavages or strains; (2) institutional or 
political elements, such as “characteristics of the electoral system and centralization of the 
government”, that expedite the emergence of new organizations (Redding & Viterna, 1999, p. 
493). LaPalombara and Weiner (1966, p. 6) conclude that there are four features characterizing 
political parties: (1) organizational continuity, referring to a party’s ongoing life-span after its 
founders pass away; (2) institutionalized connection between the party’s organizations at the 
local and national level; (3) intention to seek governmental power; and (4) intention to seek 
support at the ballot box. In modern politics, political parties have several functions and impacts, 
ranging from ensuring “the regulated balancing of power and interests” as Habermas (1994, p. 7) 
argues, to acting “as appropriate structures for bridging the gap between state and society” as 
Held (1992, p. 20) contends. Based on the above, I define political parties as political 
organizations which represent certain ideologies and citizen aspirations, bridge society and state, 
and often compose government (and parliament). 
Islamist parties belong to the broader category of political parties. Yet, they differ from their 
secular counterparts not only in that they adhere to specific religious ideologies, but that they 
strive for “advancing an Islamic way of life” and “serving the interests of the Muslim Umma 
(community of Muslims)” (Salih & El-Tom, 2009, pp. 1-2), intending to organize social, 
economic, and political life of citizens by Islamic principles and rules. Meanwhile, Islamist 
parties recognize the Qur’an and Hadith as a source of law or code of conduct. In other words, 
Islamist parties do not recognize a difference between ethics and laws, nor a distinction in their 
functions in the social, economic, cultural and political fields (Ibid). Moreover, Islamic values 
shape their approach to the mission of politics as they struggle to: (1) report and provide the 
truth in societies where information has long been suppressed; (2) achieve social justice and 
political rights; and (3) balance modern politics with the values of their religion and culture. 
In this study, Islamist parties are defined as organizations which refer to Islamic 
11 
 
interpretations and commitments as an ideological base, bring discourses of Islam into the 
political arena, and participate in politics through elections. Apolitical Islamic associations (e.g. 
Algeria’s Al-Qiyam), and religious organizations which refuse to engage in elections and insist 
on armed struggle as the only means of political participation (e.g. Algeria’s Groupe Islamique 
Armé, GIA) are not the focus of this research.  
 
Algerian HMS and Tunisian Ennahda as Study Cases 
Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt witnessed a rise of Islamist parties taking part in elections in the 
early 2010s. By comparison, the Algerian Islamist parties’ decline in popularity as an electoral 
force in the 21st century (Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne (JORA), 2002, 2007, 
2012) appeared to be a distinguishing phenomenon, considering the FIS’ landslide electoral 
victories two decades ago, and the remarkable vote share won by the HMS and MRI at the polls 
in 1995-1997. This study explores these phenomena by comparing the approach that Ennahda 
and the HMS used to link themselves to wide sections of the population, based upon the two 
parties’ speeches, writings by their leadership, newspaper reports and party platforms. Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Morocco’s Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD) are 
less useful for comparison with the Algerian HMS and are thus not my concern here. This is 
because they do not share the level of similarity with the HMS that Ennahda does, as both the 
MB and PJD emerged in monarchical systems, which had different electoral rules from party 
states (Lust-Okar & Jamal, 2002).  
Indeed, scholars may argue that there are obvious dissimilarities between Ennahda and the 
HMS. For instance, Bourguiba’s approach, inspired by the French and Turkish models, was 
radically secular if not inimical to religion. His Algerian counterparts, in contrast, drew on the 
Egyptian and Syrian experiences, which were careful not to alienate religion citizens, even if it 
set limits on the autonomy of religious institutions. Also, whereas Ennahda did not receive legal 
recognition until Ben Ali was ousted in 2011, the HMS has always been engaging in politics as a 
legal party. Moreover, the agency of HMS is more limited than that of Ennahda. However, I 
consider that these differences do not impact the comparison for four reasons. First, although 
Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali did not take a friendly position towards religion, 
this does not mean that they intended to secularize the society and alinate the religion. Instead, 
as Rory McCarthy (2014, p. 733) argues, both Presidents relied on “Islamic references for 
legitimacy” and aimed to define and interpret Islam in their own terms. These obejctives did not 
differ greatly from those of Algerian Presidents including Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari 
Boumédiène who tried to monopolize religious symbolism and marginalize other interpretations 
of Islam by establishing the official ideology, Islamic socialism (Stone, 1997, p. 53). Second, 
although the tactics adopted by the regime towards Islamist parties differed in these two 
countries, both countries had authoritarian rules for a long time. This means that for a long 
12 
 
period, neither Ennahda nor the HMS gained the full freedom to operate and mobilize, and both 
parties had to learn to live with authoritarianism. The fact that both parties have long been 
responding to constraints in authoritarianism largely explinans why both parties have fallen into 
the same conundrum: how to strike a balance between making compromise to political elites and 
keeping the party’s ideological consistency. Third, although there has been a decline of the HMS’ 
organizational strength over the past two decades, the HMS’ organizational structure was by no 
means weak when it was first created in terms of the party’s size and number of branches, as it 
was composed of 40 branches in wilayas (provinces) and 916 offices in cities and towns in 1991 
(Al-Ahnaf et al., p. 41). Fourth, the differences between the two cases do not overshadow their 
similarities. Rooted in the MB, both parties drew on the MB’s experiences (Crethiplethi, 2015a, 
2015b) of shaping a pyramidal organizational structure and adopting a multi-tier recruitment 
system. Both parties were run by individuals for years. Both parties participated in politics 
through electoral engagement. Both parties won seats through elections and had experience of 
participating in governance. Also, Members of both parties called themselves “moderate 
Islamists”, as they generally rejected the use of violence and doctrinal reading of the scriptures. 
Additionally, both parties demonstrated considerable flexibility and made significant 
compromise over ideological concerns. More importantly, both parties were among the first 
Islamist parties ever established in Tunisia and Algeria, and still exist and play a role in the 
political scene today.  
This comparative study may also be questioned for not comparing Ennahda and the FIS, 
another Algeria’s Islamist party which shares similar experience with Tunisia’s Ennahda as they 
both won a fair share in elections and then experienced harsh repression and exclusion. Yet, as 
the FIS has already been excluded from the Algerian political scene for almost three decades, 
there is a lack of data on the FIS in the period after 1991, which makes it difficult to measure 
and evaluate the mobilization capacity of the party in recent decades. Also, as the FIS was 
banned immediately after it won elections in 1991 and never got a chance to enter the 
government, the party cannot be used as a case to show how Islamist parties develop and 
mobilize after taking part in government. In a word, this research compares Tunisia’s Ennahda 
and Algeria’s HMS due to the following reasons: 1) They are among the very few parties that 
exist from the 1980s and 1990s to the present day in Tunisia and Algeria; 2) They both have run 
for elections as opponent parties and have electoral mobilization after participating in 
governance; and 3) They both are the largest Islamist parties in their countries at present.  
The time-frame for this research is 1989-2014, a period between the Islamist parties’ first 
electoral trials following the political liberalization reforms in both countries and their electoral 
participation after taking part in governance. The study argues that Islamist parties find it more 
challenging to satisfy the electorate’s demand, maintain their own consistency, and keep the 
promises they have made to supporters from various backgrounds after they start to dominate or 
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take part in the government’s decision-making.   
 
The Boundaries of the Literature  
Literature on Islamist activism and mobilization benefit largely from general social movement 
and mobilization literature. Articles of Wiktorowicz’s book Islamic Activism including Hafez 
(2004), Wiktorowicz (2004), and Robinson (2004) adopt social movement theories such as the 
political process model used by McAdam (1982), McAdam et al. (1996), Tarrow (1998), and 
Kriesi et al. (1992), but differ from social movement literature as they situate mobilization in 
religion (Mecham, 2017, p. 22). Scholarship on Islamist parties’ electoral mobilization is 
dominated by two important themes. The first concerns the demand side of mobilization, 
examining who supports or joins and why. Scholars such as Farley (1991), Fuller (2003), 
Hermassi (1984), Roy (1994), Toth (2003), Waltz (1986), Pellicer and Wegner (2015) conduct 
research on the population segments that engage in and/or sympathize with Islamism. Toth 
(2003) and Fuller (2003) argue that an Islamist support base mainly consists of the poor and 
poorly-educated, who can easily be manipulated by religious ideas and attracted by charity 
services. Conversely, Waltz (1986), Pellicer and Wegner (2015) contend that Islamist parties’ 
most critical backing is the well-educated middle class who pay close attention to politics and 
are drawn by their anti-corruption programs. Yet, none of these works observe Islamist parties’ 
support base from a dynamic perspective. Therefore, analysis is sparse regarding how different 
social groups change their attitudes as their demands change, and as Islamist parties’ networks, 
recruitment strategies, and discourse change.  
  When analyzing why people support Islamist parties, scholars focus on different reasons. Onis 
(1997)’s analysis of how Islamist parties challenge the established secular political order, Tessler 
(1997)’s argument that societal resentment drives individuals to support credible opposition 
parties against the government, lay important foundations for my development of the protest 
vote framework, as discussed in Chapter 2. Onis neither successfully explains why people are 
dissatisfied with the government, nor explains what they demand that can be supplied by 
Islamist parties. Although Tessler (1997) analyzes the immediate causes of popular discontent, 
he only emphasizes unemployment of the educated and inadequate housing, and overlooks 
citizens’ psychological and religious demands. Drawing on this vacuum, this thesis refers to 
other works on Muslim votes such as Ayubi (1991, pp. 27-36)’s focus on citizens’ demands for 
official respect of traditional religious values.  
The second theme examines the supply side of mobilization, analyzing how Islamist parties 
exert an impact on the populace. Literature exploring this theme can be classified into two 
categories. The first adopts capacity building, sectarianism, or organization mobilization theories 
to examine one particular aspect of Islamist parties’ mobilization, such as religious charity 
organizations’ fundraising and services provision (Clark, 1995, 2003; Denis, 1994), mosque 
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mobilization (Parsa, 1989), professional associations and trade union organization (Fahmy, 1998; 
Wickham, 1997), the role of kinship networks (Denoeux, 1993; Leenders & Heydemann, 2012), 
ideas and discourse (Okruhlik, 2004; Wickham, 2004). Rather than examine one specific aspect 
of the supply side of mobilization, this thesis extends these works not only by analyzing various 
aspects of the Islamist parties’ supply (e.g. discourse, leadership, networks, recruitment 
methods), but by explaining how they interact with each other in a dynamic way. The second 
category examines factors that affect the mobilization of specific political parties, such as 
Turkey’s two Islamist parties, the Welfare Party (Akinci, 1999; Gulalp, 2001; Onis, 1997) and 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010; Sezer, 2002), Egypt’s Freedom and 
Justice Party (FJP) (Elsayyad & Hanafy, 2013; Farag, 2012), Morocco’s PJD (Khan, 2012; 
Perekli, 2012), and Algeria’s FIS (Chhibber, 1996; Heristchi, 2004). By comparison, fewer 
efforts have been made to compare different Islamist parties’ mobilization. A prominent 
exception is Shahin (1998)’s rigorous comparison of the Islamist parties in Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Morocco, which examines their roots and dynamics, and the tenets of their ideologies from their 
creation to the 1990s. Yet, the work is limited in terms of time frames, and there is lack in 
comparative studies that analyze different Islamist parties over a longer historical period, or that 
include the changes since the Arab Awakening.  
To date,  some efforts have been made to bridge the demand and supply sides of the 
mobilization issue, or to examine how the mobilizers respond to the mobilized through 
generalizable theoretical frameworks based on empirical data. One prominent work is Mecham 
(2017)’s Institutional Origins of Islamist Political Mobilization which combines social 
movement theories with elements of grievance-based theories, and notices how Islamists may 
define politics in a way that Muslims demand. Yet, Mecham (2017)’s work mainly analyzes 
what political opportunities and contexts are favorable for the rise of Islamist groups, but does 
not discuss why and how certain groups can grasp the opportunity and achieve successful 
mobilization whereas the others cannot even if they enjoy the same favorable opportunities. The 
value of this thesis is to fill the literature gap by analyzing how different Islamist parties adjust 
their supply of assets according to voters’ demands in particular political settings, namely how 
that affects their agendas, organizational processes, composition, operation, financial resource 
allocation, decision-making, and the impacts yielded by these factors 
Moreover, the thesis aims to extend the literature on mobilization processes in Tunisia and 
Algeria, with particular focus on Ennahda and the HMS. To understand Ennahda in a broad 
setting, it refers to Murphy (1999)’s analysis of Tunisia’s state empowerment methods which 
develops theoretical understanding of the relationship between economic liberalization and 
political change, Perkins (2014)’s introduction of Tunisia’s socio-economic and political 
institutions, and Camau and Geisser (2003)’s analysis of the interaction between 
authoritarianism and social relations. All three works are sufficiently substantive and provide 
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important background on Tunisia’s political history. 
The emergence and rise of Ennahda’s predecessor, Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique 
(MTI), in the 1980s did attract some academic attention. Hermassi (1984)’s surveys of MTI’s 
supporters’ profiles, and Waltz (1986)’s analysis of Hermassi’s survey results provide a picture 
of who supported MTI/Ennahda and why in its early years. Allani (2009)’s article, “The 
Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation” which examines MTI/Ennahda’s 
relationship with the government, and Shahin (1998)’s Tunisian chapter in Political Ascent: 
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa which unpacks Ennahda’s organizational 
structures and ideologies are also useful sources to understand the party’s history. 
Ennahda’s development in 1991-2010 is generally neglected in case studies of North African 
politics by both Western and Arab scholars, as Ennahda underwent frequent suppression, little 
information about it was available, and no one considered it more important than the other very 
minor Islamist parties.  
It was not until Ennahda ascended to power in 2011 that it received detailed attention in 
academia. A prominent work was conducted by McCarthy (2015), which, based on field 
research in Sousse, draws out the complexity of the Islamic discourse as a political tool in the 
wake of its manipulation by Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Many other works analyze Ennahda’s rise 
from various angles and stress different factors, including the leadership’s efficiency in 
reorganizing the party’s resources after the downfall of Ben Ali (Lynch, 2011), the party’s 
hardline position vis-à-vis the vestiges of the old regime (Haugbølle & Cavatorta, 2011), 
Ennahda’s organizational unity and efforts to mobilize rural voters in contrast to the 
fragmentation of secular parties and ultra-conservative Salafists (Churchill, 2011; Wolf, 2013), 
and adoption of the AKP model (Marks, 2017a). What these works do not fully provide is an 
explanation for the rise of Ennahda after being banned for two decades — why its organizational 
capacity proved resilient in integrating members who had been imprisoned with those returning 
from abroad, for example, and how it avoided the pitfalls of extremism. Also, most of these 
works only examine how Ennahda reconstructed itself in early 2010s, while offering little 
detailed analysis of its development during the decades when it was banned. It is only in more 
recent works, including Wolf (2017)’s and McCarthy (2018)’s, that detail on the party’s ideas 
and grassroot activities in this period come to light, adding considerably to the field. By 
combining elements from these various studies, this thesis views Ennahda from a more 
comprehensive perspective by using the supply-and-demand model and connecting the early 
history of Ennahda with its revival after the Arab Awakening. As most works on Tunisia are 
written by Western scholars in English and French, this thesis draws on works written by 
Tunisian scholars including Ennahda members, such as the article of Mabrouk (2012), Minister 
of Culture under the Troika government, on the history of Tunisia’s religious policies and the 
emergence of different religious currents, Zaalouni (2012)’s Min Ayam Sizhiina Khaarizh Al-
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aswaar [In the Days of Imprisonment outside the Walls] which describes Nahdaouis’ lives in 
Tunisia in 1991-2011, and works written by Ghannouchi (1992a, 1992b, 1993) as more primary 
sourcing. Compared to the Western works, Arab writers especially those who are political 
activists themselves have more access to data of Ennahda and provide invaluable evidence of 
party development. Author’s interviews with Nahdaouis and Tunisian Islamists of other currents, 
newspaper reports, and party pamphlets, also contribute to the base of literature available. 
This thesis draws on a broad field of literature for background knowledge on the political 
setting in which Algeria’s Islamist parties including the HMS emerged and developed. A 
contrast of Julien (1964)’s study of French theories of colonization in Algeria and Trumbull 
(2009)’s description of how narratives of Islamic mysticism affected colonial intervention based 
on both Arabic and French sources help understand Algeria’s colonization experience. Lowi’s 
(2009) exploration of Algeria’s economic governance, Werenfels (2007)’ account of how the 
state works, and a former Algerian army officer Aboud (2002)’s French monograph on the 
military’s structure, provide important insights into the nature of the regime, the FLN, and the 
military. Bouandel (2003)’s historical analysis of political parties’ role in Algeria’s transition, as 
well as Willis (2002a, 2002b)’ two articles on party structure, typology of parties, and political 
parties’ role and significance in the Maghreb region help illuminate the development of party 
politics generally in Algeria.  
In terms of Algeria’s Islamist parties, early works, the majority by Algerians (Addi, 1992; Al-
Ahnaf et al., 1991; Chhibber, 1996; Denaud, 1997; Heristchi, 2004; Labat, 1995; Lamchichi, 
1992; Mortimer, 1991; Zoubir, 1996) focus heavily on the FIS, which experienced a spectacular 
rise in 1990-1991 that stunned both Western and Algerian media and academics. Apart from the 
FIS, there is scant literature on other Islamist parties, even main ones such as the HMS, 
Mouvement de la Renaissance Islamique (MRI) or Movement du Rénouveau National (MRN), 
all of which had longer electoral experience and achieved important positions on the Algerian 
political scene after the FIS was banned. Willis (1998)’s analysis of MRI’s political discourse, 
Driessen (2014, pp. 136-180)’s exploration of both HMS and MRI’s moderation processes, and 
Hamladji (2002)’s examination of the interaction between the HMS and ruling elites go some 
way to filling this gap. Among them, only Hamladji (2002), an Algerian scholar who serves in 
the UNDP as Deputy Regional Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa, examines specifically 
the HMS through an empirical assessment of how its co-optation by ruling elites worked in 
Algeria. These works analyze the manner in which the parties fitted themselves into official 
political institutions in response to the regime’s co-optive policy, and how this process affected 
the parties’ positions and ideologies, but do not discuss in any detail how the parties justified 
their change of political discourse, or how such a change provoked disputes within the parties 
and affected their mobilization capacity.  
Unlike their counterparts in other North African countries, the HMS-led Islamist coalition 
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failed to enlarge its support base in elections in the early 2010s, and thus attracted very limited 
attention in either the media or academia. The literature that does address this topic is primarily 
articles rather than books, and analyzes the decline of Algerian Islamist parties generally, 
including the HMS, from different perspectives, such as their fragmented structures (Ghanem-
Yazbeck, 2014), professionalization and pro-regime positions (Khemissi et al., 2012, p. 553), 
failure to offer practical solutions to socio-economic problems (Marwane, 2018), citizens’ fear 
about the recurrence of civil war (McAllister, 2013; Lazar and Nehad, 2013), and the state’s 
rentier economy that alleviated citizens’ grievances (Lazar & Nehad, 2013). Although these 
works offer insight into the HMS’ decline in popularity, none of them examine the HMS 
specifically, and tend to be descriptive, rather than offering in-depth theoretical engagement. 
Based upon these works, as well as news reports, and authors’ interviews with HMS members 
and Islamist activists of other currents, this thesis also refers to primary sources — original 
memoirs, party statements, party pamphlets, and works written by Algerian Islamists such as 
Nahnah (1999)’s literature. By observing the HMS’ developmental trajectories since its creation 
and relating the case study to theoretical discussion, this thesis highlights the intricacies of the 
elements that affected its mobilization capacity that led both to its successes, and its decline.  
 
Data Sources 
This study is based on a combination of original field data, primary sources drawn from party 
records and electoral reports, and secondary studies produced in the two states themselves, as 
well as by area specialists. The study uses the data collected through my fieldwork in Algeria 
and Tunisia over a period of nine months in August 2015-April 2016. I conducted 130 
interviews (72 in Tunisia, 58 in Algeria) with four groups of people: (1) 29 interviews with 
current and former members of Ennahda in Tunisia, and 15 interviews with HMS members in 
Algeria; (2) five interviews with Algerian political activists of other Islamist parties and 
religious groups, including those who are exiling in Geneva and Zurich, and five interviews with 
Tunisian religious activists of non-Ennahda groups; (3) eight interviews (four in each country) 
with journalists and scholars specializing in Islamist parties; (4) eight interviews (four in each 
country) with politicians with more secular agendas; and (5) 60 interviews (30 in each country) 
with voters from different age groups, genders, geographic regions, and educational and 
professional backgrounds. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, French and English. Each 
interview lasted around one hour. Many interviewees were interviewed several times so that 
emerging themes could be pursued later. To protect the identity of individual interviewees, I 
employ common Arabic first names for those who asked for anonymity  
Primary sources adopted in the study, include (1) Algerian and Tunisian press reports, 
speeches of party candidates during electoral campaign published in Algerian newspapers such 
as El Watan, Infor Soir, L’Expression and Le Soir d'Algérie, and Tunisian newspapers such as 
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Le Temps and La Presse, as well as in overseas media such as Al Jazeera, Jeune Afrique, and 
BBC News; (2) announcements and electoral platforms of political parties; (3) party documents, 
histories, manifestos, and publications (print and web-based); (4) memoirs, biographies and 
other publications of political figures from within the parties, or associated with them; (5) 
government documents; and (6) surveys and opinion polls conducted by local and international 
institutes.   
An important data source used in this research is surveys conducted in 2007, 2011 and 2013 
by Arab Barometer, a research network supported by foundations including US-Middle East 
Partnership Initiative, BBC, and Qatar National Research Fund. The public opinion surveys it 
conducted reached over 1,200 people in Algeria and 1,190 in Tunisia aiming to discover the 
interviewees’ religious attitudes, political attitudes, and evaluation of public institutions. Another 
data source is surveys conducted by the World Values Survey, an NGO supported by the Bank 
of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the Dutch Ministry for Education and Research, and the 
Russian Federation. Each of its surveys on Algeria in 2002 and 2014, and on Tunisia in 2013 
used common questionnaires and reached over 1,200 people, aiming to study people’s changing 
beliefs.  
One important dataset adopted by this thesis is Turess1, which is a Tunisian news service 
website which contains all articles of 45 Tunisian newspapers from 2001 to 2018. Sources for 
Tunisia also include Surveys of Tunisian Public Opinion published in 2011-2014 by the 
International Republican Institute, an NGO supported by the National Endowment for 
Democracy and Freedom House. Aiming to address citizens’ concerns, each of the surveys used 
face-to-face interviewing methods and reached over 1,200 Tunisians. Socio-economic data of 
Tunisia including unemployment rates and inflation were accessed in Statistiques Tunisie. 
Additionally, the profiles of almost all parliamentary deputies published on the official website 
of Marsad Majles are conducive to learning about the activities of Ennahda members over the 
past three decades. Moreover, securing access to Ennahda’s internal files including its brochures, 
conference briefing and mailing lists allowed me to make sense of the party’s organizational 
structure and propaganda methods.  
Among the sources for Algeria, the Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne was a useful 
resource, as it covers Algerian electoral laws, official electoral outcomes, information about the 
elected candidates of each political party in disparate constituencies, and voter turnout in every 
constituency. Two datasets for Algeria, Algeria-Watch and DjaZairess2, are also helpful, as they 
allow access to all articles published by a wide selection of Algerian Francophone newspapers 
                                                   
1 The database of Turess is accessible at https://www.turess.com/fr. 
2 The database of Algeria-Watch is accessible at https://algeria-watch.org/, and the database of DjaZairess 
is accessible at https://www.djazairess.com/fr/  
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including El Watan, Infor Soir, L’Expression, Le Soir d'Algérie, Liberté, and Le Quotidien 
d’Oran. Algeria-Watch is a German human rights NGO. Its website contains more than 10,000 
documents from Algeria, including newspaper articles, working papers, magazine articles, and 
videos from 1998 to 2018. Yet, it selects only those relevant to human rights and therefore does 
not include all newspaper articles. DjaZairess is an Algerian news service website which 
contains all articles of 64 Algerian newspapers from 2001 to 2018. Socio-economic data of 
Algeria including unemployment rate and inflation can be accessed in Office National des 
Statistiques. Compared to Ennahda, the HMS is less open to observers and therefore its internal 
files are less accessible. I managed to access a few brochures which proved helpful to 
understand the type of political discourse it utilized.  
It is worth noting that a challenge to analyzing Islamist parties’ mobilization in electoral 
authoritarianism is lack of precise data to measure the parties’ mobilization capacity. Electoral 
results, an important measure of party mobilization, are often questionable, as they can be 
falsified by ruling elites. Although this study does not assume that all information the results 
provide are true, it uses official electoral results as a reference. This is because other measures 
such as opinion polls conducted by independent institutes are generally lacking in autocratic 
systems, and because some of the information provided by official electoral outcomes reflects 
certain phenomena worth studying. For instance, the official electoral outcomes of Algeria show 
a dramatic increase in invalid votes over the past two decades, which is an indicator of certain 
electorate sensibilities (e.g. voters’ distrust of both regime parties and non-regime parties).  
  Yet, I acknowledge that ruling elites may falsify the number of votes gained by Islamist 
parties to manipulate the electoral politics and ensure the regime party’s hegemony. Hence, 
when analyzing the mobilization effect of Ennahda and the HMS, I also use other sources as 
references, in order to reduce errors. There are, for example, disputes about the exact number of 
votes gained by Ennahda in the 1989 election. Using various sources (Toumi, 1989; Burgat & 
Dowell, 1993; Willis, 2012), I find that Ennahda’s vote share was likely to range from 15%-30%. 
Although it surely acquired much more votes than other non-regime parties, there was no hard 
proof that Ennahda’s vote share outnumbered that of the ruling party, RCD.  
In Algeria, it is not uncommon to hear Islamist parties complain about “fake electoral results”. 
For instance, Abederrazzak Mukri, the campaign manager of the HMS-led Islamist coalition 
called Alliance de l'Algérie Vert’s (AAV), claimed that “Islamist parties should be closely 
behind Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in the initial tabulations” in the 2012 legislative 
election (Schemm, 2012). Although there may be no way of knowing the exact vote share gained 
by the HMS and other Islamist parties in each election, I find that the HMS’ decline in 
popularity over the past two decades as shown in official electoral outcomes reflects the real 
picture after analyzing other sources.  
For instance, my interviews with Algerian voters from different backgrounds shows that the 
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HMS’ support base has declined significantly, as 16 out of the 30 interviewees mentioned that 
Mahfoud Nahnah, founder of the HMS, was well-known and his party was supported by many 
people they knew in mid- and late- 1990s, and that the HMS was supported by very few people 
in recent decades after Nahnah’s death. 
According to an opinion poll carried out two months before the 2012 election by El Watan 
and ECOtechnics of citizens from different ages, sexes and professions in 28 wilayas (provinces), 
the average support rate of AAV is 2%, which is much less than that of FLN (25%) and RND 
(5%). Another opinion poll conducted by the Youth Action Gathering (Rassemblement Actions 
Jeunesse, RAJ) and ECOtechnics immediately after the election of youths in the 18-35 
demographic shows that among those who have claimed to have cast a vote, merely 4.7% have 
voted for AAV. This also shows that the HMS and other Islamist parties’ support base has 
shrunk in the 21st century. 
 
Methodology and Methods 
By comparing the elements that have affected the mobilization of Ennahda and the HMS, the 
research adopts the “method of similarity” (Mill, 1843, p. 454), a comparative historical 
approach whereby one compares different cases which have the same outcome. For instance, 
although Ennahda and the HMS adopted different mobilization strategies, they suffered the same 
fate of having their electoral gain slashed after taking part in government.  
The thesis primarily adopts qualitative research methods. I used semi-structured interviews, 
meaning that while a set of questions were covered in all interviews, I followed topical 
trajectories in conversation, enabling me to bring up new ideas and adjust my interview 
questions according to the interviewees’ responses (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). After 
verbal data were hand-written and then taped, I analyzed interview transcripts and categorized 
the data into theoretical concepts such as demands, political opportunities, organizational 
structure, and movement strategies. 
 
The Structure of the Study 
To fulfill the thesis objectives, the structure of the study focuses on the following: first, to 
explain how Ennahda and the HMS enable citizens to be informed of their existence, goals, and 
representatives, and hence, can be primed to vote for them when the political opportunity 
presents itself; second, to extend the argument on the parties to explain why some Islamist 
parties demonstrate stronger mobilization capacity than the others, and why some parties 
demonstrate stronger mobilization capacity on certain occasions than others; and third, to 
describe how electoral politics works in North Africa and what elections really mean to voters 
and Islamist parties. Further, it addresses the role of the parties in introducing and maintaining 
Islamist discourse as a vital element within the political sphere. 
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The thesis is chronological in form. Chapter 2 discusses the literature and debates surrounding 
voters’ behaviors, electoral authoritarianism, and party mobilization as a theoretical background 
of the research, and proposes a demand-and-supply framework to address the research question. 
Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of the emergence of Islamist parties as part of the 
broader Islamist movement in Algeria and Tunisia, the early evolution of Ennahda and the HMS, 
as well as their interactions with the regimes before their first engagement in elections. Chapters 
4 through 8 divide the development of Ennahda and the HMS into four stages and examine their 
electoral mobilization strategies and outcomes in each stage. Specifically, Chapter 4 tests the 
logics of the demand-and-supply theory through in-depth comparative studies of Ennahda and 
the HMS’ first trial at the ballot box in 1989 and 1991. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 compare Ennahda 
and the HMS’s mobilization during three key time periods: 1992-1998, 1999-2010, and the early 
2010s. These three chapters focus on how the political landscape, government actions, and 
opportunities available for Islamist parties changed in the two countries, how Ennahda and the 
HMS adjusted their organizational structure, network building and movement strategies in 
response, and how the two parties’ mobilizational outcomes varied. The concluding chapter 
discusses the generalizability of the model presented in this research and proposes implications 






















Chapter 2   
Theorizing Islamist Parties’ Mobilization at the Polls 
 
A Heuristic Framework of Islamist Parties’ Electoral Mobilization 
To address the research questions, an explanatory and comprehensive framework has to be 
proposed. Drawing inspiration from the socioeconomic metaphor used in the work of De Witte 
and Klandermans (2000) on extreme right-wing parties in Flanders and the Netherlands, this 
study builds a supply-and-demand framework, but is based upon observation of North African 
political contexts. For this purpose, I adopt the Political Process Theory, and develop a structure 
suited to my research question and which takes forward the data analysis so that it enables 
generalization to other cases.   
The mobilization process involves two important roles: the mobilizers and the mobilized. To 
understand Islamist party mobilization, that is, what the mobilizers supply and why, I seek to 
identify what the mobilized demand. An analysis of the context of electoral authoritarianism and 
the phenomenon of protest voting helps understand the demands of the mobilized in particular 
contexts, in this case, through the eyes and actions of the mobilizers. I argue that in electoral 
authoritarian or resilient authoritarian systems, citizens who cast blank votes, vote for non-
regime parties, or refuse to vote at all, still wish to have their voices heard and through these 
actions, show they are demanding change. They are potential supporters of opposition parties 
including Islamist ones and constitute the demand-side of electoral politics in North Africa. At 
the center of the  concerns of the mobilized are two issues: first, whether there exists a party that 
can reject the practices of the current regime and change the status quo, and second, what costs 
that party and its intentions may bring to voters. Meanwhile, it is important to analyze the 
mobilizers’ opportunities to offer a program for change, intention and legitimacy to bring such 
change, and the capacity to compete with the ruling party in elections, the precondition for 
bringing about any meaningful shift in the political arena. By analyzing these dimensions, it 
becomes possible to evaluate the supply-side elements that affect mobilization outcomes.  
 
The Demand Side: Voting in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes 
Classical voting behavior theorists have observed citizens’ voting in Europe and North 
America through three perspectives, namely the sociological model, psychological model, and 
economic model (Harrop & Miller, 1987). The sociological approach focusses on the cleavages 
between the haves and have-nots, considering this the crucial factor in shaping citizens’ voting 
preferences (Berelson, 1954; Brooks et al., 2006; Elff, 2007; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967). In utilizing this model, much of the Islamic activism scholarship finds a causal 
relation between sociological strains and the popularity of Islamist parties (Chhibber, 1996; 
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Gulalp, 2001; Onis, 1997, pp. 753-757).  
The psychological model was pioneered by sociologists such as Campbell, Converse, Miller, 
and Stokes (1960) in the 1960s at University of Michigan and developed by recent researchers 
such as Harder and Krosnick (2008), Helal and Hamza (2015). It argues that party identification 
is driven by more factors than sociological status and discontent, and that psychological 
attachment to a party is a key determinant of voting behavior (Campbell, 1960; Campbell et al., 
1966). In line with this theory, Islamic experts have attributed the “Islamist vote” to religio-
psychological factors, arguing that support for Islamist parties derives from their ability to 
reinforce cultural differentiation from the West and uphold traditional religious values (Ayubi, 
1991, pp. 27-36; Burgat & Dowell, 1993, pp. 39-41).  
The economic model derives from rational choice theory (Edlin et al., 2007; Farber, 2009). 
Unlike the sociological and psychological perspectives, it stresses that voting decisions are made 
on the basis of sophisticated cost-benefit calculations. Voters understand how to use voting to 
their benefit and are likely to choose the parties that best represent their interests, and can deliver 
on their promises within a competitive field (Downs, 1957; Edlin et al., 2007; Lazarsfeld et al., 
1944; Sanders, 1993).  
The three models are important because they highlight aspects of voting behavior that over-
ride, organize or rationalize the impact of institutions and party-systems from the perspective of 
individual choice. They all interpret voting behavior as a self-driving mechanism for voters to 
express demands, identity and differentiation, but do not consider outside factors, such as regime 
type, or political risk (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). This research makes more complex the 
analysis by including individual drivers, such as socio-economic grievances, within the larger 
political context. Additionally, the sociological, psychological, and economic theories elucidated 
above have mainly been tested in Western political systems where elections are relatively fair 
and free (Tachau, 1994, p. xiv). In systems where elections are controlled by ruling elites who 
aim to maintain a political monopoly (Schwedler, 1998, p. 27), people’s voting behavior may be 
very different, and reflect factors other than those proposed in frameworks relevant to more 
pluralistic systems. By considering non-democratic institutions’ features, it becomes possible to 
explore how citizens’ voting behavior is expressed in electoral authoritarian contexts such as in 
North Africa.      
Most North African states have adopted electoral authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002, pp. 23-24; 
Schedler, 2006; Morse, 2012), a system that combines democratic elements including party 
politics and elections with authoritarian practices such as affecting electoral results by 
gerrymandering or depriving certain parties’ right to contend elections. Despite holding elections, 
these regimes do not meet basic requirements for a democracy, whether in terms of the 
Schumpeterian minimal procedural definition stressing electoral competitiveness and 
representation (Schumpeter, 1942), or in terms of the substantive conception of democracy such 
24 
 
as Dahl’s (1989) proposal of polyarchy (or pluralism) or Pateman’s (1970) advocacy of 
participative democracy, both of which emphasize procedures such as inclusiveness (the 
democratic process should be available to every citizen) and control of the agenda (citizens 
should be able to indicate the matters that should be discussed). According to Szmolka, a 
political theorist of electoral authoritarianism, unlike in democratic systems where elections 
facilitate the selection of government officials for a specific time period, elections under 
electoral authoritarianism serve a different set of functions. Specifically, authoritarian elites use 
the process of elections to show themselves enlightened and open to modern democratic 
practices — that is, to convey an image of pluralism to the outer world. They also use elections 
as a tool to strengthen regime parties’ popular support, illustrate the hopelessness of opposition, 
and critically, provide ruling elites with information about potential dissidents (Szmolka, 2006, 
pp. 40-41). In this context, electoral processes and outcomes are controlled by the military, the 
president, the monarch, the security system or a hegemonic party through manipulation, to 
prevent opposition parties from achieving significant power (Hudson, 1994, p. 6). 
For citizens opposed to the status quo in electoral authoritarian regimes, three voting choices 
are available to express their protest: voting for a non-regime party, casting blank votes, or not 
voting. Whether to take the first option depends on calculations of benefits (a rejection of the 
regime and the potential to change the status quo), and costs (the potential loss of citizen rights 
and of social stability). The latter two options neither cost nor benefit the voters very much, but 
they are common practices in electoral authoritarianism, especially when there lacks a non-
regime party that demonstrates intention and capacity to bring change. In Algeria, for instance, 
over 60% of voters choose not to vote and over 4.5% of voters cast blank votes in every election 
in the 21st century. 
Therefore, if the opportunity presents itself, the first option, voting for an opposition party, is 
the most common. I argue that voters in this situation are likely to cast protest votes, which, 
according to Tessler (1997), means that citizens calculate which party might actually gain 
sufficient votes to achieve some of the benefits they want, even if there are other parties they 
prefer, but which they calculate will gain too small a proportion of votes to actively bring change. 
Voters must consider what they can achieve by casting their votes for a party outside the 
mainstream, and whether there exists a party that can bring meaningful changes to the existing 
social order.  
A party is likely to garner protest votes if it can identify problems with the current system and 
provide concrete solutions, demonstrate its organizational capacity to compete with regime 
parties, and show its intention and legitimacy to make changes. Meanwhile, I contend that in 
electoral authoritarian systems, opposition voting is not without risks, and that to gain protest 
votes, a party needs to ensure citizens that voting for it costs them little. Risks include voting in 
a party that adopts similar elite practices as the existing regime, and of voting for a party, such as 
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the FIS, that so threatens the regime that it leads to a complete clampdown and rejection of the 
vote. Additionally, in the scenario of introducing Islamist ideologies into regime practices (such 
as the implementation of sharia (Islamic law)), either through popular inclusion or regime 
replacement, for instance, women may worry about their right to work, to divorce, or to appear 
in public spaces without a hijab (headscarf) (Al Jazeera, 2012a). Moreover, as extensions of 
Islamist movements, the ascent of Islamist parties to power could risk facilitating political 
activism by more radical Islamist strands such as jihadi salafiyya, which might threaten the 
society’s security (Guazzone, 2013, p. 39).   
It is to be observed that, even in contemporary Tunisia where relatively free elections have 
been in place since the Arab Awakening, an inheritance of the protest vote —  voting for a party 
that is likely to gain sufficient votes to achieve certain benefits wanted by voters rather than for a 
party the voters actually prefer — is still evident (The New York Times, 2014). This may partly 
be attributed to absence of prior democratic experience. Morover, as Farmanfarmaian (2014, p. 
657) argues, “practices and power centers [that] carried over from the past, through elite 
networks of privilege that have long experience in state capture” have made the newly 
established system more a “resilient authoritarianism” — “a hybrid system of secured domains 
combined with certain public freedoms” (p. 661). Among the 30 Tunisians to whom I asked why 
they voted for Ennahda in the election of 2011, six admitted that they were ideologically more 
inclined to support the Congrès pour la République (CPR) and three said they preferred other 
small leftist parties. Halina, an undergraduate in Medicine from Nabeul explained why she voted 
for Ennahda rather than the party she actually preferred: “CPR is a small party and is not strong 
enough. It will never achieve dominance in elections. I will not waste my vote … but will vote 
for Ennahda instead…to ensure that a strong party against the old regime can dominate Tunisia 
after the revolution” (Interview, Halina, 2015, Tunis). Halina’s views were typical among my 
interviewees.  
In sum, in electoral authoritarianism, demand is largely guided by cautious calculation of 
benefits and costs. As citizens who reject the regime are likely to vote for a non-regime party if 
it appears to bring them large benefits and few costs, Islamist parties need to show themselves 
susceptible to incorporating popular views into their agendas to garner the protest vote.  
                                                   
Supply Side: Applying the Political Process Theory 
This study analyzes the supply side through the political process model, emphasising the 
elements of political opportunities, organizational structure, and network building . The key 
dimensions concerning the mobilizers in a mobilization process are: 1) the space that allows 
them to demonstrate their capacities, 2) their capacity to accumulate resources, and 3) their 
strategies to convince the mobilized that they are willing and sufficiently legitimate to bring a 
real change both through the resources they command, and their ability to minimize risks to the 
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voters. Applied by sociologists such as McAdam and Tarrow, the political process framework 
argues that when grievances spread and demands for change exist, successful mobilization is 
only possible in the presence of favorable exogenous political opportunities, including an 
increase in the institutional openness to oppositional forces, or a rise in fierce elite schisms 
(Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). In addition to highlighting 
advantageous political environments, the framework stresses that organizations’ endogenous 
structures, network building and movement strategies are key elements that determine to what 
extent the potential for social mobilization can be realized (Mcadam, 1986; McCarthy & Zald, 
1977).  
Yet, the political process model, as part of social movement theory, is developed to explain 
movement participation in uninstitutionalized and unconventional actions such as protests 
(Bayley, 1969; Costain, 1992; Kitschelt, 1986; Meyer, 1993) and armed insurgent movements 
(Alimi, 2006; Hafez, 2004; McAdam, 1999), and largely ignores cases in which social 
movements utilize formal means to mobilize mass support. The political process theorists who 
pay attention to formal politics examine Western cases in liberal democracies (Aminzade, 1995; 
Andrews, 1997; Anheier, 2003; De Witte & Klandermans, 2000), and there is little examination 
of non-Western electoral authoritarian cases. The very few works that apply the political process 
model to formal political parties in non-Western cases either analyze the interactions between 
the regime and opposition parties (Schwedler, 2004), or opposition parties’ activities (Alexander, 
2000; Eligür, 2010). What is completely lacking is analysis relating the mobilizing parties to 
their mobilized targets, the citizens.  
This research aims to fill the vacuum in studying mobilization through formal institutions 
(McAdam et al., 1996, p. 35-36) in non-Western electoral authoritarian contexts. I stress the 
necessity to link the mobilizers to the mobilized, and to examine to what extent a party’s supply 
can satisfy the voters’ demands and prompt a successful protest vote. I contend that political 
opportunities, organizational structure, network building, and movement strategies determine 
whether a strong alternative option is in place to challenge the regime party. The various 
dimensions of the supply side are not isolated factors but interact with each other in a dynamic 
way. Below is an elaboration of these points.   
 
    Political Opportunities 
Political opportunity is conceptualized as the likelihood that challengers will strengthen their 
interests or increase the current benefits they can obtain if they act collectively (Tarrow, 1998, p. 
85). Although the term “political opportunity” is widely used by social scientists (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 1999; Koopmans, 1999; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Osa & Corduneanu-Huci, 2008), little 
consensus is reached when it comes to identifying specific elements of political opportunity. 
Founders of the political opportunities structure agree on the importance of the following three 
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components: (1) presence or absence of elite alignments; (2) openness of the political system; (3) 
level of the state’s repression (Brockett, 1991, p. 254; Kriesi et al., 1992, p. 220; McAdam, 1996, 
p. 27). A breakdown in the cohesion among ruling elites provides a vacuum for opposition 
forces to fill and to interfere with policy making (Albrecht, 2005, pp. 390-391; Grove, 2001, p. 
12). Openings in the political system and lowered levels of repression can help opposition 
parties gain access to formal politics and reduce the cost of collective mobilization (Kitschelt, 
1986, p. 62). 
I argue that in electoral authoritarianism which combines “democratic and authoritarian 
elements” (Diamond, 2002, p. 23) to “capitalize on electoral legitimacy while remaining in 
power” (Wegner, 2011, p. xvii), the level of repression and political openness to opposition 
forces are largely determined by the elite power structure, which can be dichotomized into 
undivided and divided structures (Lust-Okar, 2004, p. 159), that is, the “presence and absence of 
elite allies” (McAdam, 1996, p. 28). When ruling elites reduce disputes among themselves either 
by finding common ground for all factions or by establishing a hegemonic system with one very 
powerful faction, opposition forces are more likely to face intense repression and political 
closure. A case in point was Tunisia’s crackdown of Ennahda after Ben Ali secured hegemonic 
dominance within the elite circle soon after taking power (Quandt, 1998, p. 60).    
Conversely, a divided structure refers to circumstances where little common ground is shared 
by different power factions and none is able to command hegemony. This leads some ruling 
elites to “increase political openness to some political opponents while excluding others” (Lust-
Okar, 2004, p. 160) in an effort to counterbalance their adversaries within the elite circle. For 
opposition forces such as Islamist parties, such openness can be in the form of either informal 
tolerance — allowing the parties to operate and mobilize, but without legalizing them (Albrecht 
& Wegner, 2006, p. 123), or controlled inclusion — legalizing the parties while still constraining 
their activities (Ibid). The most straight-forward approach of imposing restrictions is to enact 
laws to the disadvantage of legal Islamist activists such as forcing them to remove the Islamic 
elements from the parties’ titles and platforms. Willis terms such methods “legal forms” of 
interference (Willis, 2002, p. 6). Additionally, covert means can be used as “supplementary 
measures” (Ibid). One frequently used covert method by North African ruling elites is to 
catalyze inner splintering within opposition parties by financing one power faction and inciting it 
to break away from the party (Ibid). Another covert means, often adopted by President 
Bouteflika in Algeria, is to encourage the emergence of large numbers of Islamist groups, 
provoking inter-group competition to divide and weaken the Islamist camp (Joffé, 2009, p. 943). 
Offering different levels of political openness to different opposition parties is a common 
practice among electoral authoritarian regimes in North Africa. This was reflected in Algeria’s 
policy in the late 1990s when it offered the HMS and MRI controlled inclusion while totally 
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excluding the FIS (Layachi, 2004, p. 55). 
 
Organizational Structure 
As McAdam (1999, pp. 43-44) observes, a conducive political setting merely affords 
mobilizers the chance to realize extensive mobilization. To convert favorable opportunities into 
organized action, the mobilizers must possess sufficient resources.  
Organizational strength covers mobilizing organizations’ structural and networking dynamics, 
and examines how they “combine money, materials, people and technology into strategic and 
tactical action” (Zald & McCarthy, 1987, p. 45). In North Africa, where religion is dominated by 
Sunni Islam, Islamist parties’ connections to religious facilities and organizations yield 
important strengths compared with secular opposition parties, which are unable to establish what 
Hamid called “states-within-states” networks (2014, pp. 11-12) composed of mosques, 
kindergartens, schools, hospitals, think tanks, banks, etc.  
Nonetheless, not all Islamist parties are able to optimize these resources, the effectiveness of 
which depends on the parties’ organizational structures and relations to Islamic non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Organizational structures refer to the organization’s 
recruitment capabilities vis-a-vis the population, and their mechanisms to resolve internal 
disputes. A central question opposition parties must address, and which engenders considerable 
debate, is whether to adopt an inclusive or exclusive approach in membership recruitment. 
Conventional wisdom, supported by some academic scholarship (Carty et al., 2000; Zald & Ash, 
1987) considers that a welcome-to-all strategy enables a party to enroll as many committed 
members as possible. The idea has increasingly been criticized, however, as an inclusive 
recruitment strategy can only require minimum levels of initial commitment, meaning that 
sympathizers merely give the organization general support without much obligation (Zald & Ash, 
1966, p. 331). Zald and Garner claim that exclusive opposition organizations find it easier to 
endure than inclusive ones, because they select members who have the “heaviest initial 
commitments” (Ibid) and can thus hold constant their loyalty especially in the context of 
suppression. Aside from fewer commitment requirements, other conundrums of the inclusive 
approach include how to represent different needs and ideas of members from a variety of 
backgrounds, and how members with divergent ideas can find common ground. Charismatic 
leadership helps, to some degree, to maintain a party’s’ unity (Salih & El-Tom, 2009, p. 34), as 
does installing consultation and consensus mechanisms which are conducive, at least 
temporarily, to alleviating disagreement. A party with neither difference-settlement mechanisms 
nor charismatic leaders are likely to be plagued with ideological conflicts and power struggles, 





  Another important dimension with bearing on opposition parties’ mobilization is the 
relationship with Islamic NGOs. Most Islamist parties emerge from a wider social movement 
composed of a broad variety of NGOs (Wegner, 2011, p. xxxvii). For instance, the two Islamist 
parties discussed in this research, Ennahda and the HMS, respectively originated from Al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI) and Al-Jama’a al-Muwahadin (JM)/Al-Irchad wa al-Islah (II), two 
broad religious organizations. Similarly, left-wing parties are often closely linked to trade unions 
and communist associations (Kalfat, 2014). While effective interaction between Islamist parties 
and their related NGOs helps enhance the parties’ influence and public awareness, ineffective 
relationships between them makes it difficult for NGOs to play supporting roles for their related 
political parties. An example was when disputes arose between the HMS and II in the first 
decade of 2000, many II members stopped working with it on charity services, and stopped 
encouraging grass-roots constituents to vote for it in elections.   
Effective interactions with NGOs not only enable opposition parties to carry out face-to-face 
contact with prospective voters, one-to-one meetings, and door-to-door canvassing at the most 
grass-roots level during campaigning seasons (Delibas, 2009, p. 99), but they can enable the 
parties to remain working in abeyance during periods when political opportunities are narrowed 
or shut down altogether (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). In sociological terms, abeyance illustrates a 
holding process whereby movements sustain themselves during periods of unfavorable political 
opportunities and “provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another” (Ibid). I 
contend that the rule also works for opposition parties in settings of electoral authoritarianism. 
Efficient organizational dynamics and extensive NGOs are instrumental for repressed parties to 
survive crackdowns and ensure “the continuity of the[ir] political agenda” (Delibas, 2009, p. 90).  
 
 
Linking Demand and Supply 
   Islamist parties’ mobilization success largely relies on capturing citizens whose demands are 
guided by cautious calculation of benefits and costs. Whether an opposition party’s efforts to 
enlarge its support base succeed or not largely depend on the extent to which, over time, and/or 
at any given moment, the supply meets the demand.  
Interactions of supply and demand can map onto political process theory, leading to a thicker 
understanding of party mobilization. Three possible scenarios emerge. The first is successful 
mobilization. When the state’s repression is relaxed and political opportunities increase, if an 
Islamist party maintains internal unity, establishes effective interactions with relevant NGOs, 
adopts discourse that command resonance and trust of its legitimacy, capacity and intention, then 
the supply satisfies the demand, and the party is likely to increase its support base, possibly even 
achieving mass mobilization at the polls. Examples include the overwhelming vote share gained 
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by the FIS in the elections of 1990-1991 in Algeria, and by Ennahda in Tunisia’s 2011 election.  
The second scenario is mobilization in abeyance, referring to the circumstance in which the 
party’s organizational strength remains vibrant but favorable opportunities are lacking. The party 
in this case may largely work in abeyance, meaning that the members would find “a niche for 
themselves and … thus maintain activist networks, repertoires, goals and tactics as well as a 
collective identity” (De Witte & Klandermans, 2000, p. 701) while waiting for the right time and 
opportunity. A case in point of a party in abeyance was the Tunisian Ennahda throughout the 
two decades after it was banned in 1991.  
The third possible scenario is unsuccessful mobilization. If a party lacks sufficient 
organizational strength or resonant frames or both, whether there are opportunities in place or 
not, the party is likely to fail to expand its vote base. If there are no political opportunities, or the 
costs involved in producing a political alternative are too high, mobilization likewise is not 
feasible. 
 
Plan of Case Study Analysis 
The following chapters proceed chronologically, privileging a historical rather than thematic 
treatment of the evolution of Ennahda and the HMS since their inception and addressing their 
development over the past two and a half decades. Chapter 3 narrates the background of Islamist 
movements in the two countries and the politicization of Ennahda and the HMS’ predecessor 
organizations, which highlights the similarities and differences of the two MB-inspired Islamist 
parties’ structures and agenda formulation. Chapters 4-7 then examine the two parties’ 
mobilization in elections, and the outcomes of their strategies. Due to the length of the thesis, the 
mobilized are addressed in demands and electoral response, and the organizational strength and 















Chapter 3   
Historical Background 
 
This chapter analyzes the political context, creation, structures and ideas of the predecessors 
of Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS, namely Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI)/ Ḥarakatu l-
Ittijāhu l-Islāmī (MTI) and Al-Jama’a al-Muwahadin (JM). It considers both groups as part of 
the broader Islamist movements in both countries. The chapter examines (1) the historical 
backdrop of both groups’ creation; (2) the way political opportunities affected their development; 
and (3) the two groups’ similarities and differences. To better utilize the concepts elaborated in 
the political process model which analyzes political opportunities in a general manner, this study 
contends that political opportunities should be broken down into more specific categories and 
explored in context. Rather than dividing political openness into inclusion and exclusion, this 
research considers that political openness in North Africa is more complex, and can be further 
parsed into controlled inclusion or informal tolerance, which lie along a spectrum between 
complete inclusion and exclusion. From the 1960s to 1980s, we can see that the JI/MTI and JM 
was at various times offered opportunities in the form of informal tolerance.  
Looking into the cases of the formation and development of JI/MTI and JM, I argue that in 
post-independent Tunisia and Algeria, the centralized authorities found themselves trapped in 
the ambivalence between the need for Islamic political expression to strengthen their legitimacy 
and fear of the threat posed by the rising popularity of the Islamist movement. In both cases, the 
regime’s responses opened up political opportunities for Islamic political activism, as part of a 
maneuver to capitalize on the Islamists for the regime’s own purposes. Once the regime 
considered that the utility of Islamist parties dropped below the level of threat it posed, the 
opportunity offered by the regime closed, and the parties found themselves on the defensive, 
having to reduce their activities, and becoming plagued by internal party rifts. The second 
argument is that the more complex Islamist spectrum in Algeria and the JM’s shift from outright 
opposition to pragmatic accommodation made it less likely to lead Algeria’s institutionalized 
Islamist forces in the same way as the MTI did in Tunisia late 1980s. 
 
Origins and Party Creation of Tunisia’s MTI  
This section covers the history of Tunisia’s Islamist groups from independence in 1956 until 
the Bread Riot of 1984 when the concentrated outbreak of citizens’ discontent paved the way for 
Islamist groups to enter electoral politics. The focus throughout is on early creation and 
politicization of Ennahda’s predecessor, the JI/MTI, how it differed from other Islamist groups 
at the time, and its interactions with the regime. Works on Islamist movements’ early 
developments (Tessler, 1980; Allani, 2009; Perkins, 2014, pp. 135-187) mainly explore how the 
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relationship between the regime and Islamist groups developed. This section intends to take one 
step further and argues that neither the regime nor Islamist groups acted as homogenous entities. 
Rather, there were debates and divisions among government officials as well as among Islamists. 
Thus, an interesting part of the interactions between the regime and Islamist groups is that the 
divergence among political elites may have increased political opportunities for Islamist groups, 
as was demonstrated in Bourguiba’s acquiescence of the Islamist groups’ growth in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. On the other hand, policy change toward Islamist groups may intensify 
divisions between their different sections. This was the case when Bourguiba adopted hardline 
policies toward the JI/MTI and narrowed its political opportunities in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The divisions between Tunisiyya and non-Tunisiyya sections, and between hardliners and soft-
liners, deepened, and finally caused the departure of many Islamists from the JI/MTI.  
 
Bourguiba’s Religious Reforms and the Formation of JI 
The religious policies of Habib Bourguiba, the first President of the Tunisian Republic, were 
a critical backdrop to the changes taking place in the religious sphere, and the Islamist 
movement emerged as a response to Bourguiba’s manipulation of the Islamic market.  
As in many other Muslim countries, Tunisian institutionalized Islamism epitomized by 
Ennahda was closely related to broader social movements that gained strength in response to the 
regime’s religious policies. Indeed, it was the intermingling of secularist, Islamist and nationalist 
motivations that contributed to the emergence of Tunisia’s modern social movements. Though 
the nationalist movement led by Neo-Destour in Tunisia was a far more pragmatic national 
liberationalist movement compared to its predecessor, the Destour, which was primarily inspired 
by its religious roots as part of the Jeunes Tunisiens movement, it was prepared to exploit 
Islamic symbolism to gain political support (Abun-Nasr, 1987, p. 420). For example, Neo-
Destour described the independence struggle as a jihad fi sabil Allah (holy war in the path of 
reaching God) against anti-Islam forces. And once in power, Habib Bourguiba, founder of Neo-
Destour, awarded himself religious titles such as al-za’im (the leader) and al-mujahid al-akbar 
(the supreme fighter) (Rice, 2007, p. 144).  
What complicated the development of Islamist politics was the tension between competing 
sources of authority and scholarship. When analyzing Bourguiba’s political platforms and 
policies, several works attribute his secular inclination to his stay in Sorbonne University (Page, 
2003, p. 70; Karber, p. 290; Gana, p. 59). But as Tessler (1980, pp. 8-10) note, Bourguiba’s 
thought may have been formed even earlier than his study in France. Bourguiba was, like many 
leaders of the Neo-Destour party, a graduate of Sadiqi College — a secondary school established 
by Khair al-Din al-Tunsi Pasha in 1875 to challenge the established brand of Zaytouna 
University, the first Islamic university in the Arab world (Perkins, 1989, p. 118). According to 
the Sadiqi Destourians, acquiring both traditional Arabo-Islamic and Franco-scientific education 
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was the only way forward. They claimed, “Our concern is to return to the religion its dynamic 
quality” (Tessler, 1980, p. 11), and used Islamic symbols like the slogan of jihad to gain popular 
support against colonial rule in the 1940s and 1950s.  
 As part of the wider Arab modernist renaissance movement in the 19th century, similar to the 
Tanzimat in the Ottoman Empire in 1839-1876 and the Young Ottoman movement there, Sadiqi 
Destourians were opposed to Zaytouna’s dogmatic reading of Islamic texts and rejection of 
modern practices (Goldthorpe, 1996, p. 164). In their view, many Islamic traditions, such as 
fasting, hindered the country’s modernization, and Islam had to be reformed to comply with 
modern values and norms. In post-independent Tunisia, Bourguiba followed the example of 
Kemal Ataturk’s West-oriented strategy (Esposito et al., 2015, p. 178). Though Tunisia’s first 
constitution stated that “Tunisia is a republic; its language is Arabic; its religion is Islam” 
(Constitution du 1er juin 1959, 1959), Bourguiba embarked on a secularization program (Enhaili, 
2010). 
Having graduated from Sorbonne University and been inspired by Enlightenment thinkers 
including Rousseau and Hugo (Boubly, 1988, pp. 590-591), Bourguiba encouraged citizens to 
abandon traditional religious practices such as polygamy as they contravened the values of 
gender equality (p. 593). In 1956, he promulgated the Personal Status Code (République 
Tunisienne, 1997) to improve women’s status. The Code forbade polygamy and child marriage, 
and eliminated men’s right to repudiate their wives unilaterally (Tessler et al., 1978, p. 142). 
Though there is reason to believe he also intended to conduct more reforms such as changing the 
inheritance law, he failed to do so, according to McCarthy (2014, p. 736), due to the resistance 
from many government officials including the Justice Minister, Ahmed Mestiri, who thought it 
not wise to “consider cutting the people off from their roots” (Mestiri, 2011, p. 121).  
Bourguiba’s secularization policy was also reflected in his attitudes toward Ramadan. In a 
speech delivered on February 18, 1960, he called on the people not to fast (Mabrouk, 2012, p. 
52), and famously drank a glass of orange juice on daytime TV during Ramadan on one occasion. 
He argued that Tunisia was engaged in a jihad for development and, since, when on jihad, 
fasting for Ramadan was excused, Tunisians did not have to observe the fast. Bourguiba’s 
breaking the fast became infamous and was condemned by many (Willis, 2014, p. 158). 
Mustapha, an engineer in his fifties in Tunis, remembered it, and explained: “It’s impossible for 
us to stop fasting because fasting is not only a religious practice but a part of our culture” 
(Interview, Mustapha, 2015, Tunis). This corroborated Haugbølle’s (2015) argument that under 
Bourguiba’s rule, Islam never disappeared from people’s life but was transformed from public to 
a private practice. It was this tendency of Islam to become a private domain activity that 
provided potential supporters for Islamist groups to mobilize.  
When Bourguiba first took office, he faced two groups opposed to his leadership: (1) the 
religious conservatives, including traditionalists who had gathered around Bourguiba’s political 
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rival, Ben Youssef (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 107); and (2) secularist dissenters composed of leftists led 
by Ahmed Ben Salah, and pro-France liberalists associated with Muhammad Masmoudi and Ben 
Yahmed (Ashford, 1965). For Bourguiba, neither of these opposition groups was easy to deal 
with, as each had a support base in the society. Whereas many of Ben Youssef’s traditionalist 
followers were associated with religious institutions such as Zaytouna University, leftist 
dissenters were deeply supported by trade unions represented by the Union Générale Tunisienne 
du Travail (UGTT). In this context, Mehdi Mabrouk, a Tunisian sociologist who became Culture 
Minister after the fall of Ben Ali in 2011, considered Bourguiba’s religious reforms as designed 
on the one hand to undermine the religious conservatives, and on the other to appease the 
secularist opponents. According to Mabrouk (2012, p. 50), Bourguiba’s purpose was to 
dismantle the traditional Islamic institutes, which he considered threatening to his regime. In 
1957, Bourguiba terminated the habous (a religious endowment) to cut off mosques and other 
religious institutions from their financial sources. A year later, the regime eliminated religious 
schools and integrated the religious education system of Zaytouna University, the country’s 
center of religious learning and intellectuals, into the theological faculty in the University of 
Tunis (Enhaili & Adda, 2003, p. 67; Mabrouk, 2012, p. 50). Consequently, Zaytouna’s ulama 
were deprived of their educational roles and thereby, isolated from the society and the youth, 
over whom they had exercised considerable influence.  
The establishment of government control over theologians and religious personnel and 
deprivation of their religious endowment infringed on the interests of theologians and religious 
personnel. This was in effect a political opportunity to offer something different, to counter the 
official discourse of secularism and to appeal to a segment of the population that was feeling 
ignored and hurt by the rejection of divine law. In response to these infringements on religious 
practice and public belief systems, various groups advocating more traditional religious practice 
came into being in the 1970s and 1980s.  
When analyzing the Islamist movement, Cavatorta (2007, pp. 66-68) and Wittes (2008) 
suggest dividing Islamist groups into different categories to analyze their political behaviors. 
They both note that Islamist groups generally fall into: (1) conservative groups with violent 
Salafi orientations (e.g. Al-Qaeda); (2) groups that emphasize local uniqueness and Islamic 
renaissance in the local context by combining political participation and national liberation (e.g. 
Hamas in Palestine); (3) groups interested in political actitivies (e.g. MB). Their approach is 
useful but problematic in two ways. First, not all conservative groups with a Salafi orientation 
use violence, and the model fails to consider Salafist groups that are apolitical such as the 
quietest Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya (scriptural Salafism) (Guazzone, 2013, p. 44). Second, although to 
divide Islamist groups into different types facilitates research on their activities, strategies, and 
organizational structures, we should keep in mind that some Islamist groups involve members 
from different trends and thus demonstrate features of more than one type of Islamist group. One 
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example is Algeria’s FIS. It involves the adopters of the MB model, violent Salafists, and the 
Jazairiyya (Algerianist) section which emphasized Algerian context (Joffé, 2012, p. 125).  
In 1970s and 1980s, three different kinds of Islamist groups stood out in Tunisia. 
Tabligh wa Da’wa (TD, Transmission and Preaching) represented the purist group. It 
originated from Pakistan and was composed of preachers who traveled around the world to 
advocate religious practice and piety (Jackson, 2006, p. 233). Apolitical in essence, it stressed 
individual practice of Islam. Meanwhile, it adopted the approach of “social Islamization from 
below” (Burgat, 2003, p. 54; Kepel. 1994, p. 33), meaning that it focused on the peaceful 
Islamization of the population, and was devoted to promoting the practice of Islam through 
peaceful means (Allani, 2009, p. 258). It first appeared as a Pakistani circle (Burgat & Dowell, 
1993, p. 17) composed of Pakistanis in Tunisia who dressed like Eastern Muslims (Hamdi, 1998, 
p. 20). This meant that its members looked very different from the majority of Tunisians who 
wore Western and traditional clothes. Consequently, it’s influence in Tunisia was limited and it 
only had a few dozen members (American Foreign Policy Council, 2014, p. 345)  
The most important violent Salafist group in post-independent Tunisia was the Parti de la 
Libération Islamique (PLI). This was a branch of the Liberation Party of Jordan founded by 
Takieddine Nebhani, a Palestinian living in Beirut. Drawing on teachings from Sa’id Qutb, the 
group adopted the approach of “revolutionary Islamization from above”, meaning that it 
prioritized the overthrow of the state by violent actions (Legrain, 1994, p. 413). It advocated 
social re-engineering to replace the non-Islamic state with a religious “caliphate” by attacking 
the regime (Allani, 2009; Keddie, 1986, p. 28). PLI believed that infiltrating the state’s military 
and security apparatus would be an effective method to promote Islamization. Hence, its 
recruitment focused on low-level military officers (Rubin, 2010, p. 400). The group’s influence 
in Tunisia was as minimal as TD and only involved dozens of members (Allani, 2009, p. 258).  
Then there was the Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI, The Islamic Group), which first appeared in 
the 1960s as a small religious discussion circle in the Zaytouna Mosque focusing on reading and 
learning religious texts under Rachid Ghannouchi’s leadership. Born in 1941 in a town of Gabès, 
Ghannouchi first attended traditional religious education institutions subordinate to the Zaytouna 
system (Dunn, 1994, p. 152). He completed an undergraduate education degree at the University 
of Damascus in Syria, where he started to come into contact with the ideologies of the Egyptian 
MB (Dunn, 1994, p. 152; Crethiplethi, 2015). At its inception, JI’s core participants included 
young men with Arabic-Islamic educational backgrounds and religious training, such as 
Ghannouchi’s colleagues Abd al-Fatah Mouru and Ahmad Enneifer, who later became the 
group’s central leaders (Shahin, 1998, p. 67). Compared to TD and PLI, JI was distinct in three 
aspects.  
First, though it was inspired by foreign Islamist organizations groups such as MB, JI 
represented a more indigenous Islamist current that evolved within Tunisia’s Zaytouna 
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University. Its beginnings can be traced to the mid-1960s when Zaytouna ulama, such as Sheikh 
Ahmed Ben Melad, formed clandestine discussion groups composed of traditional religious 
scholars and their students. The purpose was to discuss religious studies without being 
supervised by government officials. Among the early members were Ghannouchi and his group. 
The discussion groups defended “pure Islam”, and expressed discontent with Bourguiba’s 
Westernization and deviation from Islamic traditions and practices (Willis, 2012, p. 160). 
Combining the ideas of the Zaytouna ulama and Islamic reformers such as Rashid Rida, they 
advocated Islamic renaissance by following essential religious and cultural elements of the 
sacred texts, while at the same time making creative reforms to accommodate modern realities 
(Tonta, 2012, p. 178). In 1984, Ghannouchi published an article entitled Al-Taghreeb wa 
Hatmiyyat al-Dictatoriyya [Westernization: An Imperative to Dictatorship], in which he 
commented that the government’s program was “neither Western, nor, indeed, Islamic, because 
its initiators [were] not deeply rooted in Islam; nor [were] they Western”, and stated instead, “It 
is mimicry” (Ghannouchi, 1984, p. 168).  
Second, although TD, PLI, and JI all emerged as groups with religious references, JI 
represented incipient political aspirations, with plans to develop a public membership, presence 
and platform. Attempting to become a broader political entity, it developed plans to mobilize the 
public by assessing its responsiveness to various statements and approaches, and showed interest 
in supporting a form of religious activism.  
Third, the three groups’ recruitment strategies differed markedly. TD and PLI adopted what 
Zald and Garner (1966, p. 331) call the “exclusive method”, as they only recruited adherents 
who had similar ideologies. TD, for instance, focuses on Deobandi disciples, and PLI selects 
low-level military officers (Munson, 1986, p. 212). As they isolated their members from the 
broader society, neither group was able to gather a large membership. In contrast, JI adopted 
what Zald and Garner (1966, p. 331) called the “inclusive method”, as it required minimum 
levels of initial commitment and involved as many members and supporters as possible. JI 
gradually imitated the MB’s organizational structure and adopted a more inclusive recruitment 
strategy which later developed into a multi-tier recruitment program, aiming to include members 
from various social groups, including students, the poor, intelligentsia, and the middle class. 
This structure, discussed in Chapter 4, enabled it to become the largest Islamist group in Tunisia.  
 
JI’s Politicization and Formation of MTI 
   An evolution of the JI in the mid-1970s was its political turn. This culminated in the creation 
of an Islamist political party, the MTI, in 1981, marking the start of institutionalized Islamist 
campaigning in Tunisia. 
   JI’s politicization was attributed to both domestic and international factors. Two international 
events occurred over the course of seven years during the 1970s, which had significant impact 
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on its flowering: (1) In the early 1970s, shortly after Egypt’s new President, Anwar Sadat, 
released large numbers of MB activists imprisoned under Nasser, a new wave of ideological 
propagation started in North Africa. In his analysis of contemporary social movements, Tarrow 
(1996, p. 61) suggests that social movements exert transnational influence by spreading beyond 
national boundaries and transcending state institutions. Sa’id Qutb’s violent ideas, and the more 
peaceful ideas of MB spiritual guides, Omar al-Talmasani and Mustafa Mashhour, soon spread 
to Tunisia. A proliferation of MB literature, including the magazine Al-Dawa (The Preaching) 
were available at the first ever international book exhibition held in Tunis. In a 1985 interview, 
Enneifer stated that this motivated JI members “to be engaged more directly in political action” 
(Burgat, 1988, pp. 206-207). (2) The 1979 Iranian Revolution established an Islamic Republic, 
which further intensified Tunisian Islamists’ enthusiasm. Ghannouchi commented when 
preaching to his followers at the time, “The example of Iran shows us the awakening has come” 
(Washington Post, 1987). 
   In Tunisia, two important domestic factors influenced JI’s political turn: (1) The rise of the 
leftist movement in the 1970s, which affected the groups’ mobilizational strategies, as another 
round of confrontation between ruling elites and the leftist protesters opened political 
opportunity for the Islamist movement to grow; (2) The leak of the group’s details by Salah 
Karkar and Ben ‘Issa Dimni in late 1980 under regime torture led to Ghannouchi’s creation of a 
political party in sharp response.  
When analyzing JI’s political turn, scholars including Hamdi (1988, pp. 25-27) and Cesari 
(2014, p. 128) stress the importance of the group’s presence in universities and trade unions, but 
does not elaborate why the group suddenly reached out to these institutes in the 1970s. I argue 
that JI’s expansion on campuses and in labor unions resulted from the shift of its mobilizational 
strategies inspired by the leftist movement, and benefited from the favorable opportunities 
caused by the confrontation between the leftists and the regime. Before analyzing the leftist 
movement’s influence on the Islamist movement, the research briefly introduces the leftist 
movement’s main tendencies and development in Tunisia.  
First introduced to Tunisia by the French Communist Party in the 1930s, the leftist activism 
soon split into two streams: one, represented by Parti Communiste Tunisien (PCT), emphasized 
the benefits of living under French rule; the other stream, holding a less pro-France discourse, 
joined the nationalist movement led by Neo-Destour (Alport, 1967; Perkins, 2014, pp. 110-134) 
and later established the largest trade union in the country, UGTT. In post-independenceTunisia, 
after PCT was accused of involvement in a plot to assassinate the President, Bourguiba banned 
PCT and increased his collaboration with UGTT led by Ahmad Ben Salah (Nelson, 1979, p. 56).  
In the early 1960s, inspired by the economic progress in neighboring Algeria through state-
centered models, Bourguiba accepted Ben Salah’s proposal for adopting a socialist approach to 
promote economic development. The President not only implemented central planning, 
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industrialization and collectivization of agriculture (Alport, 1967, pp. 690-691; Ghose et al., 
1991, p. 3), but renamed the regime party Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD) to show his 
commitment to a new political platform.  
However, by the late 1960s, the socialist experiment turned out to be a failure due to 
opposition from members of the dispossessed private sector. In 1969, after presiding over a 
faltering economy and rising inflation, Bourguiba terminated the socialist project, and used Ben 
Salah, then Prime Minister and ex-Secretary General of UGTT, as a shield against mounting 
civil discontent, by dismissing him from the premiership. But by doing so, Bourguiba provoked 
profound dissatisfaction among the leftists, who were well represented in the UGTT, and among 
the working classes. Morover, as workers’ benefits were reduced by Ben Salah’s successor, Hedi 
Nouira, labor unrest grew (Perkins, 2014, p. 167). Hence, the leftist movement led by UGTT 
rose up in the 1970s, culminating in the massive strike known as “Black Thursday” which 
involved thousands of participants in Tunis in January 1978. Interpreting the strike as a menace 
to its authority, the regime sent army units to repress the strike (Nelson, 1987, p. 196).  
As most analyses on JI’s early development (Hamdi, 1998, p. 26; Allani, 2005, p. 259; 
Mossallanejad, 2012, p. 151; Esposito, 1999, p. 166) indicate, the leftist movement’s strike 
created important opportunities for the Islamist group’s expansion and politicization in the 
following years, because confrontation between Bourguiba and the leftists continued to escalate. 
Since the leftists were seen as its most threatening rival, Bourguiba concentrated on them, 
combating the remaining leftists’ influence in student unions, trade unions and other institutions. 
Hence, not only was the Islamist movement considered by the President as a secondary threat to 
the leftist movement, but it was viewed as “an enemy’s enemy” that could be utilized to the 
benefit of Bourguiba. Consequently, the divide between Bourguiba and the leftist movement 
opened political space for JI.  
Goodwin and Jasper (2004, p. 6) notice a key problem faced by Political Process Theorists: 
“The more broadly one defines political opportunities, the more trivial the political opportunity 
thesis becomes”. One way to solve this conundrum may be to define and break down political 
opportunities according to specific contexts in different regions. There is a tendency among 
political opportunity analysts to assume that the political system should be either in a position of 
openness or closure (Tarrow, 1998, pp. 19-20; Layton, 2000, p. 11; McAdam, 1996, p. 10). 
However, in North Africa, absolute openness or closure for Islamist parties is rare. In most cases, 
electoral authoritarian regimes adopt an ambiguous attitude towards Islamism and their policies 
towards Islamist parties vary between the two poles of openness and closure. Hence, political 
openness has to be broken down into subcategories when analyzing North African cases. 
Following Albrecht and Wegner’s (2006, pp. 124-126) claim that Islamist parties can be 
tolerated on an informal basis or formally included into political institutions under state control, 
this study contends that in addition to inclusion and exclusion, political openness can be further 
39 
 
divided into controlled inclusion and informal tolerance. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Bourguiba 
adopted informal tolerance policies towards the JI. Whilst he did not give it legal recognition, he 
turned a blind eye to the group’s efforts to publish its statements in journals and spread its ideas 
in mosques (Waltz, 1986, p. 656), and encouraged it to encroach on the leftists’ influential 
sphere on campus and challenge leftists’ student unions (Toumi, 1989, pp. 116-117). This meant 
that though real political openness was lacking, the JI had more space to operate and expand. 
According to Boubly’s (1988, pp. 600, 603) research, the JI had penetrated into 300 mosques 
and dozens of universities by 1981. Meanwhile, the JI became more outspoken than before. 
Comments on political events in its magazine, Ma’rifa (Knowledge), increased by over 10% of 
the ensemble of articles in the 1970s (Hermassi 1985: 101-7). In his content analysis of 
Ghanouchi’s output, Hermassi (1984, p. 48) found that Ghannouchi increased criticism of 
government agendas on such topics as students and labor forces’ rights, which constituted over 
60% of his works in 1981,  
Tunisia’s leftist movement also had an influence on the Islamist group’s strategies, a 
development largely ignored in the literature, but which had an important impact on the JI’s 
political consciousness and organizational dynamics. From its inception, the JI viewed Western 
liberal philosophies and leftist ideologies as similarly negative, and considered them both as 
major targets. While identifying Western liberalism as the ideological base and driving force of 
colonialism, Ghannouchi opposed Marxist theories such as the one that claimed, “Religion is the 
opium of the people” (Marx, 1844), concluding that the theory was drawn from European 
societies and was not applicable to North African contexts (Ghannouchi, 1992, pp. 33, 35). 
Meanwhile, he rejected Marxism’s notion that human beings’ every action could be attributed to 
economic factors. The JI’s early publication claimed, “The social confrontation between the rich 
and poor is a Marxist formula that does not correspond to our understanding of life” (Esposito, 
1999, p.164). However, after being increasingly exposed to the leftist ideologies, Ghannouchi 
and other group leaders’ views gradually changed and became more tolerant of Marxism’s 
notions.  
The populace’s enthusiasm in the protests of January 26, 1978 directed JI’s attention from 
ideological conflicts to people’s socio-economic needs. Ghannouchi recalled in an interview 
with Tamimi (2001, p. 51): “The workers’ revolt…had awakened us ….to the social and 
economic ramifications of the problems the workers had been complaining of”. Other group 
leaders showed similar change. Ali Larayedh, a JI leader who became Tunisian Prime Minister 
in 2013, asked in an early interview with Esposito (1999, p.164), “How could we be that much 
out of touch with what was actually going on within our own society so that we did not play any 
role?”. The JI leaders also discovered the effectiveness of the left’s class-conflict language in 
describing and criticizing soaring prices, the income gap, unemployment, and other socio-
economic issues affecting the working class. Hence, a shift of focus reduced Ghannouchi’s 
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antipathy toward leftist ideologies and hastened the JI’s reformulation of its social justice 
slogans. Ghannouchi stated, “The value of justice is the greatest value in Islam... How could we 
then have embroiled ourselves in opposing those, even if they were Marxists, who struggled for 
securing the interests of the poor and the oppressed?” (Tamimi, 2001, p. 53). The JI’s increasing 
acceptance of leftist views and activities was particularly reflected in its support for the first time 
of the celebration of International Labor Day on May 1, 1980 (Hamdi, 1998, p. 32).  
The JI’s shift from focusing on religio-cultural values to responding to citizens’ political 
concerns by commenting on political issues and government programs (Dunn, 1994, p. 153), as 
well as its inclusion of the leftists’ class-conflict language, helped strengthen its mobilization 
capacity, particularly in universities. Now, its slogans resonated with many university students’ 
psychological demands. In her research on early JI’s early supporters, Waltz (1986, pp. 665-669) 
stresses the self-identity problem faced by many students on campus, but her work assumes the 
Islamist ideologies to be something brand new and completely different from the ideas that the 
students had been exposed to before and hence, fails to explain why and how they could easily 
accept ideologies which were strange to them. Drawing on Haugbølle’s (2015, pp. 322-323) 
work, I explain university students’ identity problems in a different way. In Haugbølle’s research 
on Islam in Tunisian society, he discovered that in the 1960s, although many students did not 
have many opportunities to learn Arabic or enroll in the Islamic curriculum in schools, nor many 
chances to access public Islamic practice, since the population was discouraged from wearing 
veils or fasting, they were exposed to Islam at home as their parents still fasted and some parents 
even asked sheikhs to teach them Islamic courses (Ibid). Hence, it was not surprising that when 
these students went to universities in the 1970s, they found themselves trapped in self-identity 
confusion, because neither the state program nor the leftist ideologies reflected the religious 
knowledge and practice they learnt at home. The Islamist message sent by the JI, however, 
confirmed to the students that what they learnt at home was not wrong. By combining religious 
discourses and the leftists’ class-conflict language to address problems concerning students’ 
rights, the JI related the students’ self-identity concerns with their socio-economic needs. In 
1979, readership of the group’s magazine, al-Ma’rifa, rose to 25, 000 compared to 6, 000 in 
1971 (Boubly, 1988, p. 60). According to Waltz (1986, p. 654), over 20% of the JI’s supporters 
in early 1980s were young Islamist activists in universities, though she misses the link that it 
was thanks to JI’s expansion on campuses in the 1970s.  
  The leftist movement’s impact on the JI’s organizational and mobilizational tactics was also 
apparent. The Islamists drew on the experience of Marxist syndicate mobilization (Alexander, 
2000, pp. 470-473), which enabled it to expand into universities, high schools, and trade unions 
in the 1970s. It first set up small discussion groups composed of students and faculties. 
According to Mohamed Ben Salem, a senior leader of JI at the time, Islamist student groups on 




They [Islamist students] used to get together to pray, discuss and have conversations…We had 
an open base and it was open to everyone…The members were gathered together as they 
shared the same ideologies…  
                                                                                              (Interview, Ben Salem, 2015, Tunis) 
 
In addition to its mobilizational efforts on campus, the JI also recruited UGTT members 
(Christopher, 2000, p. 473; Interview, Ksiksi, 2015, Tunis). Yet, its emergence and expansion in 
trade unions was superficial compared to its success on campuses. The main reason was the JI’s 
lack of a place at the bargaining table to address workers’ treatment and welfare, an advantage 
the left at the time enjoyed.  
Thus, the President’s policies of informal tolerance first gave the JI the opportunity to take a 
political turn by confronting and then learning from the left. As Albrecht and Wegner (2006, p. 
128) argue, an important reason why government officials preferred informal tolerance to formal 
inclusion was because it made it easier and less costly for the regime to reverse its attitude. 
Indeed, it was not long before President Bourguiba reversed his attitudes and policies toward JI. 
This was, first, because the group learnt from the leftist movement’s organizational tactics and 
swiftly expanded its outreach; and second, because it refused to be played by the regime and 
instead used the opportunities created by the informal tolerance policy to criticize and 
delegitimize the regime.  
  In addition to the leftist movement’s influence, another element that had implications for JI’s 
political turn was Bourguiba’s ambivalent position towards the Islamist movement. Whereas at 
first the President attempted to find a legitimating foothold in Islamism and used the Islamists to 
counterbalance the leftists, this changed as Bourguiba’s fear of the Islamists rose, especially 
when he became aware of the JI’s criticism of the government’s policies. Additionally, there 
appeared to be an inverse relation between political learning and government utility in the JI’s 
structuring of political opportunity. As the group’s ability to tie Islamist discourse to leftist 
slogans of workers’ rights strengthened its ability to connect with the public, this reduced its 
utility to the government and hence reduced the opportunity that had led initially to the group’s 
growth. As tension increased over religious control, and as the opportunities available through 
informal tolerance narrowed towards closure, a second political turn occurred in the 
confrontation with Bourguiba, which led to the launch of a formal party.  
Realizing that the JI challenged what McCarthy (2014, p. 741) describes as Bourguiba’s 
“monopoly of religious symbolism to maintain his position at the pinnacle of the political 
system”, the President tightened his control over the group in the late 1970s, when the leftist 
movement waned subsequent to the Black Thursday confrontation — the first large uprising of 
the Tunisian leftist movement against Bourguiba’s regime. Bourguiba’s first step was to ban the 
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group’s magazine, al-Ma’rifa, in 1979 (Dunn, 1994, p. 151). On December 5, 1980, the police 
arrested Salah Karkar and Ben ‘Issa Dimni, two JI’s Executive Bureau members. Under torture, 
they were forced to disclose detailed information about the group’s foundation, structure and 
membership (Hamdi, 1998, p. 37). As the group’s structure and networks were exposed to 
Bourguiba, Ghannouchi felt it necessary to apply for legal recognition and operate as a formal 
party which might prevent the regime from repressing its nationwide branches and bases (Ibid). 
The final decision to form a party was made at a meeting in Enneifer’s home on May 29, 1981, 
where the Executive Bureau with five members was elected: Zahir Mahjoub, Habib Mokni, 
Demni, Ghannouchi and Mouru, with the latter two as the amir (leader) and secretary-general 
respectively. On June 6, the JI held a press conference in Tunis in which it declared the 
establishment of a new political party, Ḥarakatu l-Ittijāhu l-Islāmī (Islamic Tendency Movement, 
MTI) (Dunn, 1994, pp. 153-154). During the conference, Ghannouchi announced as party leader 
that the MTI wished to acquire official registration (Hamdi, 1998, p. 39). It turned out that 
Ghannouchi’s reaction to the disclosure of internal information by creating a political party 
further infuriated the regime. Noting that JI/MTI aimed to take part in the competition for 
political power which could threaten the legitimacy of Bourguiba’s regime, the President further 
shifted from informal tolerance to censure of the Islamist group.  
 
Tension with the Regime and MTI’s Splintering  
  The period of 1981-1984 was marked by confrontation between the regime and the newly 
formed MTI. Bourguiba’s hostility was manifest in his arrest of MTI members, and his 
disapproval about legalizing the party. The closure of political opportunities affected MTI’s 
strategies and organizational structures, as it triggered fierce debates among MTI leaders on the 
party’s developmental orientation, methods, and positions towards the regime.  
The formation of MTI coincided with a significant shift in the way the government contended 
with opposition, and its decision to adopt a seemingly pluralist party system to better control the 
political field. In the early 1980s, to appease secularist opponents who called him a “fascist” 
because of his autocracy (Perkins, 2004, p. 171), Bourguiba decided to consolidate the regime’s 
authority and “Bourguibize” the opposition. The plan was to create the illusion of a pluralist 
system by including secularist opposition parties in formal electoral politics (Ware, 1985, p. 36). 
At the 1981 PSD congress, Bourguiba announced that non-Destourien party members were 
allowed to engage in the November legislative elections as independents. The Prime Minister, 
Mohammed Mzali, promised that should any organization receive over 5% of the votes, it would 
be granted official recognition (Perkins, 2014, pp. 170-171). Bourguiba was confident that the 
regime party, the PSD, could easily eclipse most opposition parties in Tunisia which were small 
and fragmented. His real concern was to contain the increasingly popular MTI (p. 171).  
  Bourguiba not only prevented MTI members from running for elections, but launched large-
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scale suppression of Islamists several months before the 1981 election, on the grounds that they 
showed sympathy to a bombardment by dissenters to military facilities in Gafsa (Allani, 2009, 
pp. 261-262). On July 18, 1981, forty days after the foundation of MTI (Ware, 1985, p. 36), the 
regime embarked on a cleanup operation, arresting more than 100 MTI members, including 
Ghannouchi and Mouru. Accused of anti-government propaganda and illegal organizational 
activities, among other issues, they were sentenced in September to prison terms ranging from 
six months to ten years (Ibid).  
The MTI experienced more pressure from the regime following the 1981 election. In 1982 
and 1983, several secular parties were legalized, including PCT, MDS, and MUP, though none 
of these parties’ voting share reached 5% in the 1981 election (Nelson, 1979, p. 218). Yet, the 
MTI’s application to be recognized as a political party was declined. Further, the regime found 
ongoing pretexts to repress Islamists, arresting 500 in 1981-1984 (Ghannouchi, 2016, p. 61).  
The arrest of hundreds of MTI members, and the imprisonment of Ghannouchi and other 
leaders, caused significant disagreements within the group. The first dispute concerned whether 
the MTI should replicate the MB model. As the precursor of the Islamist movement in North 
Africa, the MB had experienced many disputes and changes concerning its strategies and ideas 
since its creation in 1928 (Aly & Wenner, 1982, pp. 350-354). Tracking the MB’s ideological 
history since the leadership of Hassan Banna, I find that when first created, the group was 
characterized by five traits. First, it stressed the goal of attaining a “renaissance of Islam” (Al-
Da’wa, 1976, pp. 2-3). This was reflected in the idea of reviving religious practice, and 
implementing political socio-economic policies based upon sharia regulations (El-Sherif, 2014, 
p. 14), which were viewed as solutions to existing problems faced by Egypt such as poverty and 
unemployment. Second, to achieve the goal, the MB advocated a three-stage process: 
propaganda and educational mobilization, recruiting, and political action (Al-Husayni, 1956, p. 
39). This meant spreading religious ideas, mobilizing people to support the Islamist movement, 
and taking part in electoral politics. Third, the MB strove for legitimate and formal participation 
in pluralist electoral politics, something it had advocated since the 1970s, but which it had been 
consistently denied, with its group failing to achieve recognition, and hence the chance to run 
candidates, except as independents, for election. (Aly & Wenner, 1982, p. 352). Fourth, 
advocating pan-Islamic ideologies, the MB proposed transnational Islamism that “went beyond 
the artificially imposed borders of the colonial construct that was the modern national state” 
(Milton-Edwards, 2016, p. 163) — in other words, developing a broader Islamic “ummah”. Fifth, 
the MB presented itself as defender of native culture and as a fighter of colonialism, Westernism, 
and imperialism (Pargeter, 2013, p. 11).  
Mourou advocated that the MTI adopted the framework and drew on the MB model 
(Cavatorta & Merone, 2015, p. 42) to construct its platform of five general aims in 1981: (1) 
revival of Islam as an identity of Tunisia and the renaissance of Islamic values and cultures; (2) 
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purification of Islamic thought which had deflected from the original Islamic scriptures; (3) 
improvement of the masses’ living conditions by developing the economy and by establishing a 
fairer distribution system; (4) defense of the country against interference from Western countries 
and their proxies (referring to Bourguiba’s Tunisian regime); and (5) support of revivalist 
activities in other Arab countries to restore Islamic values at the international level (Keddie, 1986, 
p. 38).   
As Bourguiba’s regime had no intention of allowing MTI’s formal political engagement, a 
group of JI members calling themselves the Tunisiyya (Tunisianist) section, and led by Hamida 
Enneifer and Slaheddine Jourchi questioned the viability of the MB model, seeing it as an 
imported structure not relevant to the Tunisian context (Enhaili, 2010, p. 400). They argued that 
the model only focused on ideological debates between Islamism and nationalism, but remained 
“indifferent to other factors influencing social development” (Jourchi, 1999, p. 124). Hence, the 
Tunisiyya section abandoned the idea of transnational Islamism, and advocated al-khususiyya al-
tunisiyya (Tunisian specificity), meaning the development of Tunisian Islamism in the context of 
national conditions (Allani, 2009, pp. 262, 269). The Tunisiyya rejected the MB’s anti-
Westernism, and approved of many Western, modern, and liberal views such as freedom of 
speech, which it understood in a Muslim and Tunisian context, and thus produced a philosophy 
that was in-between the Ikhwaniyya and Bourguiba’s ideologies.  
Enneifer and Jourchi also considered it more urgent at that moment to act on the educational 
stage than on the mobilizational and political stages in Tunisia (Shahin, 1998, p. 79). It therefore 
focused on propagating religious and cultural issues by publishing clandestinely a new magazine 
called 15/21 3 . The Tunisiyya-Ikhwaniyya debates sparked a departure by the 10% of the 
membership advocating the Tunisiyya perspectives. They formed a new party, Mouvement de la 
tendance progressive islamique (MTIPI). According to Jourchi, this division constituted a loss to 
MTI, as 50 or 60 of the 500 members joined the MTIPI (Interview, Jourchi, 2015, Tunis).  
After the Tunisiyya section’s departure, the MTI was plagued by a second debate concerning 
participation methods. Much like what happened to the MB in the 1950s when one section took 
up violence, causing a rift while the mainstream developed a more pragmatic Islamization from 
below, a similar scenario began to affect MTI in Tunisia. Whereas the soft-liners led by 
Ghannouchi and Mourou persuaded MTI activists to negotiate with the regime in legal and 
peaceful ways (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013, p. 867), hardliners headed by Salah Karkar and 
Sadok Chourou urged armed violence as a response to the government’s growing repression of 
the party (Allani, 2009, p. 262). This very much mirrored the situation of the MB in Egypt as the 
soft-line group had a great deal of difficulty there in terms of avoiding the negative image that 
                                                   
3 15 refers to the 15th century according to the Muslim calendar while 21 refers to the 21st century 
according to the Christian calendar.  
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the violent group brought upon the MB. As discussed in Chapter 4, the softline-hardline 
divisions escalated in the 1980s and affected the MTI’s consistency.  
In sum, the JI was formed as part of the broader Islamist movement in Tunisia in the 1960s, a 
response both to Bourguiba’s monopoly of the religious narrative and weakening of traditional 
religious institutions. The following decade witnessed the JI’s political turn as it was galvanized 
first from abroad by the Iranian Revolution and re-activation of the Egyptian Islamist movement, 
and second domestically, as it benefited from the relaxing of government control in the context 
of conflicts between Bourguiba and the leftists. Exploiting this political opportunity or informal 
tolerance, the JI expanded its base from the mosques to the campuses, became more outspoken 
about the government’s policies, and learned new mobilizational strategies from the leftist 
movement. In 1981, the group, seeing the political opportunity it had previously benefited from 
beginning to shrink as Bourguiba changed tactics and began to repress Islamists, created a 
political party, the MTI. From its inception, the MTI adopted the MB model and shared 
fundamental ideologies with the MB. Yet, the replication of the MB model was questioned by 
some JI members who formed a separate group, the Tunisiyya, in the early 1980s when the 
regime narrowed the opportunities for the MTI by excluding it from the superficially pluralist 
political scene and imprisoning its members. Thw Tunisiyya section advocated developing 
Tunisian Islamism in Tunisian context and fusing Western values with an Islamic agenda, and 
focused its activities more on promoting education than on developing the political stage. 
Simultaneous to the contentions arising around the validity of the MB model, the worsening 
political environment triggered debates between soft-liners and hardliners. How the MB 
influenced the MTI’s organizational and mobilizational structures, how the MTI’s debates 
deepened, and how these elements affected its first electoral trial in new political opportunities 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. Interestingly, debates over the adoption of the MB model not 
only triggered divisions in Tunisia’s Islamist camp, but provoked disputes between Algeria’s 
Islamist groups, as discussed below.  
 
Beginnings and Politicization of the HMS 
This section follows Algerian Islamist movement’s historical trajectory from independence in 
1962 to Black October in 1988. The circumstances in which both Tunisia’s and Algeria’s 
Islamist groups began have many similarities. In both cases, the Islamist movement emerged as 
a response to the regime’s attempt to control religious spheres and grew in the context of 
confrontations between the regime and the leftist movement. The differences, however, are 
significant. The HMS failed to take a leadership role within the Islamist movement due to the 
more complicated spectrum of the Islamist camp in Algeria; the HMS also approached politics 
with an inclination to greater compromise with the regime. The focus throughout this section is 
on early creation and politicization of the HMS’ predecessor, the JM, its differences compared 
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with other Islamist organizations, and its interactions with the regime. First, I examine the 
religious policies of the Ben Bella and Boumédiène regimes. Second, I discuss their impact on 
the Islamist movement’s emergence in post-independence Algeria, before looking at the 
characteristics of JM compared to other Algeria’a Islamist groups. Next, I analyze how 
Bendjedid’s religion-friendly policies increased political opportunities for the Islamist 
movement’s growth in the context of intra-elite conflicts. Finally, I explore how the new 
opportunities affected various Islamist groups’ political consciousness and mobilizational 
dynamics, and how the JM, in responding to the new opportunity structures, differed in both its 
approach and goals, from other Islamist groups.  
 
Origins of Islamism and Authoritarian “Islamic Socialism” 
Similar to Tunisia, the nationalist movement in Algeria in the 1950s used religious symbols to 
mobilize mass support for the counter-colonization struggle. Like Tunisia’s Neo-Destourians, 
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) in Algeria 
widely used Islamist terms such as mujahideen (holy war fighters) and shuhada (martyrs) to 
recruit fighters and expand public influence (Brand, 2014, p. 122). Likewise, the Algerian 
nationalist movement allied with the Islamist movement during the independence war.  
Algeria’s Islamist movement first took shape in the 1930s under the leadership of 
Abdelhamid Ben Badis and his Association des Uléma Musulmans Algériens (AUMA) which 
grew out of the Jeunes Algériens movement dating back to the end of the 19th century and 
derived its inspiration from the Salafiyya tendency. When it was first created, AUMA tried to 
rebuild an “authentic” Arab-Islamic identity, which in its view had been damaged by traditions 
of the Marabout (Sufi religious scholars admired as saints), and hence ran against the principles 
of Islamic texts. It felt similarly about the use of the French language and imposition of Christian 
culture, both of which were introduced to Algeria (and Tunisia) by French colonialists and used 
for purposes of cultural assimilation. As such, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the AUMA 
established several primary and secondary Qur’anic schools to promote education based on 
Standard Arabic and Islamic theology (Ageron, 1974, pp. 88-89). After the independence war 
started in November 1954, a large proportion of AUMA members were absorbed into the FLN 
and became frontline fighters (Deeb, 1997, p. 120). It was at this time that Ben Badis made his 
now famous statement to orientate the Algerian Islamist movement, and which became a 
powerful slogan in the war: “Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my nation” 
(Wyrtzen, 2014, pp. 23-24).  
The government’s efforts to consolidate an official interpretation of Islam, in several ways 
similar to Bourguiba’s approach in Tunisia, marked the early decades following Algerian 
independence. Unlike Bourguiba, however, who deemed Islam as hindering modernization, Ben 
Bella and Boumediène took a friendlier position towards Islamic institutions and intellectuals. 
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They not only acknowledged that “Islam was the religion of the state”, and “any constitutional 
amendment should not deny the religion of the state” (Stora, 2001, p. 191), but built large 
numbers of mosques, and increased the tax on alcohol (Willis, 1996, p. 39). Under the banner of 
“cultural decolonization”, the Algerian government hired many fusha linguists from Egypt to 
help the entire population relearn its mother tongue, a language that had seldom been used in 
daily conversation for decades (Joffé, 2012, p. 122).  
The Algerian regime’s more religion-friendly policies could partly be attributed to its 
collaboration with the AUMA during the war. But a more important reason was that the FLN 
leaders such as Ben Bella and Boumediène, who believed that the country could only be 
modernized through socialism, feared that the socialist plan could run against the principle 
promulgated by the FLN in the 1950s, of “Islam is my religion”, and thus bring into question its 
legitimacy (Deeb, 1997, p. 122). As Algerian experts including Stone (1997, p. 53), Entelis 
(1986, p. 160), and Singh (1981, p. 68) argue, the Ben Bella and Boumediène approach was to 
meld the two ideologies — socialism and Islam — together. The combination of Islamic and 
socialist elements was reflected in Boumediène’s quote in a speech he delivered in Cairo in 1966, 
“Two complementary revolutions are taking place at the same time; a revolution for building up 
a socialist society and another to revive our Islamic civilization and heritage” (Nasser & 
Boumedienne, 1966). Claiming that the Muslim world should go beyond Islamic reformism and 
engage in social revolution, and that socialism corresponded with Islamic values (Sanson, 1983, 
p. 98), the regime used Islam to legitimize the FLN’s socialist revolution. The regime thus co-
opted many AUMA members and offered them positions in the Ministry of Religious Affairs to 
preach according to government guidelines — a step that required the clerics to publicly adopt 
the socialist creed. Tawfiq al Madani, an AUMA member who took the portfolio of Minister of 
Habous4, for instance, was quoted by an Algerian newspaper, Combat, as saying “Islam is a 
socialist religion and a religion of equity” (Vallin, 1973, p. 51), a clear statement of support for 
the government’s socialist orientation.  
Not surprisingly, the government’s religious policies were intended, much like Bourguiba’s, 
to monopolize the religious institution and to reinforce the government’s control over the 
religion, rather than to offer entry for different Islamic schools. As such, the ulama and imams 
were trained and monitored by the government, and the content of khutbah (Friday sermon) was 
decided by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p. 85) to ensure that it 
supported the regime’s policies on, for example, industrialization and agrarian revolution.  
As in Tunisia, and other North African countries, the Algerian regime’s attempt to control 
religious personnel and monopolize interpretations of Islam in the early post-independence years 
                                                   
4  Habous is a North African expression of waqf, referring to land property legislation in Islam, which 
involves both public property and private property. 
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triggered what Eickelman and Piscatori (1996, p. 5) called “Muslim politics”, meaning the 
contest between the regime and resistance movements led by Islamist groups over the 
interpretation of Islam and religious institutions. Similar to Tunisia, the religious groups in post-
independence Algeria fell into four broad categories: (1) the conservative, religious purists; (2) 
advocators of Islamist renaissance in the Algerian context; (3) the violent Salafists; (4) the 
adopters of the MB model.  
Among the religious groups in Algeria, five stood out, all but Bouyali’s hardline Salafist 
groups (which took shape a decade later) having begun organizing in some form in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. 
    (1) The most important religious purist group was the Badissiya which was formed in the 
1960s. While many ex-AUMA members compromised their principles in response to the 
regime’s co-optation policies, a small number of Ben Badis’ followers, including Abdullatif 
Soltani and Ahmed Sahnoun, rejected the ideology of Islamic socialism and the regime’s 
socialist modernization projects such as agricultural cooperatives, and became representatives of 
the Badissiya (Zoubir, 1996, pp. 68-69). Seeking to express their disagreement and keep their 
independence, they created in 1963 Al-Qiyam (Islamic Values) which had scores of activists. 
These traditional clerics were intransigent about the changes to modernity in terms of lifestyles, 
laws, etc., which, in their eyes, were Western products, and hoped to restore the Islamic culture 
and lifestyle in the society (Interview, Zoubir, 2016, Algiers). Al-Qiyam also rejected all sorts of 
imported ideologies, and therefore strongly opposed the Algerian government’s combination of 
socialism and Islam. One article published in the group’s journal, Humanisme Musulman 
(Muslim Humanitarianism), stated, “Any political parties, regimes and leaders that are not based 
upon Islam are dangerous. Communist parties, secular parties and socialist-Marxist parties 
should not exist on the land of Muslims” (Meredith, 2011, p. 450). Al-Qiyam adopted the 
approach of “social Islamization from below” (Burgat, 2003, p. 54; Kepel. 1994, p. 33) by 
focusing on preaching personal piety, and providing advice on how to be good Muslims. Unlike 
the Islamist groups including the Jazairiyya and the the Ikhwaniyya, Al-Qiyam was not 
interested in political engagement, and never came up with a political agenda. In the late 1960s, 
Al-Qiyam was dissolved by the regime which rejected interpretations of Islam other than official 
ones.  
   (2) The second category of resistance against the regime’s control of religious interpretation 
was composed of advocates of an Islamist renaissance in the Algerian context. This was 
represented by the Jazairiyya (Algerianist) group led by Malek Bennabi. Bennabi was brought 
up in a family that had the means to enable him to receive education both in French and 
Qur’anic schools. He was fascinated by Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-din al-Afghani’s works, 
as well as those of René Chateaubriand and Alphonse de Lamartine (Naylor, 2006b, pp. 130-
131). Though Bennabi was originally an Al-Qiyam member, his ideas differed substantially from 
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this group, and he started his circle in late 1960s around a student mosque in Algiers (Walsh, 
2007, p. 241).  
Known as a thinker who tried to bridge Arabic/Islamic and French/secular cultures (Bariun, 
1992, pp. 336-337; Naylor, 2006b, pp. 130-131), Bennabi did not reject the French language as 
Sahnoun and Soltani did, nor values imported from the West as did both the Badissiyya and the 
Ikhwaniyya. Bennabi wrote several works in French including Que sais-je de l’Islam (What do I 
know about Islam?). He thought highly of the moral basis of Western civilization, which, in his 
eyes, enabled the occidental world to develop science and industries (Bennabi, 2003, p. 56). An 
important conclusion he drew after comparing Western and Islamic civilizations was that an 
Islamic model of democracy was realizable (Bennabi, 1991). To reach this goal, he rejected 
dogmatic implementation of Islamic texts. He explained in The Question of Ideas in the Muslim 
World translated by Mohammed Tahir El Masawi from its French version, “the Prophet himself 
never let any occasion pass without warning Muslims against vanities with inhibiting effect on 
the development of contemporary Muslim society…” (Bennabi, 2003, pp. 74-75). Additionally, 
Bennabi wanted to combine divine elements with political and social aspects, such as rights and 
securities, and to reconnect the state with the individual (Bennabi, 1991).  
Many of Bennabi’s followers considered the convergence of the two cultural philosophies as 
“a necessary step forward” (Walsh, 2007, p. 246), and as the basis for a strong political platform 
that could attract citizens. Driven by this idea, members of the Jazairiyya group became the most 
active Islamists in party and electoral politics in the late 1980s when the regime initiated 
pluralist reforms. Also, known as “Algeria’s own theoretician of an authentically Algerian 
Islamist vision” (Joffé, 2012, p. 122), Bennabi was broadly viewed as an “Islamist nationalist” 
(Walsh, 2007, p. 238; Zoubir, 1996, p. 70). Like the Tunisiyya group in Tunisia, Bennabi and his 
followers contended that each society had its particularity. In another of his works, On the 
Origins of Human Society, he stated, “we should never rely on borrowed solutions no matter 
how relevant and successful they might be” (Bennabi, 1998, p. 123) because they are 
“inextricably linked to the social environment within which they have ‘taken place’…” (Bennabi, 
1998, p. 123). Based upon this theory, the Jazairiyya group in Algeria questioned the 
Ikhwaniyya group’s idea of copying the Egyptian MB model, while also criticizing Ben Bella 
and Boumediène’s implementation of the Soviet Union’s model, because in their eyes, Algeria 
could only modernize by taking its own path (Walsh, 2007, p. 246). Bennabi’s advocacy for 
combining elements in Western culture with Arabo-Islamic values resonated with intellectuals, 
especially Francophone students from faculties of science and engineering, but sparked 
opposition from Arabophone students from the faculties of liberal arts (pp. 240-241). Although 
the Jazairiyya group was not large, many participants who had been Bennabi’s followers 
became leaders of the later-created FIS, including Rashid Benaissa, Moustapha Brahmi, Anwar 
Haddam, Mohammed Said, and Abassi Madani (who later became the FIS’ President) (p. 240).  
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(3) The third category was the violent Salafist trend. The first group of Islamists that turned 
to violence was led by Mustapha Bouyali. Born in 1940 and a veteran of the independence war, 
Bouyali created the Group for Defense against the Illicit in the late 1970s and the Mouvement 
Islamique Armé (MIA) in the early 1980s. Bouyali opposed Algeria’s overt military rule and 
intended to establish an Islamic state. Seeing that non-violent Islamist groups such as Al-Qiyam 
were disbanded, Bouyali considered that peaceful means did not produce immediate results and 
that his goal could only be realized through the approach of “revolutionary Islamization from 
above” (Legrain, 1994, p. 413), meaning overthrowing the regime through violence (Rubin, 
2009, p. 240). Meanwhile, the MIA also launched attacks to gain financial resources. For 
instance, it attacked a factory near Algiers in 1985 and pillaged £110, 000 (Roberts, 2003, p. 23). 
The MIA was dissolved after Bouyali was killed by security forces in 1987, but was 
reconstructed in the 1990s by Abdelkader Chebouti and other followers of Bouyali. Based in 
rural areas of the Atlas Mountains, the MIA involved the unemployed youth, peasants and 
vendors (Willis, 1996, p. 84). Its discourse and actions attracted more adherents than less violent 
and active groups such as Al-Qiyam, which, according to Evans and Phillips (2007, p. 130), was 
largely because its violent rhetoric evoked “memories of the bandits of honor in the mountains, 
paralleling the life of the Prophet and drawing on the original war of liberation”. Among MIA’s 
hundreds of Salafist supporters was Ali Belhadj who later became the FIS’ Vice President in 
1989, the largest and most influential Islamist party in Algeria’s history (Naylor, 2015, p. 121).  
(4) The fourth pillar of the Algerian Islamist movement was the Ikhwaniyya, which was 
introduced by the Egyptian fusha faculties into Algerian classrooms in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Barka, 2012, pp. 100-101). There were two important representatives: (A) Al-Jama'a al-
Islamiyya (JI) (The Islamic Group) led by Abdallah Djaballah and (B) Al-Jama’a al-Muwahadin 
(JM) (The Unity Group) led by Mahfoud Nahnah. Whereas the JM had nationwide branches and 
a complex organizational structure similar to Ghannouchi’s JI/MTI in Tunisia, Djabllah’s JI had 
fewer organizational branches and its influence was localized in east Algeria.  
(A) Djaballah’s JI started in the 1970s as a discussion group in the Law Faculty at the Ain El 
Bey University in Djaballah’s hometown, Constantine, the third largest city in Algeria. 
Intending to Islamize the society, Djaballah and his followers built mosques and musalaat 
(prayer rooms) in Constantine, and offered religious training both on campus and in the 
community, according to the instructions of Hassan al-Banna (Al-Ahnaf et al., 1991, p. 43). 
Ideologically, Djaballah was closer to the less mainstream “Islamic Left” sub-grouping of the 
MB represented by Hassan Hanafi (Roberts, 2003, p. 68). This sub-grouping understood the aim 
of Islamic preaching as not simply to advocate individual religious practices but to promote the 
fight against oppression, in particular, eradicating the gap between the rich and poor (Ayubi, 
1999, p. 75). Although Hanafi and Djaballah’s ideas showed certain similarities to socialism, as 
they supported public economy and nationalization of natural resources, and opposed economic 
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liberalism, their theocratic frameworks were based upon Islamic principles, in contrast to the 
atheist bases of socialism (Musallam, 2005, p. 150). Notwithstanding the obvious influence of 
MB on Djaballah’s group in terms of Qur’an teaching and charity work, Djaballah was more 
comfortable with the label of “independent” Muslim Brother than “pure” Muslim Brother 
(Willis, 1998, p. 48), as he was unwilling to become an Algerian branch of the Brotherhood and 
subordinate to the Egyptian MB (Barka, 2012, p. 101). Due to a lack of funding, the group’s 
organizational branches were initially unable to expand, and only operated around Constantine. 
Correspondingly, the majority of its supporters were residents of east Algeria, including well-
educated intelligentsia, university students, and those from liberal professions such as lawyers, 
doctors, andengineers (Roberts, 2003, p. 68; Hill, 2009, p. 132; Boubekeur, 2009, p. 172). 
(B) Nahnah’s JM first appeared as a youth-oriented, campus-based group with a membership 
of 19 in the late 1960s. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it was active in mosques and 
universities in Blida, the founder’s hometown, a provincial city that represented important 
sources of activism and recruitment in the face of disenchantment with government policies. It 
also had a presence in Algiers where Nahnah pursued a degree in Arabic literature and then 
taught at the University of Algiers. Compared with the above-mentioned Islamist groups, JM 
distinguished itself in two aspects.  
First, unlike the Badisiyya and Jazairiyya groups, which represented indigenous Islamic 
schools, JM was more affected by the Islamist movement in the broader Muslim world and had 
closer ties with the MB than Djaballah’s JI. This was not only reflected in Nahnah’s extensive 
personal contacts with MB leaders, established through the many Egyptian fusha teachers he met 
when he taught at Algiers University (Maréchal, 2008, p. 71; Willis, 1996, p. 57), but in the 
large amount of funding that JM was reported to have received from the MB (Boubekeur, 2007, 
pp. 1-2), which was transferred to Nahnah through banks in France and Switzerland (Labévière, 
2000, pp. 148-149). The MB was the most important source of finance for Nahnah and provided 
specifically so his group would copy the MB’s organizational structures in Algeria and conduct 
charity works in grass root units throughout the country.  
Ideologically, Nahnah followed in the footsteps of the MB’s opposition to the “decadent” 
West. This was demonstrated in the JM’s early advocacy to “struggle against secularism and 
‘francophone supporters’” (Barka, 2012, p. 100). Although Nahnah’s JM also hoped to win 
people over back to religious culture and lifestyle, it took a less intransigient approach than that 
taken by traditional clerics represented by Al-Qiyam. Benguage Mlouka, a senior member of JM 
and HMS, claimed, “Unlike Al-Qiyam, we never punish a member for eating in a French 
restaurant…The group [JM] has delivered religious courses and created a religious 
atmosphere … but nothing is by force” (Interview, Mlouka, 2015, Oran).  
Nahnah’s group was characterized by its strong inclination towards pan-Islamism. This was 
illustrated in his important role in recruiting Algerian Islamists and transporting them to Pakistan 
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and Afghanistan to contribute to the anti-Soviet effort (Driessen, 2012, p. 148), justified by the 
claim that the occupation of Afghanistan was a Communist war against Muslims (Zoubir, 2009, 
p. 242). The transportation of volunteer fighters was conducted under the cover of pilgrimage, 
with many of them first sent to Saudi Arabia from where they then headed to Central and South 
Asia (Naravas, 2008). The pan-Islamism commitment distinguished Nahnah’s JM from other 
Algeria’s Islamist groups, which were more oriented toward nationalist activities.  
Second, Nahnah followed Hassan al-Banna’s gradualist da’wa strategy, which favored a 
bottom-up method to Islamize society and advocated that relations between the individual, 
family, society, and the state should be regulated according to Islamic laws (Shahin, 2007, p. 1). 
Unlike the Jazairiyya group, which called for governing the country through elections, Nahnah 
believed that long-term missionary work both in urban and rural regions was a precondition for 
social, religious and political transformations (Roberts, 2003, p. 131; Utvik & Tønnesen, 2008, p. 
20). This approach of gradualist reform explained Nahnah’s slow engagement in party and 
electoral politics throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
Early Activities of the Islamist Movement and Interactions with the Regime 
Unlike in Tunisia where the confrontation between Bourguiba and the leftists in the 1970s left 
a vacuum in which the Islamist movement thrived and expanded, Boumédiène’s socialist regime 
deemed Islamist groups a major challenge to its power. He thus implemented total exclusion and 
hardline repression toward them in the years from 1966 to 1989. On September 21, 1966, the 
regime forced Al-Qiyam to dissolve its organizational branches in the wilaya (province) of 
Algiers using the justification that it criticized the execution of Sa’id Qutb in Egypt (McDougall, 
2017, p. 262).  
The crackdown on the Islamists represented by Al-Qiyam temporarily quieted down for the 
first half of the 1970s. It was not until Boumediène officially committed to socialism in 1976 by 
adopting the National Charter that a new round of conflict between the regime and Islamists 
emerged. Nahnah viewed the Charter as a “communist, anti-Islamic document” (Walsh, 2007, p. 
242). He and his group expressed their dissatisfaction by publishing hundreds of pamphlets 
entitled “Where is Boumediène Going?” (HMS Pamphlet, 2015), in which the JM criticized the 
government’s adoption of socialist and communist ideas and policies (Shahin, 1998, p. 122). 
Under the Algerian legislation, which stated that those defaming the government could face 
prison or monetary fines, Nahnah and his followers were arrested. Nahnah was given a custodial 
sentence of 15 years (Boubekeur, 2007). During his imprisonment, the JM’s activities were 
coordinated by Mohammed Bouslimani, who later became Nahnah’s deputy and brother-in-law, 
according to Boudjemaa Ayad, one of the JM’s founders (El Chorouk, 2013).  
Boumédiène’s death in 1978 provided Algeria with the occasion to readjust the country’s 
political orientation (Roberts, 1988, p. 576). Once in office in February 1979, the new President, 
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Chadli Bendjedid, launched economic liberalization reforms that focused on decentralizing 
economic decision-making, reducing the state-owned enterprises’ domination, and increasing the 
autonomy of the private sector, all under the slogan of “min ajli hayyatin ahsan” (for the sake of 
a better life) (Murphy, 1996, pp. 181-186; Ruedy, 2005, pp. 234-235). To push forward the 
reforms more effectively, Bendjedid initiated a government reshuffle by replacing 
Boumedienne’s high-ranking officials with young liberal technocrats such as Abdelhamid 
Brahimi, Mouloud Hamrouche, and Sid Ahmed Ghozali, all of whom loyal to Bendjedid.  
Yet, Bendjedid’s de-Boumediènisation faced huge obstacles, leading him to rebalance the 
forces around him and engage with the Islamists. A significant challenge to his power came 
from the military elites and senior FLN activists, who had been the main beneficiaries of the 
political economy implemented by Ben Bella and Boumediène. As such, Bendjedid’s authority 
was challenged by Boumédiènists on the left, led by Mohammad Salah Yahiaoui, and 
Boumédiènists on the right, led by Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Roberts, 1988, p. 578). Meanwhile, 
Bendjedid’s economic neoliberal reforms and attempts to repress references to socialism also 
faced opposition from the leftists outside the Boumediène camp. The fact that ruling elites were 
themselves part of the field of political competition had important implications for Islamist 
groups, as it created a political opportunity, the nature of which political process theorists have 
described as “elite divisions”. In this scenario, they argue, one elite section is likely to co-opt 
opposition groups such as Islamist groups to offset the influence of its rival (Albrecht, 2005, pp. 
390-391; Grove, 2001, p. 12).   
Ruling elites do not only increase political openness for elite management, but also for 
opposition management. When ruling elites face serious challenge from one opposition camp, 
they are likely to support other opposition groups to let them counterbalance one another.When 
Bendjedid first ascended to presidency, he not only faced challenges from other elite groups, but 
from the opposition Berberist movement. In the decades after Algeria gained independence, 
many of the Berber population was dissatisfied with the regime’s neglect of their language, 
identity, and contribution to the war of independence. When the government banned a lecture on 
the use of Tamazight (the Berber language) due to be delivered by Berber intellectual Mouloud 
Mammeri at a university in Tizi-Ouzou on March 19, 1980, the Berberists launched a protest 
called the Berber Spring in which they demanded the recognition of Tamazight as an official 
language (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p. 122). Though the protest was repressed by force, the 
Berberists’ rise in political consciousness alarmed Bendjedid and drove him to mobilize other 
movements to counteract the challenge they posed (Joffé, 2013, p. 202).  
To balance against the challenges both from ruling elites and the opposition, Bendjedid’s 
tactic was to loosen repression of the Islamists. He replaced his predecessors’ complete 
exclusion policies towards Islamist groups with informal tolerance policies. Whereas Bendjedid 
continued his predecessors’ policy of rejecting any legal basis for formal organization of Islamist 
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groups, he acquiesced to a growth in the movement generally by encouraging Islamists to 
undermine the leftists’ and Berberists’ influence in schools and universities (Roberts, 1988, pp. 
578-579). Consequently, the competition and collision between Islamist student organizations 
and leftist student unions became intense in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and culminated in 
the stabbing of a leftist student, Kamel Amzel, by Islamist students in Algiers’ Ben Aknoun 
University during a conflict in 1981 (Ruedy, 1996, p. 108). In a move to draw Nahnah’s group 
over to the regime’s side, Bendjedid and the military sought a deal with him while in prison. The 
JM would refrain from criticizing government programs, in exchange for early release from 
prison (Al-Ahnaf et al., 1991, p. 37). In 1981, President Bendjedid issued an amnesty to Nahnah 
and his followers and terminated their imprisonment ten years early (Al-Ahnaf et al., 1991, p. 
37). 
In line with his intentions to abandon the socialist project, Bendjedid attempted to strengthen 
his regime’s legitimacy by clothing it in Islamic credibility. To this end, as Algeria lacked a 
well-known Islamic university in the same league as Zaytouna University in Tunisia and the 
University of al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco, Bendjedid initiated the construction of Université Emir 
Abdelkader des Sciences Islamiques to train imams and experts in Arabic and Islam. Further, he 
invited two prominent Egyptian Islamic thinkers, who were also MB activists, Mohammed al-
Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, to guide the country’s religious education (Evans & Phillips, 
2007, p. 128). In 1984, Bendjedid also promulgated a highly conservative Family Code which 
stated, “our people have always applied the prescriptions of sharia in terms of personal status” 
(Knauss, 1987, p. 136). The Code confirmed the legality of polygamy and marriage tutoring 
(women’s marriage should depend on male sponsors’ approval) (Stora, 2001, p. 192). 
The concessions that Bendjedid made to the Islamists were not wholly successful. First, 
although most Islamist groups welcomed the conservative Family Code, many, such as the 
Salafists, were not fully satisfied (Salhi, 2010, pp. 171-172; Willis, 1998, p. 63). They 
considered it not Islamic enough and demanded that the state should implement the sharia (Salhi, 
2010, pp. 171-172) thoroughly, such as by totally banning alcohol.  
Second, in relaxing control over the religious sphere, and by establishing an Islamic 
university, Bendjedid created an informal tolerance opportunity for Islamist groups, which 
allowed the Jazairiyya group, JM and Djaballah’s JI to expand their influence on the younger 
generation. After the Berber Spring, the Berberists allied themselves with Francophone 
secularists, leading many Arabophone students to side with Islamist organizations. The Islamists’ 
expansion on campuses also occurred because the Islamist discourse of defending Islam and 
Arabization of education (Miller, 1997, p. 506) resonated with the Arabophone students’ 
demand for total Arabization in public life, which they believed would eliminate the 
disadvantages they faced in the job market (Abdel-Moneim, 2016, p. 64).  
This raises two important issues. First, when exploring why certain governments prefer 
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informal tolerance or controlled inclusion to absolute inclusion or exclusion, Albrecht and 
Wegner (2006) claim that the former strategies are less costly than pure exclusion but are more 
flexible than formal inclusion, as the regime can easily reverse policies without damaging its 
legitimacy. Nonetheless, what they do not illustrated is that informal tolerance or controlled 
inclusion policies could also be used to create a sense of constant uncertainty. For instance, 
although Bendjedid acquiesced to the conflicts between Islamists and leftists on campus, the 
government arrested many Islamists after the killing of the leftist student Kamel Amzel in 1981 
(Roberts, 2003, p. 22). By setting up a politics of ambiguity, the regime put the opposition 
groups in a position of insecurity and confusion about what they could or could not do, and thus 
pushed many of them to adopt methods of self-preservation that limited their growth and range, 
as was the case with Nahnah’s group after the 1980s.      
Second, the manner in which parties or organizations interpret political opportunities should 
be taken into consideration because different ways of interpreting the same opportunities may 
yield different results, which in turn can affect how political opportunity opens or closes in 
response.  
The interpretation of political opportunity can be seen to have differed markedly among 
various Islamist groups. Although the increasingly fierce confrontation between Arabophone 
Islamists and Berberophone-Francophone leftists on campus escalated into physical encounters 
which achieved Bendjedid’s goal of undermining the leftist and Berberist movements, the 
President soon found himself trapped in the game. When attacking Berberophone-Francophone 
students, the emboldened Islamist forces in the universities also became increasingly critical of 
the government’s policies which, in their view, were not fully in accord with sharia. On 
November 12, 1982, a mass prayer meeting of over 5, 000 students occurred at a central building 
of Algiers University, where the Islamists and their sympathizers delivered a 14-point petition, 
demanding sexual separation in schools and workplaces, an increase in religious education, and 
implementation of sharia (Miller, 1997, p. 506), under the leadership of Soltani and Abassi 
Madani. This was the first time that Madani, who was then a member of the Jazairiyya group 
and later became head of FIS, surfaced as the head of anti-government protest (Lowi, 2009, p. 
117). Djaballah’s group did not engage in the mass rally but expressed support by reading out 
the 14-point petition in the university mosque in Constantine and distributing copies in local 
neighborhoods (Willis, 1998, p. 49).  
Only Nahnah’s JM took the approach expected by the regime. Unlike the other Islamist 
groups which capitalized on the favorable opportunities to undermine the regime’s legitimacy, 
JM chose not to confront the regime directly, and instead adopted a more “neutral” stance, 
expressing little critique of the policies, due to the apprehension associated with imprisonment. 
Indeed, after being released, Nahnah kept a much lower profile than Soltani and Madani and 
maintained a wait-and-see position to let the regime be distracted by other Islamist groups to 
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ensure his group’s survival and development space. Thus, the JM did not engage in the 1982 
demonstrations, nor did it sign the 14-point petition, despite the commonalities between the 
petition and its platform. When Bendjedid started to repress the Islamist forces that had 
organized the rally and petition in late 1982, and arrested Soltani and Madani, Nahnah’s group 
escaped censure, enabling him to benefit by increasing his presence on campuses and enhancing 
his group’s influence (Willis, 1996, pp. 79-80). 
Wegner (2011, xxviii-xxix), in analyzing Moroccan Islamist groups, notices an important 
dilemma faced by Islamist parties operating in restricted political environments: If they 
demonstrate a strong anti-regime position, they are likely to be deprived of the right to operate 
and mobilize; but if they demonstrate a pro-regime position, they risk losing a considerable 
portion of their support base. The JM’s performance in the 1980s fitted into this theory.  
In general, the impact of the JM’s lack of engagement in the protests organized by other 
Islamist groups was two-fold. On the one hand, Nahnah’s low profile and gradualist 
performance throughout the 1980s was in sharp contrast to more active Islamist figures such as 
Abassi Madani, which not only meant Nahnah’s group was ill-positioned to lead the country’s 
electoral Islamist forces in 1989-1991 when the regime initiated political liberalization reforms, 
but also, it was less popular among the electorate who called for radical changes of the status 
quo and felt Nahnah’s party had let them down. 
Yet, on the other hand, the tactic enabled the JM to escape repression experienced by most 
Islamist groups from 1982 onward (Al-Ahnaf et al., 1991, p. 37). Djaballah, for instance, was 
interrogated on some fifty occasions in 1982-1986 (Willis, 1998, p. 49). By interpreting the 
opportunity of informal tolerance differently from most other Islamist groups in Algeria, and 
indeed the Tunisian Ennahda did, Nahnah’s group emphasized that it could play by the rules of 
the political game set by government officials. Its approach of interpreting the opportunities and 
resources at hand changed the political opportunity for Nahnah’s group, and eventually led the 
regime to offer it long-term, albeit limited, inclusion. By conducting self-limitation continuously, 
Nahnah’s interpretation of political opportunities and their outcomes affected his group’s 
political goals. Although Nahnah in effect sacrificed the opportunity to lead the country as a 
strong Islamist figure, he later became as an active player in governance, a different goal perhaps 
than he originally set out to achieve, but a way to interpret a degree of unique achievement. This 
shows that Islamist groups can interpret restricted political landscapes in different ways, and 
reveal different benefits depending on the trajectories they adopt. Hence, we see that the field is 
more complex than an in-out paradigm.  
In sum, Nahnah’s JM emerged as part of the broader Islamist movement in Algeria in 
response both to Ben Bella and Boumediène’s advocacy of an Islamic socialist ideology and to 
the tightening of the government’s control over religious preaching in the 1960s and 1970s. 
From its inception, it employed the MB model, received funding from the MB, and shared its 
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fundamental ideologies. The JM expanded its organizational scope like other Algerian Islamist 
groups in the early 1980s when Bendjedid’s regime encouraged the Islamists to counteract the 
challenge from Boumédiènists on both the left and the right. Yet, Nahnah’s group became much 
less outspoken in its criticism of the government’s policies compared with the other Islamist 
groups, stifled by its experience of incarceration, and hence adopting a more pragmatic strategy 
to ensure its survival. This included undermining other Islamist groups by avoiding high-profile 
participation in counter-regime protests. How this strategy affected its development in late 1980s 
and the party it later created, the HMS, and how that affected its positioning in elections in the 
context of the new political opportunities available in early 1990s, will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to unravel the rise of Islamist movements in post-independence 
Tunisia and Algeria, as well to trace the origins of the specific Islamist groups from which 
Ennahda and the HMS emerged. It likewise suggests nuances in the theorization and application 
of Political Process Theory. It argues that more specific categories are necessary when analyzing 
political opportunities. Informal tolerance is a sub-category in which the regime manipulates 
opposition groups by offering them a certain operating space while denying them legal status, 
creating a sense of uncertainty which may lead opposition groups to conduct self-limitation 
practices. This chapter also indicates that ruling elites not only increase political openness to 
manage elite divisions, but to manage confrontations between ruling elites and opposition camps. 
Additionally, it contends that different ways of interpreting the same opportunities yield 
different results by affecting how political opportunity opens or closes for different groups, in 
turn, affecting the political goals of different opposition groups. In both Tunisia and Algeria, the 
Islamist movements appeared as opposition forces in response to the ruling elites’ policies of 
monopolizing the religious sphere. In both countries, the Islamist movements expanded their 
networks and outreach when favorable political opportunities arose as a result of conflicts 
between political elites, in Tunisia in the early 1970s and in Algeria in the early 1980s.   
Predecessors of Ennahda and the HMS, namely JI/MTI and JM, both adopted the MB model 
at their inception. They harbored the goal of encouraging Islamic practice in their countries and 
solving their country’s existing problems by implementing sharia. Additionally, they adopted 
the approaches of Islamic preaching and political engagement, and promoted pan-Islamism and 
anti-Westernism in the 1970s and 1980s. They both adopted MB forms of organization, and 
benefited from its funding. In the 1970s and early 1980s, both groups’ largest support base was 
the youth in universities.  
Yet, the two groups differed in two important aspects. First, while JI/MTI was the only 
Islamist group in Tunisia that showed interest in evaluating the regime’s political policies and 
pursued institutionalized participation, there were several Islamist groups in Algeria that 
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emphasized political engagement, including the Jazairiyya group, Djaballah’s JI and Nahnah’s 
JM. Nahnah’s approach was to adopt a gradualist method, focusing first on Islamic da’wa before 
proceeding to the establishment of an Islamic state. This, along with the deal he made with the 
regime to adopt a less critical approach to its policies, meant his group became less active in 
engaging in opposition party and electoral politics than other Islamist groups in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  
Second, unlike the JI/MTI and its later incarnation, Ennahda, which remained an opposition 
force, despite its willingness to dialogue with the Tunisian regime, Nahnah’s group was 
characterized by its pragmatism, which meant that the JM and the party it later built, the HMS, 
always compromised with the regime. This strategy allowed the JM to suffer less repression than 
JI/MTI. Yet, as JM followed a path that was less controversial and which would not draw the 
negative attention of the regime, it chose not to engage in the counter-regime protests organized 
by other Islamist groups. This made it unable to lead the country’s institutionalized Islamist 
forces, unlike the MTI did in Tunisia in the late 1980s. It was also unable to mobilize the 
electorate who were calling for a party to confront and replace the regime in the early 1990s. It 
thus could not resist or counter the FIS when the latter emerged in 1989.  
The next four chapters divide the development of Ennahda and the HMS into four stages and 
examine their mobilization strategies and outcomes. I analyze the two groups’ different features, 
focusing on the way their differences affected their reactions to changing political opportunities 

















Chapter 4    
First Trial at the Polls 
 
 This chapter tests the logic of the demand-and-supply theory through in-depth comparison of 
the MTI/Ennahda’s and HMS’ first trials of electoral mobilization in 1989. It traces (1) citizens’ 
grievances with the regimes which caused massive protests in both countries; (2) the two 
regimes’ responses to protests and the change of Islamist parties’ political opportunities; (3) how 
the MTI/Ennahda and HMS organized their parties and formulated discourses in new 
environments. 
  The limited political openness and informal tolerance for the MTI following the 1984 Bread 
Riot and 1987 coup offered its activists the opportunity to run for the 1989 elections as 
independents. In the electoral mobilization process, its establishment of extensive branch offices 
and networks with NGOs across the country also enabled it to rise as the largest opponent to the 
regime party, PSD/RCD. Finally, the combination of inclusive and exclusive recruitment 
approaches increased both its mobilizational capacity and survivability. Yet, the MTI/Ennahd 
was still unable to outrank the PSD/RCD in the late 1980s, as, on the one hand, it could not run 
as a legal party, and on the other, its conservative discourse aroused many citizens’ fear of losing 
freedom if it ascended to power.  
As for the HMS’ electoral mobilization in 1991, though Islamist parties were more tolerated 
by the regime and thus had more political opportunities in Algeria than in Tunisia, Nahnah’s 
hesitation in forming an official party, together with his moderate strategy which failed to 
resonate with citizens’ demands for radical change, led to its failure to enlarge its support base, 
leading it to fall far behind its Islamist rival, the FIS. The HMS’ trial in 1991 suggests that an 
Islamist party’s establishment of extensive organizational networks and efforts in relating 
Islamic ideas to social practice do not necessarily guarantee a large support base, if the party 
cannot convince citizens that such organizational strength can be transferred to form an 
alternative power base to replace the existing ruling party. Yet, interestingly, a comparison 
between the first electoral experiment of the MTI/Ennahda and HMS shows that whilst an 
Islamist party’s moderate strategy may cause doubts among citizens as to the benefits they can 
get by voting for it, a more radical and conservative strategy may cause the electorate to worry 
about the potential costs they may suffer if an Islamist party wins an election.  
 
MTI/Ennahda in the 1989 Election 
The very few works analyzing Tunisia’s 1989 election either focus on the electoral system by 
evaluating electoral laws and the elections’ fairness (Dillman, 2000a; Gasiorowski, 1992), or on 
the MTI’s specific campaigning tactics (Hermassi, 1995; Hamdi, 1998). I explore the election 
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from a more comprehensive perspective by linking the MTI’s political opportunities to its 
mobilizational strategies, and more importantly, by conceptualizing the role of demand and 
supply through an analysis of how the MTI’s organizational strength and framing process 
responded to citizens’ demands. This section on Ennahda’s first electoral trial begins by 
illustrating popular anger against Bourguiba’s regime, which culminated in the Bread Riot of 
1984 in which the MTI actively engaged. Then, I analyze what the informal tolerance policy 
adopted by Bourguiba’s successor, Ben Ali, meant to the MTI in terms of political opportunities 
in the context of Tunisia’s political liberalization and the ensuing honeymoon relationship 
between the regime and MTI. I also evaluate how Ben Ali’s political reforms opened the door to 
mobilization activities by the Islamist party. Third, I explore how the MTI developed its 
organization when new political opportunities were presented in the late 1980s, how the party 
responded to citizens’ benefit and cost concerns, and how these aspects affected its electoral 
outcomes.  
  
The Bread Riot of 1984 
Bourguiba’s socio-economic liberalization reforms beginning in late 1960s largely failed to 
achieve his original intention of improving living standards and employment opportunities, and 
instead triggered a significant level of popular resentment. Four reasons for this stood out. First, 
although the official data showed unemployment rates dropping from 15.21% to 12.87% from 
1966 to 1980, unemployment actually increased from 927,300 to 1,576,900 during this period 
(Rama, 1998, p. 67), due to the massive population growth following the country’s 
independence. 
Second, with the growth of tourism and other industries concentrated in the northern coastal 
areas, the southern interior governorates that lacked resources witnessed an intensification of 
historical north-south and urban-rural discrepancies in the 1970s. While the coastal regions 
received most of the newly built factories in the 1970s and 46,000 out of the 86,000 new jobs 
created between 1973 and 1978, the impoverished hinterlands such as Sidi Bou Zid, Kairouan, 
Gafsa and Kasserine shared fewer than 3.6% of the new factories set up throughout the 1970s 
(Findlay, 2015, p. 225). Residents of the very few industry-concentrated wilayas in the 
hinterlands such as Gafsa, the phosphate mining center, complained that they did not enjoy the 
same care from the government as littoral regions due to a lack of infrastructure and economic 
diversification plans (Ben Romdhane & Kadel, 2008).  
Third, resulting from the geographic implications of the market economy, the wealth gap 
between the rich and poor expanded, which was intensified by unequal access to lucrative 
business opportunities caused by corruption (Bibi et al., 2011). Since the corruption-related 
inequalities appeared to be long-lasting and intractable, the problem of economic deprivation 
tended to generate social isolation and psychological alienation (Yunker, 2003, p. 105). 
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 Lastly, the regime found itself mired in “the logic of concentrated power”, meaning that 
political power was increasingly centralized in the hands of a few individuals, causing 
dysfunction and corruption (Gilley, 2003, p. 18). Being incapable of bringing social justice and 
equalities whether by implementing a socialist or liberalist approach, the PSD, which dominated 
the political system, saw a deterioration of its legitimacy (Waltz, 1986, p. 665).  
  In the early 1980s, Tunisia suffered economic decline due to European stagnation. The 
situation was worsened by the fall of the international oil price after 1983. By 1984, the Tunisian 
budget deficit that had hovered around 5-6% of GDP in the 1970s tripled (Bureau, 1993, p. 2). 
Bourguiba had little choice but to accept the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s terms of 
cutting government spending, devaluating the TND currency, and imposing austerity measures 
in exchange for a loan, which Tunisia desperately needed (Dilek, 2015, p. 98; Murphy, 1999, p. 
93). On December 29, 1983, an announcement was made to reduce subsidies on commodities, 
notably cereals, which caused the doubling of bread prices (Ware, 1988, p. 590). This had an 
immediate impact on people’s well-being, triggering the “Bread Riot”. This was the first 
insurrection to spread across the country and the number of participants was estimated at half a 
million (Taylor, 2014), ten times as large as the ‘Black Thursday’ uprising organized by the 
UGTT six years ago. 
  The riot started as sparse, small-scale protests in the south and southwest parts of Tunisia, 
where the population relied heavily on food subsidies. Most of the early protesters were low-
income groups, including farmers, seasonal workers and the unemployed (Guay, 2013). In 
January 1984, the riot spread to northern and coastal areas. New social elements including high 
school and university students became involved. Unlike the early protesters, most students came 
from middle-class families and did not lack financial means (Seddon, 1986, p. 10). Their 
resentment centered on limited employment opportunities and social marginalization. Despite 
the diversity of protesters in the bread riot, their common concern was to change the status quo 
marked by “inequality, unemployment and poverty” (Ibid).  
   Unlike the 1978 uprising, the 1984 protest emerged spontaneously. The protest was not 
organized at the beginning, despite the engagement of the Islamist and leftist groups after the 
uprising erupted. The first opposition group to actively respond to the bread riot was the MTI. 
Hoping to translate the public grievance into political clout and support for Islamism, it took 
three initiatives.  
First, it tried to guide the public voice by attributing the Bourguiba regime’s dysfunction to 
his negligence of Islam and authorization of the West’s economic colonization. In an interview 
with New York Times (1984), two MTI members in their twenties who attended the riot blamed 
the country’s development of manufacturing and tourism as they only provided products and 
amusement for the West. The MTI likewise condemned the unfair trade between Tunisia and the 
West, as Tunisia exported phosphate at a low price but re-imported it at 20 times the price as 
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fertilizer (Ibid). Hence, the party described the President as anti-Islam and a pro-imperialist 
figure. To deepen this impression, it promoted slogans that had Islamic potency such as “There 
is but one God and Bourguiba is the enemy of God” (Le Monde, 1984). By relating the regime’s 
dysfunction to its negligence of Islamic identity and ideology, it addressed what it viewed as a 
key demand of the population, and advocated transformation by using religioius discourse. It 
thereby attempted to create the impression that to restore Islamic percepts was the only way to 
offer protesters what they wanted: namely, to combat corruption, bring social justice, and lay the 
foundations of good governance. During the course of the protests, MTI members repeatedly 
chanted religious slogans such as “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great) both in the mosques and in the 
streets to advocate Islamic renaissance (Seddon, 1986, p. 9).  
  Second, by taking the lead in supporting the social unrest and putting itself at risk of being 
repressed, the party tried to distinguish itself from secular opposition groups. In so doing, MTI 
activists claimed that their party was the main opposition force in Tunisia, which was the reason 
why it was outlawed while several secular opposition parties were legalized. Thus, the MTI tried 
to label itself as the party that was most likely to bring changes to the status quo, exactly what 
protesters in the Bread Riot demanded. By comparison, the other parties such as the PCT and 
MDS did no more than require the government to find solutions to the crisis in the later stages of 
the riot (Walton & Seddon, 1994).  
Additionally, the MTI circulated the protests’ slogans such as “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great) 
and anti-regime discourses (Ibid) both in the mosques and in the streets, broadening the riot’s 
momentum and exerting more pressure on ruling elites.  
In sum, the party’s active role in the social riot after it erupted in 1984 demonstrated its ability 
to mobilize religious resources and present a clear intention of overthrowing the existing 
economic and political orders created by the regime, which resonated with the protesters’ 
demands and laid an important foundation for the party’s electoral mobilization five years later 
in 1989. How the regime reacted to the Bread Riot and MTI, how the unrest catalyzed a power 
shift, and how this changed political opportunities for MTI will be elaborated below.  
 
Riot Control and Ben Ali’s “Constitutional Coup” 
  In response to the escalating turmoil, Bourguiba undertook four policy initiatives: (1) 
quenching the riots by announcing a state of emergency and firing live ammunition into the 
crowds, killing 150 people (Paul, 1984, pp. 4-5); (2) alleviating protesters’ dissatisfaction by 
controlling price rises of bread and dietary staples (Gana, 2013, p. 11); (3) initiating a 
government reshuffle by sacrificing Prime Minster Mohammed Mzali as a scapegoat for 
government failures (p. 66) and promoting military officers such as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to 
maintain stability. Ben Ali had 16-years of experience in directing military security, and was 
accredited as Secretary of State for National Defense in October 1984 and then Interior Minister 
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in April 1986 (Ware, 1988, pp. 593-594). (4) Expressing displeasure at the robustness of the 
Islamist movement and narrowing its space to breathe and survive.  
Shortly after the Bread Riot, Bourguiba tightened restrictions on religious practice. Veiled 
women were prohibited from entering universities and professions. Taxi drivers who had long 
beards were in danger of license revocation (Esposito, 1999). Prayer rooms in factories, 
educational institutes, and offices were closed (Boulby, 1988, p. 611). In 1986, Bourguiba 
orchestrated show trials of several MTI members for conspiracy (Halliday, 1994, p. 103). On 
March 9, 1987, Ghannouchi was arrested for giving lectures in mosques without a license and 
inciting disturbances (Shahin, 1998, p. 97). In August, bombings at several hotels in Sousse and 
Monastir, for which the MTI denied involvement, caused 12 casualties; but the situation offered 
Bourguiba the excuse he had been waiting for to wipe out of the Islamists.  
These measures taken by Bourguiba’s regime had at least two implications that would take on 
growing importance for the country’s political orientation in the late 1980s. First, control of 
price rises did not reduce corruption and injustice and thus could not remove the root of massive 
dissatisfaction. Second, the protesters’ wrath even increased after witnessing the police’s killing 
of civilians and the regime’s restrictions on religious practice. Thus, Bourguiba’s 
mismanagement of the massive unrest provided the grounds for the MTI’s expansion. Moreover, 
the MTI’s engagement in the Bread Riot, its fighting for people’s rights of religious practice, 
along with its activists’ sufferings of incarceration in the aftermath, all created the impression 
that the party was on the receiving end of the regime’s anger because it fought for the populace. 
Thus, Bourguiba’s tightening grip triggered a backlash as the crackdown on the MTI actually 
corroborated the latter’s claim that it was a group fighting for people’s benefits (Gana, 2013, p. 
66) 
  Third, Bourguiba’s promotion of Ben Ali directly paved the way for the latter’s seizure of 
power. Although Ben Ali had taken charge of the repression of MTI when he held the post of 
Interior Minister, he disagreed with Bourguiba’s decision to hang scores of MTI members 
including Ghannouchi. For fear that the martyrdom of the MTI’s spiritual leader, Ghannouchi, 
might arouse national and international Islamist violence, antipathy from secular dissents in 
Tunisia, and denunciation by the international community (Boulby, 1988, p. 612; Jeune Afrique, 
1987), he persuaded Bourguiba to abandon executing Ghannouchi (Ware, 1988, pp. 588-589). 
Yet, this advice was refused by Bourguiba. Claiming that Bourguiba’s decision was likely to 
drag the country into a war, and that the only way to prevent this from happening was to 
overthrow Bourguiba, Ben Ali initiated a coup against the President on November 7, 1987. Ben 
Ali’s putsch was greeted positively by the MTI. Ghannouchi, who escaped the death penalty, 





“Honeymoon” between Ben Ali and MTI 
  In the early years after the “medical coup”, Tunisia witnessed more political openness and 
relaxed religious policies. Under Ben Ali’s policy of informal tolerance toward the MTI, its 
relations with Ben Ali between 1987 and 1989 reached the “honeymoon” stage (Allani, 2009, p. 
257; Hermida, 1994, p. 58) in which the MTI was allowed to run for elections as independent 
candidates.  
According to political process theorists’ “elite division” argument (Albrecht, 2005, pp. 390-
391; Grove, 2001, p. 12), in authoritarian regimes such as Tunisia, ruling elites’ internal power 
structure has a strong bearing on the government’s decision to repress opponents, much as do 
electoral rules and party laws which determine to what extent opponents can participate in 
politics through formal institutions. As soon as Ben Ali became President, he started to replace 
the old guard, pro-Bourguiba, elites with young activists. In 1989, Ben Ali’s domination of the 
ruling party was established and rival parties, whether legalized or not, faced a more 
consolidated PSD than in 1981 (Murphy, 1999, pp. 169-171). Thus, the scenario of power 
struggle in Algeria between reformers led by Bendjedid and followers of Houari Boumediene 
which left a political vacuum for the rise of FIS in late 1980s and early 1990s did not occur in its 
neighbor, Tunisia. 
Moreover, attempting to prove himself as a more qualified chief of state than his predecessor, 
Ben Ali threw himself into democratic reforms immediately after ascending power. Vowing to 
pave the way for democracy and allow official opposition forces greater involvement in political 
life, Ben Ali renamed the ruling party the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) 
and promised to “institutionalize the multiparty system” (p. 172).  
However, the reform was still in the framework of electoral authoritarianism, as it only 
created the appearance of political pluralism in the absence of political actors with autonomous 
social and economic power” (Anderson, 1999, p. 4). The political parties that garnered legal 
recognition were either satellite parties established by ruling elites such as Union Démocratique 
Unioniste (UDU) and Parti Social pour le Progrès (PSP), or weak parties with small 
memberships which posed little threat to the regime party such as Rassemblement Socialiste 
Progressiste (RSP). Opposition parties, which demonstrated stronger organizational strength 
such as Mouvement de l’Unité Populaire (MUP) were excluded from electoral politics.  
Ben Ali’s attitudes towards the MTI were more complicated. Although Ben Ali was no more 
sympathetic to Islamists than his predecessor, he considered it more dangerous to keep it 
“outside the political tent” (Perkins, 2013, p. 69). To create the impression that he and the 
Islamists were on the same front against Bourguiba, Ben Ali adopted the informal tolerance 
policy. He permitted the MTI to publish a new weekly newspaper, al-Fajr (the Dawn) (Dunn, 
1994, p. 156) and appointed Mouru as one of the 25 members of the Higher Islamic Council 
(Allani, 2008, pp. 238-240). Ben Ali’s rapprochement with MTI reflected his initial intention of 
65 
 
instrumentalizing political and religious forces to contribute to his credibility.  
However, Ben Ali’s more tolerant position towards MTI did not mean that he would let the 
Islamist party grow and expand as it wished. In fact, the Higher Islamic Council mainly 
functioned as a consultative institute and the aim of recruiting Islamist scholars into the Council 
was to create a façade suggesting that the Islamists agreed with the government’s agenda (Ibid). 
Moreover, to prevent the MTI from menacing the regime party’s hegemony, a clause was 
promulgated in May 1988 which prohibited the formation of parties on the grounds of religion, 
language, region or race (Murphy, 1999, p. 172).  
Anyhow, Ben Ali’s release of Ghannouchi and inclusion of the MTI in signing the National 
Pact in a period of tolerance were first received with positive responses from the party, as 
elaborated in the ensuing sections. Below is an analysis of MTI’s mobilization strategies in the 
1989 election. First, I provide an introduction to the party’s organizational structure, as it 
affected its electoral mobilization when limited political openness was offered. 
 
Party organization  
The MTI had diverse financial resources to support its activities and operations. According to 
some reports (Refworld, 1994), in addition to membership subscription fees and donations from 
activists, the MTI received large amounts of funds from the MB and Saudi Arabia, though 
unfortunately solid evidence is lacking to show the exact amounts. Like Nahnah’s JM/HMS, the 
MTI received significant foreign funds through Bank Al-Taqwa in Europe.  
The financial resources offered by the MB and Saudi Arabia enabled the MTI to copy the 
MB’s organizational structure in two ways. First, it imitated the MB’s pyramidal structure in the 
1980s. At the top of the pyramid is the amir (chief). Under the amir, there was the Congress 
which convened regularly for important decisions concerning the party, such as the appointment 
or resignation of the amir, establishing the party’s strategic plans and issues of organization and 
membership. At the third level was the Majlis Shura (Consulting Committee), the party’s 
legislative institution consisting of 25 members. The fourth level was the Executive Bureau, 
nominated by the amir, who also nominated leaders of the Executive Bureaus in different 
governorates, with affiliated committees focusing on specific fields ranging from financial 
management to educational and cultural affairs. 
The regional institutions were composed of Executive Bureaus and grassroots units. The 
regional Executive Bureaus existed at three levels: wilayi (provincial), jihawi (regional), and 
mahali (local), parallel to institutes in governorates, cities or towns, and districts. The Executive 
Bureaus at all these levels had similar functions to those at the central level. At the grass-roots 
level, the minimal unit was the usra (family) consisting of five members. According to Latifa 
Habachi who is an MTI veteran and current parliamentarian, this small unit assumed political, 
social and educational functions, among which the priority was to offer Qur’an courses 
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(Interview, Habachi, 2015, Tunis). Morover, the grass roots units were in charge of door-to-door 
communication with residents in the neighborhoods, which allowed the party to understand 
people’s demands and respond to their needs in the far reaches of the country. Regional 
administrators, ‘amils (scholars), acted as bonds that linked the central institutions to the local 
ones by transmitting instructions from the national Executive Bureau to local subdivisions 
(Shahin, 1998, pp. 90-92).  
Such a sophisticated set of levels facilitated the work of the MTI’s large organizational bodies, 
especially in a restricted political environment, as the party’s bylaws determined each branch’s 
missions and responsibilities, which made divisions of labor clear-cut and enabled different 
levels to organize in an organic way (Al-Anani, 2016, p. 104). The MTI’s structure corroborated 
Kim (2006, p. 94) and Baker’s (2003, p. 183) theory that a difficulty of party development in 
authoritarian settings is the tendency of opposition parties to mirror the same authoritarian 
structures, top-down procedures lacking transparency as the establishment. 
The second organizational structure the MTI learnt from MB was the multi-tier recruitment 
system. There is debate as to whether inclusive or exclusive organizational structure best 
promotes Islamist groups’ mobilizational capacity. Whereas one perspective (Munson, 2001; 
Zald & Ash, 1966, p. 331) considered that an inclusive structure which welcomed members from 
various backgrounds might broaden their support base in an open political environment, the 
other perspective (Hafez, 2004, p. 41; Zald & Ash, 1966, p. 331) contended that an exclusive 
structure made it more likely for the groups to survive a repressive political environment. 
However, as the political opportunities for Islamist parties in North Africa were mostly informal 
tolerance or controlled inclusion, they often had limited space for operation. Concomitantly, 
some Islamist parties such as the MTI combined inclusive and exclusive structures, which 
allowed them to consider both their mobilizational capacity and survivability. This was reflected 
in the multi-tier recruitment system adopted by the MTI following the MB’s model.  
Sahbi Attig, current deputy President of the Ennahda’s Majlis Shura, joined MTI when he 
was still in high school. According to him, religious piety, such as wearing the hijab and keeping 
away from alcohol, was one key criterion for MTI’s recruitment. Additionally, members had to 
share the Islamist ideology, meaning that they agreed to work towards the common goal of 
reviving Islam in the country (Interview, Attig, 2015, Tunis). Yet, not all members were required 
to demonstrate the same level of religiosity, loyalty and obedience. The MTI’s grass-roots 
subdivisions were composed of members at varying commitment levels. Sympathizers who 
expressed an intention to join would receive religious education for two years from MTI. 
Members at this level were considered “candidates under education and observation” (Camau & 
Geisser, 2003, p. 286). Once the two-year training ended, candidates would be offered 
opportunities to move on to the second level and be organized into usar maftuha (open cells) in 
which they would be required to conduct one year’s internship, which involved learning 
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religious texts and organizing the party’s activities. Activists of these first two levels were 
uncommitted members and were merely required to discuss general issues and donate small 
amounts of money. The ones who presented high discretion and organizational spirit, passed 
religious examinations, and wished to join formally would be promoted to committed members 
and then be placed into usar multazima (closed cells) under the recommendation of two core 
members (Shahin, 1998, p. 90). Committed members’ duties included pledging allegiance to the 
party, studying specific political or religious issues, and contributing monthly fees. Committed 
members’ contributions usually accounted for 5% of their monthly earnings, yet the proportion 
could rise to 20-50% in some cases. In the mid-1980s, Hermassi (1984, p. 42) conducted a 
survey of MTI supporters and another of core activists who were arrested by the regime. The 
two surveys showed that 75% of the committed members were school teachers and university 
students, and the remaining 25% were mostly technicians and low-income employees. The 
composition of uncommitted members was similar, with a higher percentage of high school and 
university students, and the median age of all MTI activists is 25 (p. 41). Such a component 
could be attributed to the grievances of the educated youth who struggled to find employment 
and identity, and the MTI’s presence on campus.  
This three-tier membership structure contributed much to the party’s expansion. The 
establishment of the uncommitted membership category reduced the party’s threshold of entry, 
allowing the participation of people who lacked profound Islamic education or were less ready to 
devote much time to attending MTI’s activities as a member. Morover, the multi-tier structure 
also enabled the party to observe its members over a relatively long period, which enabled the 
leaders to evaluate the activists’ loyalty and commitment. This is particularly important for a 
party in an authoritarian setting where maintaining secrecy when conducting party activities was 
significant, because a member’s leak of party information might cause harassment or arrest of 
activists (Al-Anani, 2016, p. 3). But a negative effect was that it prevented a lot of independent 
thoughts or individual initiatives.  
In addition to copying the MB formula, MTI adjusted some of its structuring to better adapt to 
the political context of Tunisia. For instance, although family members often joined MTI 
together, an interesting phenomenon with Islamist families in the 1980s was that the husband 
often became committed activists and gained membership, while the wife worked for MTI as a 
sympathizer without membership. Kalthoum Badreddine, current parliamentarian and wife of an 
MTI leader, recounted how this worked in her case:  
 
I was working with them and cooperating with them secretly, but did not have a 
membership card as a political activist... We did not want both of us to be involved in the 
MTI at that time. One of us worked as a member while the other worked underground. So if 
one of us was arrested, the other one could take care of the family. 
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                                                                                (Interview, Badreddine, 2015, Tunis) 
 
A critical intention of such a division of roles between husbands and wives was to ensure the 
safety of at least one family member, so that when the government intensified repression, the 
wife could escape imprisonment, carry on the MTI’s task, and sustain party networks. Such a 
division of roles between family members contributed much to the MTI’s survival during its 
most difficult days in 1991-2010.  
In the 1980s, along with MTI’s expansion in universities and schools, it developed many 
branches across the country and close networks with religious facilities and NGOs ranging from 
mosques to student syndicates. At this stage, the MTI’s mobilization in education institutes 
became more institutionalized. According to Badreddine Abdellkefi, an MTI activist and current 
parliamentarian, Islamist teachers’ unions were created in high schools in the 1980s (Interview, 
Abdellkefi, 2015, Tunis) and a supervision system was built for high school students. As 
claimed by Sahbi Attig, the minimum recruitment age was 16 years old (Interview, Attig, 2015, 
Tunis). There were mushrifs (supervisors), each supervised ten schools and had specific duties. 
Some focused on religious education and preaching, some guided students to participate in 
political affairs in local units of MTI, and others organized cultural events (Interview, Habachi, 
2015, Tunis). In 1985, the MTI formed the Union Générale Tunisienne des Étudiants (UGTE) 
which soon took ground in universities and became the second largest student organization next 
only to the leftist UGET. The creation of a student union and increasing presence on campuses 
were vital in compensating for the party’s exclusion from the formal political arena (Torelli, 
2016, p. 35) and from labor unions dominated by the UGTT.  
According to Attig, only people over 20 were eligible to obtain official membership in the 
1980s. Younger students between 16 and 20 could only work as sympathizers without 
membership. They worked as reserve units and were well exposed to the MTI’s conferences, 
seminars, private house meetings, mosques, etc. before being recruited as members (Interview, 
Attig, 2015, Tunis). 
The complex structure and financial backing of the MTI’s extensive branches organized 
through bylaws and networks with Islamic NGOs proved to be an advantage compared to 
secular opposition parties which were limited to a few geographic regions and failed to establish 
nationwide networks partly due to lack of funding (Karawan, 2001, p. 181). This is elaborated in 
the following section, in which a comparison of the party’s structures to those of its secular 
rivals is conducted, and how the MTI’s organizational dynamic affected its mobilization in the 
1989 election is explained.  
 
Attending Elections  
The 1989 election was the first time that the MTI was allowed to run for an election since its 
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formation, although party members had to launch campaigns as individual candidates due to its 
lack of legal recognition. There is debate as to the factors that affected Islamist parties’ 
participation or lack of participation in electoral politics. Whereas Lewis (1996, pp. 52-63), 
Kepel (1994, pp. 193-194), and Bukay (2007, pp. 71-79) stress the importance of Islamist parties’ 
ideological dimensions, such as to what extent the Islamist activists compromise Islamist goals 
and accept pluralist political institutions, Wegner (2011), Sinno and Khanani (2009) emphasize 
other elements including the elections’ level of fairness and Islamist parties’ organizational 
structure. My historical research on the MTI corresponds with the second theory. The MTI’s 
responses to Ben Ali’s policies in the late 1980s show that when divisions between hard- and 
soft-liners exist within an Islamist party, unfair elections and party rules are likely to affect the 
party’s decision to engage in electoral participation by intensifying internal debates. In 
December 1988, to comply with a new law prohibiting the creation of political parties on 
religious bases, Ghannouchi changed the party’s name from MTI to Ennahda (Renaissance) — a 
vague term which did not directly refer to religion, but complied with the party’s ideology of 
“Islamic renaissance” (Shahin, 2013, p. 217). Further, before the 1989 legislative election, 
Ghannouchi initially considered that his party should “represent a symbolic presence” by only 
having 5 candidates stand in 25 constituencies to avoid arousing Ben Ali’s alarm (Hermassi 
1995, p. 112). By taking these actions, Ghannouchi tried to demonstrate that his party only 
wanted to be part of the formal politics as a legal party with no intention to replace the ruling 
party. Nonetheless, when the MTI’s application of legal recognition was refused, the long-
standing hard- and soft-line debates were sharpened. The hardliners represented by Chourou 
considered that Ben Ali was as untrustworthy as Bourguiba, and that it was time for the party to 
claim its rightful place in Tunisia’s political scene (Wolf, 2017, p. 70). Given Ben Ali’s refusal 
to legalize the MTI, Chourou’s proposal to run electoral lists in as many constituencies as 
possible to exert pressure on Ben Ali gained more support from the party’s leadership than 
Ghannouchi’s advocacy of partial participation in the election. Ghannouchi thus had to agree 
with the party members’ full participation in the 1989 election as independent candidates (Ibid).   
After the decision to have full participation in elections was made, it did not take long for the 
MTI to display its organizational strength over many of its secular rivals. Among the five legal 
secular parties apart from RCD, the RSP, PUP, UDU and PSP were only able to field candidates 
in several districts (Zartman, 1989). Alhough the Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes (MDS), 
the largest secular opposition party created by defectors from PSD/RCD, presented candidates in 
23 out of 25 constituencies5, it suffered from party splintering after Ben Ali transferred one of its 
founders, Hamouda Ben Slama, to the RCD and promoted him to Secretary of State for Public 
                                                   
5 
 As the MDS was prohibited to campaign in two of the constituencies due to ineligible 
candidates and sponsors, it actually contested in 21 constituencies. See (Zartman, 1989). 
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Health. This not only damaged the MDS’s unity but created the impression that the MDS 
worked hand-in-hand with ruling elites (Murphy, 1999, p. 183). In contrast, the MTI sent 
candidates to all but one district6 and competed for 129 out of 141 seats in parliament (Dunn, 
1994, p. 157). It not only endeavored to maintain and develop its networks, but wooed votes by 
offering services, such as escorting civilians to their meetings and to the ballot stations during 
the election period (Hermassi, 1995, p. 113). 
Debate has focused on whether nationalism and religion are opposing or complementary 
forces in Arab politics. Whereas Moaddel (2002) and Zubaida (2004) argue that nationalism and 
religion complement each other in certain cases, Tibi (1997) contends that tensions always exist 
between Islam and Arab nationalism. My research on the MTI’s discourses in the 1980s supports 
the first argument, as it used both nationalist and religious slogans. To consolidate its legitimacy 
in addition to criticizing the regime as not religious enough, the MTI used nationalist slogans 
and attributed Tunisia’s underdevelopment to French colonialism. The MTI Ghannouchi (1984, 
pp. 168-169) argued in his book Maqaalaat (Articles), the cause of all the economic, social and 
political grievances in Tunisia was the westernization policies implemented by the westernized 
elites. He considered that these elites formed a pro-western privileged circle which abandoned 
Tunisia’s original culture, exercised their own prerogatives, and guaranteed the previous 
colonists’ economic and political interests — all at the expense of the masses (Ibid). Hence, 
problems such as unemployment, autocracy and corruption were, in his view, actually identity 
problems which could not be resolved without “gaining a clear idea of who we are and to which 
culture we are attached” (Ghannouchi, 1992, p. 22). Following this logic, even if the ruling elites 
were replaced with opposition secular, pro-western forces, they were likely to follow similar 
trajectories and the existing problems would remain. In the MTI’s eyes, this scenario could not 
be overcome unless the anti-western Islamists seized power. 
 Anti-imperialism rhetoric motivated the public’s nationalist emotions and served as rationale 
for people to take actions against the pro-West regime such as voting against the regime party. 
By accusing Tunisia’s westernized elites of serving the interests of the West, the MTI offered an 
answer as to why none of the socialist and liberal experiments in post-independent Tunisia had 
ever satisfied the masses’ expectations. A combination of nationalist and religious slogans 
distinguished MTI’s message from that of the secular parties and enabled it to build a strong 
mobilizing image of being the only force capable of bringing real transformation to the country.  
In addition to diagnosing the causation of socio-economic problems, MTI also provided 
solution with a reference to religious slogans. As Wiktorowicz (2004, p. 18) argues, Islamists 
sometimes unite religious elements with nonreligious themes to maximize access to the 
                                                   
6  MTI/Ennahda was disallowed to contest in three of the constituencies, so it actually 
campaigned in 21 constituencies. See (Zartman, 1989, p. 14). 
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dissatisfied populations and gain broad support. The MTI’s platforms and slogans in the 1980s 
fitted this scenario, as it merged religious ideologies with realistic evaluation of the practical 
issues confronting Tunisian citizens. In response to Tunisians’ socio-economic dissatisfaction, it 
addressed social justice, a main topic in the party’s 1988 manifesto released at a public press 
conference. The manifesto promised to “distribute the country’s wealth … to each according to 
his efforts and to each according to his needs” (Hamdi, 1998, p. 182). Meanwhile, the manifesto 
specified platforms to respond to various groups’ concerns. To attract low-income groups from 
southern Tunisia whose main concern was poverty, it promised to “ensure a balance among the 
regions” (Ibid), and to guarantee everyone’s “rights to food, health, education, housing and all 
other basic requirements for a dignified life” (p. 183). Regarding the youth’s discontent with 
unemployment and social marginalization, the MTI promised to “guarantee employment for 
them”, “facilitate their integration into society”, and “prepare them well for the challenges … 
with a sound education” (Ibid). Hence, the MTI not only related the students’ self-identity 
concerns with their socio-economic needs, but proposed solutions — following Islamic 
principles including social justice. For this reason, it made headway in schools and universities 
in the north, as well as in the southern wilayas. In fact, during the student election of 1988, 
UGTE, the student union affiliated with MTI, won 85% of the vote share (Kaboub, 2014, p. 72). 
In the 1989 election, residents from southern wilayas provided a significant support base for 
MTI (Cook, 2017, p. 160).   
Furthermore, the MTI’s extensive structures and networks enabled it to relate party messages 
meaningfully to practices. By building Islamic communities, and communicating with and 
assisting underprivileged people, it tried to demonstrate its core argument — the party itself 
could improve social justice, equality, and fairness by putting Islamic scriptures into real life 
action, and distinguished itself from the secular parties which also talked about infrastructure 
construction, unemployment, and expansion of the people’s rights. It proved that the MTI’s 
relating of preaching to practices offered a credible alternative, which contributed to broadening 
its audience and to forcing its way into public discourse. 
By demonstrating organizational strength as the largest opposition party in terms of 
membership and branch offices, and by proclaiming that Islam was the way to bring justice and 
solve socio-economic problems as a response to the core demands of the Bread Riots of 1984, 
the MTI created an image of being the party mostly likely to supply “benefits”, or rather 
prospects of changing the status quo. This made the party appealing to various social groups, 
especially the unemployed youth in urban regions and low-income social groups from the south 
who desperately aspired to change their living and employment conditions (Guidère, 2017, 
p.450). Nonetheless, the hardline members’ use of violence, and some candidates’ conservative 
discourses in campaigns aroused worry among some citizens about the “costs”, or rather 




Party Disputes and Mobilization Outcome 
In 1987, when many MTI activists including Ghannouchi were imprisoned, the party’s 
hardliners, led by Karkar, set up a short-lived clandestine armed wing called the “Security 
Group”, aiming to counteract the regime’s crackdown violently (Dunn, 1994a, p. 156; Shahin, 
1998, p. 98). There were rumors that the Security Group plotted to attack security personnel 
(Wolf, 2017, pp. 65-66). The armed wing stopped operation when Karkar secretly fled Tunisia at 
the end of 1987 before he was sentenced to the death penalty in absentia. Though Ghannouchi 
claimed that the Security Group’s activities were “not part of the movement orientations, in spite 
of the exceptional circumstances surrounding them” (Hermassi, 1991, p. 199), the existence of 
an armed flank increased the worry, on the part of secular parties, civil society groups, and some 
citizens, about the MTI’s propensity for violence, and created distrust of the party’s “self-
representation as moderate and democratic” (Cavatorta & Haugbølle, 2012, p. 869; Willis, 2012, 
p. 175). Moreover, the MTI’s oscillation between peaceful and violent positions later provided 
grounds for the Prime Minister to argue that the Islamist party “speaks more than one language” 
in 1990 (Hamdi, 1998, p. 85) and cite this as an excuse to repress it.  
The MTI’s inconsistency was also demonstrated in its positions on women issues. 
Ghannouchi realized in early 1980s that the party needed to be less dogmatic regarding the 
application of sharia and women issues. But this was not translated into a platform, institution, 
or consensus in the party as a whole. In fact, a conservative faction of the MTI still held on to 
the party’s early ideas regarding the full implementation of sharia and women’s issues. When 
the party launched its electoral campaign, conservative rhetoric appeared in candidates’ speeches 
from time to time. Muhammad Lakhoua, a 65-year-old independent candidate of MTI expressed 
support for building an Islamic state with laws based upon sharia in campaigning speeches, and 
opposed any attempt to adapt Islam to the contemporary world. He proposed the implementation 
of hudud (physical punishment to wives), advocated the overturn of Bourguiba’s Personal Status 
Code which abolished polygamy and improved women’s status, and argued that women should 
stay at home (Hermassi, 1995, p. 117). 
Such rhetoric aroused worries among citizens, especially women, about a reduction of 
freedom if the MTI took power, particularly in the context in which illiberal practices such as 
polygamy and hudud had already been rejected through “implicit social consensus” of tolerance, 
as Cavatorta and Merone (2013, p. 866) argue based on interviews and examination of scholarly 
literature.  
  In sum, we can see that MTI’s electoral mobilization in 1989 basically fitted the scenario of 
successful mobilization in which it increased its support base remarkably. The areas in which it 
translated opportunities to its — and its voters — benefit can be seen as fulfilling three key 
categories: 1) the Islamist party gained the opportunity to compete in the elections through 
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independent candidates, 2) it built organizational strength through extensive branch offices and 
networks all over the country, and 3) it produced a cohesive message through a combination of 
religious and nationalist slogans. These various elements taken together enabled MTI to appear 
to be an effective alternative to the ruling party, and to offer citizens clear benefits, particularly 
for the educated youth in coastal regions who sought employment and identity, and the low-
income employees dissatisfied with the gap in regional development. Yet, the MTI’s 
inconsistencies regarding the use of violence and women issues created fear among many 
citizens, especially female citizens, about the potential costs such as a decline in gender equality. 
Bringing large “benefits” but certain “costs” for citizens, the MTI increased its support base with 
small success. Though the largest opposition party, it was still unable to outrank the regime party, 
RCD.    
  According to the official outcome of the 1989 legislative election, the independent candidates, 
almost all of whom were MTI adherents, gained around 17% of the vote (Toumi, 1989, p. 278), 
making the party the largest opposition party. None of the other non-regime parties acquired 
more than 5% of the vote. Rumors arose that the election figure was falsified, and some sources 
indicated that the MTI’s actual vote share might have been as high as 30% (Burgat & Dowell, 
1993, p. 34), and some MTI activists even claimed that their vote share should have been 
overwhelming (Interview, Abdellkefi, 2015, Tunis).   
There might be no way to know the exact electoral outcome in 1989, but Ben Ali was not 
reassured by the enormous vote share won by his party, RCD, and identified the MTI as the 
biggest, if not only, political threat to his rule. Although the regime determined the outcome in 
any event to ensure that no party could outrank it in terms of number of officially recognized 
votes, and that RCD swept every seat, Ben Ali tightened his control and supervision of MTI 
activities immediately after the election. This drove Ghannouchi into self-exile. The MTI was 
soon banned, and around 8,000 party members were imprisoned (Shahin, 1998, p. 101). Chapter 
5 examines how MTI activists survived, maintained the party structure and networks, and 
continued their careers in political activism from 1991 to 1999. Before moving on to the MTI’s 
development after the 1989 election, I note the electoral trial of an Algeria’s Islamist party, the 
HMS, which shared a similar organizational structure and ideological base as MTI, but adopted 
a different mobilization strategy, causing less successful electoral results and arousing less 
hostility from the regime than MTI, as elaborated below.   
 
HMS’s Belated Participation in Elections of 1990-1991 
Algeria’s elections in 1990-1991 are the subject of many analyses. With few exceptions, most 
literature only examines the rise of the largest Islamist party, the FIS (Bouandel, 1993; Chhibber, 
1996; Kapil, 1990; Sutton, 1992; Tahi & Iratni, 1991). This section on HMS’ first electoral trial 
contributes to the research by observing the mobilizational efforts, capacity, and outcome of a 
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less popular Islamist party, the HMS. It shows that Islamist parties inspired by the MB, with 
receipt of abundant funds from the MB or Gulf countries, extensive branch offices and networks, 
and the slogan of “Islam is everything” do not necessarily demonstrate strong mobilizational 
capacity. It begins by describing popular wrath against the regime which culminated in Black 
October of 1984. The tension of this period was exploited by Islamists to reach out to the 
populace and exert even more pressure on the regime by intensifying the unrest. It then goes on 
to evaluate the background of Algeria’s political liberalization reforms and controlled inclusion 
policy towards various Islamist groups. Then, I analyze how and why Nahnah’s strategies 
hindered his party from mobilizing mass support similar to its rival, the FIS.  
 
Black October 
  The socio-economic development and changes in Algeria in the post-independent era did not 
deviate significantly from the pattern of Tunisia. Like its neighbor, Algeria’s economy 
underwent a transformation from a socialist central-planned economy to a liberal market-
oriented economy. In the early 1980s, Algeria was hit hard by the fall of international oil prices 
as it made up 97% of the country’s export revenue (Willis, 2012, p. 238). For fear of 
international interference in its internal affairs, Algeria refused to turn to international financial 
institutions for help, like its neighbor Tunisia did. Nonetheless, it turned out that President 
Bendjedid developed the same measures as were proposed by IMF to address the economic 
crisis: cutting subsidies on commodities and freezing salaries (Ibid). It was due to this 
background that Walton and Seddon (1994, p. 171, 173) grouped together the Algerian “Black 
October” of 1988 and the Tunisian “Bread Riot” in 1984 as the “outbursts of popular unrest” 
precipitated by “significant increases in the cost of basic goods and services” due to structural 
adjustment. 
  Nonetheless, the two similar social unrests originated in different contexts and followed 
divergent trajectories. First, the Algerian and Tunisian uprisings reflected different roots of 
public discontent. As Hugh Roberts (2003, p. 107) argues, in the Algerian case, “the rioters were 
not expressing specifically economic grievances at all, and … the riots ended without the 
slightest concession being made to the people in the sphere of economic policy”. Even though 
Algeria and Tunisia suffered similar predicaments such as corruption, unemployment, a wealth 
gap, and regional development disparity, the economic collapse dealt a worse psychological 
blow to the Algerians. Unlike Tunisia which was a “small country”, Algeria took pride in being 
the leader of the non-Aligned movement and a hardline country towards Western powers in the 
1960s. Thus, the economic deterioration of Algeria in the early 1980s caused psychological gap 
in Algerian society. This was the background against which protesters expressed a strong 
nostalgia for the revolution era which, in their minds, was “les temps quands l’Algérie pensait 
par elle même” (the time when Algeria thought for itself) (Roberts, 2003, p. 356). Such nostalgia 
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shook the foundation of FLN’s governance, and finally played into the hands of the FIS which 
established an Islamist conception of nationalism, as explained below.  
  It is worth noting that the women’s role in the unrest of 1980s was different in the two 
countries. Unlike Bourguiba who removed forcefully many traditional constraints on women in 
Tunisia, Algerian leaders in the first three decades after independence actually revived Islamic 
traditions which maintained “male authority and control over females” (Marshall & Stokes, 1981, 
p. 635). The policies that undermined gender equality were partly attributed to the regime’s 
orientation toward Islamic socialism and its compromises with religious ulemas. But the more 
important reason was Boumediène’s belief that Algeria’s industrial development and national 
power relied on demographic growth. As such, the regime emphasized women’s domestic role 
of bearing and raising as many children as possible (Knauss, 1987, p. 111). Under the influence 
of this policy, the proportion of Algerian women without paid work reached 97% in the 1980s 
(Moghadam, 2001, p. 135). By the time that the Black October uprisings occurred, Algerian 
women’s political consciousness and engagement were minimal. Thus, unlike the Tunisian bread 
riots, the unrest in Algeria in 1988, along with many smaller-scale rural protests at the time, 
were dominated by “young men and boys” (Roberts, 2002a, p. 21), which was reflected in 
popular slogans such as “Nahnu rejal (We are men)”. This provided a background to understand 
why the FIS was directed at men when it conducted its electoral mobilization in 1989-1991, why 
FIS’ very conservative discourses did not raise the same level of worry among citizens about a 
loss of gender freedom as MTI did, and why Nahnah’s women-friendly rhetoric did little to 
enlarge his group’s support base. These points will be further discussed in later sections.  
   Similar to what occurred during the Tunisian bread riot, the Islamist forces, which were not 
significant factors in the initial uprisings, soon stood by the side of protesters and went on to the 
front line in the riots. Although all kinds of opposition organizations in Algeria, including 
communists and trade unionists, tried to exploit the uprisings to bargain with the regime (Stone, 
1997, p. 65), their responses to the rioters were not as swift as the Islamists, and they were 
hesitant to openly support the protesters against the regime (Eur, 2003, p. 161). On the second 
day of the unrest, Algerian Islamists launched a separate demonstration in the suburbs to echo 
the popular unrest (Driessen, 2014, p. 145). Like their Tunisian counterparts, Algerian Islamist 
leaders promoted slogans calling for an “Islamic republic” (Porter, 2011, p. 192). Additionally, 
radical Islamists took the lead in destroying official party facilities including FLN offices and 
sites that were inconsistent with sharia such as brothels and liquor stores (Eur, 2003).  
It is worth bearing in mind that the Algerian Islamist spectrum was more complicated than 
that in Tunisia. Unlike in Tunisia where the MTI was the major Islamist party engaging actively 
in the unrest, Algeria witnessed several Islamist groups involved in Black October including 
members of the Badissiya, Jazairiyya, and Djaballah’s group, among others. Yet, the Islamist 
figures that played the most conspicuous role in the riots were Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj 
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who later co-founded the FIS. On the 6th day of the riot, Ali Belhadj, a young imam of a mosque 
in Bab al-Oued, organized a speech to back protesters in the Place des Martyrs at the center of 
Algiers which attracted over a hundred protesters as soon as it started (Stone, 1997, p. 64). 
Though the speech was soon disrupted by the regime, Ali Belhadj became known for his high-
profile support for Black October. In comparison, leaders of Al-Jama’a al-Muwahadin (JM) and 
Badissiya group, Nahnah and Sahnoun, kept a lower profile. Unlike Abassi Madani and Ali 
Belhadj, Sahnoun disagreed with the approach of political engagement to Islamize society. As 
for Nahnah, after he promised President Bendjedid that he would not confront the regime in 
exchange for his freedom, he started to avoid direct political involvement in social unrests. 
Consequently, although Sahnoun and Nahnah enjoyed the highest prestige as Islamist scholars, it 
was Madani and Belhadj who were perceived as political pioneers of counter-regime protests. 
This helped lay the foundation for their future party, the FIS, to become the leading electoral 
Islamist force in 1989 when Bendjedid opened up the political system. The following section 
explains why the regime responded to the social unrest by changing the one-party system to a 
competitive pluralist institution, and what the new political opportunity meant to diverse Islamist 
groups.  
 
 Bendjedid’s Political Liberalization 
  Much as is Tunisia, the Algerian regime adopted carrot-and-stick methods to handle the 
nationwide protest wave. On the one hand, the security service brutally repressed protestors 
during the Black October unrest by firearms (Walton & Seddon, 1994, p. 204), resulting in a 
death toll of 500 (Globe and Mail, 1988) and injuries to 1,000 (Refworld, 1989) within seven 
days. On the other, Bendjedid’s regime increased political openness for opposition groups by 
replacing informal tolerance policies with controlled inclusion policies which allowed the parties 
to come out of hiding to take on an official standing. This opening meant that although a 
multiparty system was formalized and specified in the party law promulgated in July, and 
marked an end to the one-party rule which had characterized Algeria since its independence 
(Entelis, 2013, p. 153), the regime tried to control electoral politics both by manipulating 
electoral laws and by covert means.  
Compared to the Tunisian liberalization reform initiated by Ben Ali, the pluralist system 
proposed by Bendjedid was more competitive, as it legalized political forces of all hues, 
including Islamist parties. An important reason why the level of political openness differed in 
the two countries was that the elite’s power struggle in Algeria in 1988-1989 was more intense 
than in Tunisia. As was above-mentioned, Bendjedid, who advocated de-Boumediènisation and 
economic liberalization, had been stifled by Boumediènists in the military and FLN. Unlike Ben 
Ali who established dominance in the RCD by replacing supporters of Bourguiba with his 
followers, Bendjedid was not able to do the same as he faced pressure from the military and 
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found himself isolated within the FLN. Seeing the FLN’s decline in ruling legitimacy and the 
weakening of his own position after the 1988 October unrest, Bendjedid deliberately kept a 
distance from the FLN (Dillman, 1992, p. 33) and strived to play the role of “an arbiter above 
the arena in which future party competition would take place” (Mortimer, 1991, p. 579). To 
strengthen the anti-Boumediènist camp, Bendjedid appeased and reached out to the Islamist 
forces not only by dialoguing with prominent Islamist figures including Sahnoun, Nahnah, 
Madani, and Belhadj during the riot (Driessen, 2014, p. 145), but by offering Islamist parties 
legal status (Cheriet, 1992). 
Nonetheless, the intention to increase political openness and conciliate the Islamists was more 
a ploy to renew constitutional legitimacy and balance the elite’s power struggle (Michiel, 1996, 
p. 221) than to provide real chances for power alternation. Bendjedid’s approach, therefore, can 
be understood as flooding the scene with multiple party activities, so as to reduce the individual 
success of any one of them. To prevent opposition parties, especially Islamist ones, from 
challenging the ruling party by gaining a large share of the vote, Bendjedid not only 
gerrymandered electoral districts by laws that favored less populated areas where the FLN was 
likely to win (Roberts, 2003, p. 78), but used covert means to foster their fragmentation by 
reducing thresholds for all sorts of new parties to enter electoral politics, and promoting distrust 
among opposition forces (Lust-Okar & Jamal, 2002, p. 344). This resulted in the emergence of 
three Islamist parties competing at elections in the early 1990s. The same tactic was also used to 
handle the Berberist camp, provoking competition between two Berber-based parties, namely 
FFS and RCD. As discussed below, this divide-and-rule strategy intensified fragmentation 
within the Islamist camp. An important outcome was that Algeria’s electoral Islamist resources 
were never integrated into one single Islamist party as happened in Tunisia.  
 
Algeria’s Political Spectrum in the Early 1990s and the Challenge from FIS  
Subsequent to Bendjedid’s political reforms, Algeria witnessed a proliferation of political 
parties, including newly created parties and several newly legalized parties which had existed 
before. The 44 political parties emerging in 1989-1990 could be categorized into 4 camps: left-
wing, liberalist, Berberist and Islamist. Among them, the leftist parties such as the Parti des 
Travailleurs (PT) and Parti Socialiste des Travailleurs (PST) were small in size at their inception 
and suffered declining influence along with the collapse of the leftist ideology after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Eastern Block in the early 1990s. The 
liberalist parties were mostly personality-based parties composed of the entourage of a single 
politician. The Mouvement Algérien pour la Justice et le Développement (MAJD), for instance, 
was created by former Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah. Originating from ruling elites’ power 
struggle, these parties acted more like vehicles for politicians’ personal ambitions, with little 
interest in the populace’s concerns, and were thus less likely to become popular parties 
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(Bouandel, 1993, p. 13). Berber-based parties had their limitations because their platforms of 
reviving Berber culture and Tamzight languages aroused little sympathy in Arab-dominated 
constituencies. Considering the other camps’ limitations, the only force that seemed likely to 
gain popular support and compete with the ruling party was the Islamist camp. 
  In the late 1980s, divergences arose concerning creating political parties and who should lead 
the Islamist movement. Nahnah and Djaballah were deeply hesitant around the issue of electoral 
participation. This was both because they prioritized Islamic reform of society rather than 
conquest of political power (Roberts, 2003, p. 131), and because they were suspicious of the 
regime’s motivation and sincerity in lifting the one-party system. As Bouslimani, deputy of 
Nahnah, later claimed at the HMS’ first congress in 1991, “Hamas did not experience a cesarean 
birth” (El Watan, 1991). Leaders of the JM and JI considered that the time was not ripe for the 
creation of political parties in 1989 and only took a small step by transforming their secret 
activities into explicit political activism. To do so, they both transformed their original 
clandestine groups into formal Islamist organizations, namely, Al-Irchad wa al-Islah (II) (The 
Association for Guidance and Reform) and Al-Jama'a al Nahda (JN) (The Renaissance Group). 
Meanwhile, Nahnah also founded the Union Générale des Étudiants Libres (UGEL) which soon 
became a national student union second only to the FLN’s Union Nationale des Étudiants 
Algériens (UNEA). Nahnah’s strategy was to keep a low profile and avoid the regime’s attention 
by not being the first to create a political party, while expanding branches on campuses and at 
local levels to achieve his goal to Islamize society through bottom-up methods. It was only after 
Nahnah and Djaballah saw the creation and rise of the FIS that they built their own political 
parties and expressed an intention to participate in elections. Djaballah’s Movement de la 
Renaissance Islamique (MRI) was formed in the autumn of 1990, while Nahnah announced in a 
press conference the creation of Hamas (HMS) as late as May 29, 1991 (El Watan, 1991). 
Nahnah and Djabllah’s holding back did not obstruct other Islamists from pressing ahead with 
the engagement in party politics and elections. Madani and Belhadj, who had already 
demonstrated strong political activism by taking prominent roles in the 1988 Bread Riot, were at 
the forefront of creating political parties as soon as the President expressed the intention of 
opening political space. On February 18, 1989, they formed the first Algerian Islamist party, FIS, 
in Algiers (Jeune Afrique, 2008). From its inception, FIS aimed to seize political power by 
winning elections. It tried to assemble Islamist resources and gather together members from 
diverse Islamist tendencies (Joffé, 2012, p. 125). It was reported that shortly before the 
formation of FIS, that its future Vice President, Belhadj, had invited Nahnah to participate in 
establishing the party. Yet, Nahnah refused with a condescending posture (Al-Ahnaf et al., 1991, 
p. 37). In Nahnah’s eyes, the young Salafist Belhadj was a “kid” and “parvenu” (Walsh, 2007, p. 
244), whose intention of swiftly creating a political party and conquering political power ran 
counter to Nahnah’s belief that bottom-up missionary work should precede the creation of an 
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Islamic state (Roberts, 2003, p. 131; Utvik & Tønnesen, 2008, p. 20; Esposito & Voll, 2015, p. 
164). Morover, as a senior Islamic scholar, Nahnah preferred to keep absolute control over his 
organization and acquire a major place in the Islamist movement, rather than sharing authority 
with Madani and Belhadj. Prompted by the swift rise of FIS, Nahnah held a large-scale meeting 
in Algiers on September 20, 1990 aiming to integrate the country’s Islamist movement into a 
single unit. Over 300 Islamic associations and minor parties including Djaballah’s new party, 
MRI, attended. Yet, the largest Islamist party, FIS, rejected Nahnah’s invitation as it considered 
his attempt to gather all Islamist groups as challenging the FIS’ dominance (Roberts, 2003, p. 
67). 
The FIS imitated many of MB’s organizational structures such as the multi-tier membership 
and pyramidal structure composed of the Congress, Majlis Shura, and Political Bureau, and had 
institutes both at the national and local levels (Ruedy, 2005, p. 253). Additionally, according to 
Redissi and Lane (2013, p. 232) whose research was based upon newspaper reports and personal 
interviews, the FIS drew experience from MB in terms of building networks with diverse NGOs 
with funding from Saudi Arabia. Its plan was to increase the party’s propaganda channels and 
capabilities of providing social services. In addition to copying MB tactics, it developed a 
distinctive organizational dynamic. As an Islamist party that had been suddenly established and 
did not originate from any existing Islamist group, the FIS wooed members from all the existing 
Islamist groups. It not only created an all compassing atmosphere incorporating Islamists from 
both moderate and radical tendencies, but installed the diarchy leadership structure in which FIS 
President, Madani, spoke for middle-aged people, more moderate Islamist trends and the 
Islamist schools that emphasized Algerian culture, while party Vice-President Belhadj 
represented the message appealing to the dispossessed youth, pan-Islamist tendencies, and more 
radical Islamist schools (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p. 147; Roberts, 2003, p. 66). In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, seeing the fame that Madani and Belhadj gained by taking active roles in the 
Black October uprisings and building the first Islamist political party in Algeria, large numbers 
of Islamists from diverse tendencies including the Badissiya group, Jazairiyya, II/JN, and the 
Salafiyya current joined FIS, for fear of being marginalized (Joffé, 2012, p. 128).  
A unique strategy adopted by the FIS was to use nationalist rhetoric. One party asset that 
enabled this strategy to be effective was Madani’s participation in the FLN’s struggle during the 
Algerian War of Independence in the 1950s, based upon which the FIS claimed that it was the 
heir of the Algerian anti-colonial revolution. In view of the popular nostalgia for the ‘‘good old 
society’’ of the revolutionary era, as well as the widespread disappointment at the regime’s 
corruption, nepotism and incompetence, the FIS often used nationalist symbols to show that it 
was the legitimate heir of the core spirit of the Algerian revolution of November 1, 1954 — 
‘‘Islam is my religion, Algeria is my nation, and Arabic is my language’’ (Wyrtzen, 2014, pp. 
23-24). The FIS combined religious and nationalist ideas in its motivational discourse by 
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declaring that the nationalist spirit required all Algerians to be unified by their Arab and Muslim 
identity, and claiming that the reason why Algeria suffered so many socio-economic problems 
was that the ruling FLN did not insist on this Muslim identity in the post-independence era, 
instead importing Western values. Such a combination of religious and nationalist ideas is 
reflected in Madani’s claim that, “[t]he Algerian state in 1962 did not correspond whatsoever to 
the state about which we were dreaming on November 1, 1954…: an independent state based 
upon Islamic principles” during an interview, and his criticism of the regime for its “grave 
deviation, the opened door to ideological and intellectual misleadings with, as a consequence, 
their inevitable backlash effects from the political and economic viewpoints” (Bonora-Waisman, 
2003, p. 203). 
To enhance its influence and demonstrate its determination to bring radical changes, FIS 
organized rallies and demonstrations. On April 20, 1990, it orchestrated a rally that gathered600-
800, 000 marchers (Willis, 1996, pp. 122-123). In May 1991, it organized a general strike of 
indefinite duration which escalated into demonstrations and confrontation with the police. The 
strike involved 100, 000 participants, which exceeded the support that any Algeria’s Islamist 
group had ever been capable of attracting (Roberts, 2003, p. 74), and led the military to 
implement the state of siege. Hence, the FIS made itself a symbol of the Islamist camp, and 
distinguished itself from those Islamists who remained outside the party and kept their distance 
from protest politics (Willis, 1996, p. 123).  
In this context, despite his prestige as an Islamic scholar, Nahnah, who had established a 
political party in 1991 with extensive branch offices and networks, and tried to adopt strategies 
distinguishing it from FIS, was unable to challenge FIS’ leading role in the Islamist camp, as 
discussed below.  
 
HMS’ Unsuccessful Mobilization  
Six months before the first round of legislative elections planned for November 1991, Nahnah 
founded the political party of HMS for fear that the FIS would monopolize Algeria’s Islamist 
camp. The timing was unfavorable and too late, as two years had already elapsed since 
Bendjedid had launched the liberalization reform, and one year since the first pluralist election 
had taken place. Although to create a party at this late date might have had the advantage of 
protecting Nahnah and his followers from state repression, it also meant that his party was a 
new-comer in Algeria’s electoral politics, and could only play catch-up with FIS which had 
already taken control of 42 of 48 wilaya and 853 out of 1, 539 towns during the local elections in 
1990 (Roberts, 1991, p. 134).   
Before creating the political party, Nahnah had spent decades building networks with Islamic 
donors, intellectuals, mosques, and the student union to reform society through preaching 
(Driessen, 2014, p. 147). When the HMS was created, the party again copied the MB’s structure 
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by establishing a multi-tier membership system and building a Congress, Majlis Shura, and 
Political Bureau both at the national and local levels, paralleling the structures of not only 
Tunisia’s MTI but Algeria’s FIS and MRI.  
One difference between the FIS and HMS is that while the former party was characterized by 
the diarchy structure with Madani and Belhadji sharing the leadership, the HMS was known for 
the charismatic leadership of Nahnah who had the highest prestige and authority within the party. 
Additionally, although both the FIS and HMS combined inclusive and exclusive recruitment 
approaches, Nahnah did not attract members from other Islamist groups such as the Badissiya or 
the Salafiyya groups, unlike FIS’ attempt to attract Islamists from as many schools as possible 
and act like “Islamist umbrella organization” (Joffé, 2013, p. 200). When an official journal of 
the Algerian FLN, Révolution Africaine, asked whether the HMS had considered building 
alliances with other Islamist schools several months before the 1991 legislative election, Nahnah 
said “no” and claimed, “any alliance is based on our principles” (JPRS Report, 1991, p. 12). 
According to Benguage Mlouka, a senior member of the HMS’ Oran office, most HMS 
members were also members of JM/II and UGEL who agreed with Nahnah’s interpretations of 
Islam and the gradualist approach (Interview, Mlouka, 2015, Oran). As the JM/II already had 
extensive branch offices, HMS soon became a party with over 40 offices in 48 wilayas and 916 
municipal bureaus in 1541 municipalities (Al-Ahnaf et al., 1991, p. 41). This enabled HMS to 
field 380 candidates and compete in 88% of the constituencies in the 1991 parliamentary 
election, which was, next to the FIS — the only Islamist party that presented candidates in every 
all of the 430 constituencies (Bouandel, 1993, p. 13).   
Yet, the HMS’ large and extensive branches did not become a distinctive advantage compared 
to the FIS. As a recipient of substantial Saudi financial aid, according to Clasessen’s (2010, p. 62) 
research based upon fieldwork studies and interviews, the FIS had no fewer branches and no less 
funding than HMS. Moreover, although both FIS and HMS solved individuals’ daily problems 
at the local level by providing educational and clinical services to the poor with the help of their 
resources, networks, and NGOs, the FIS optimized its resources, as it also focused on major 
social problems such as providing disaster relief for the earthquake areas of Tipasa in October 
1989 (Roberts, 1991, p. 462), and sought high-profile publicity. Moreover, it is worth noting that 
the media were more inclined to cover the activities of the FIS than other Islamist parties, as it 
was well-known for being the first Algeria’s Islamist party to win local elections, which 
occurred in 1990. This explained why there was more coverage of the FIS’ establishment of the 
“Islamic souks” that provided lower price products for neighborhoods in Algiers during 
Ramadan of 1991 (Willis, 2014, p. 252) than the HMS, which also provided subsidies in many 
districts in the same period.  
In constructing HMS’ strategies, Nahnah emphasized the three characteristics which he felt 
distinguished his party from FIS, namely, the Islamic solution, moderate Islamist discourses, and 
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focus on women’s issues and their involvement in the Islamist movement (Ait-Hamadouche & 
Zoubir, 2007, pp. 119-120). Yet, none of these added much to HMS’ advantages in its electoral 
campaign.  
Like the FIS, the HMS also attributed the government’s dysfunction to its secular policies, 
and considered that only by following Islamic principles could Algeria get rid of poverty and 
unemployment. The HMS statutes released in May 1991 stated that it would “defend the values 
of the Algerian people, its fundamentals, and participate in resolving the crisis” (Dahmen, 2015, 
p.174). Despite the similarities, the FIS and HMS’ discourse differed in two aspects. First, 
lacking Madani-type figures who were veterans of the revolution, the HMS used fewer 
nationalist discourses than the FIS and discussed the 1954 war less. Second, although both the 
HMS and FIS used religious discourse as important mobilizational tools, the HMS distinguished 
itself as a moderate Islamist party by emphasizing peaceful and non-protest means, and by self-
representing as a party that respected and protected women’s rights. However, as citizens 
demanded radical change rather than moderate transformation, and as women’s issues were not 
the driving forces in Algeria’s society at the time, the moderate and pro-women’s discourse did 
little to help its mobilization. 
In the early 1990s, the HMS continued its predecessor’s approach of avoiding confronting the 
regime. In article 5 of the party statutes, HMS promised that it would only use peaceful means 
such as “dialogue as a civilized means of resolving disagreements”, and “political participation 
to choose representatives in constitutional institutions and to make peaceful contributions to the 
process of decision-making” (Ibid). In an interview with a reporter from Révolution Africaine, 
Nahnah claimed, “[f]ollowing the emergence of the notion of a new world order…we must work 
incessantly to provide a climate of national unity in a context of coordinated efforts, dialogue 
and love” (JPRS Report, 1991, p. 12). The HMS’ moderation was reflected in objection to the 
FIS’ general strike in May 1991 (Willis, 1996, p. 173; Esposito, 1999, p. 183). Yet, such 
moderate rhetoric did not work to translate citizens’ grievances into collective support for the 
HMS, because for many social groups such as the urban unemployed youth, rural residents and 
small merchants, the party’s non-engagement in protests reflected its unwillingness to bring 
“benefits” — a rejection of the regime and the change of the status quo. This showed that 
understanding the tone of voter’s demands, and priorities, is an important aspect of successful 
mobilization. 
Moreover, allegations against the HMS which claimed that the party was manipulated or even 
run by the Algerian regime, particularly the intelligence services, were regularly made by 
various opposition parties including the FIS. Abassi Madani, head of the FIS, even referred to 
Nahnah as “Chadli’s man” in an interview with Horizons (Willis, 1996, p. 169). Although to 
what degree senior figures in the HMS were actively working for the regime was unclear, such 
accusations had a negative impact on the support for the HMS, leading many citizens to consider 
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that the HMS’ moderate positions and non-engement in protests against the government actually 
demonstrated the possibility that it was exploited or controlled by the regime. 
Regarding women issues, scholarship on Islamist parties mainly examines two topics: (1) 
How Islamist parties explain their positions on women’s issues (Taraki, 1996; Winter, 2001; 
Ahmad, 2008); (2) What factors affect Islamist parties’ change of agenda regarding women’s 
issues (Saktanber, 2002; Sadiqi, 2016; Ayata & Tütüncü, 2008). Yet, what remains inadequately 
addressed is how Islamist parties’ different strategies regarding women issues affect their 
mobilization capacity. The HMS’ mobilizational efforts in the early 1990s raised an important 
question: Why didn’t the party enlarge its support base by showing more respect to women’s 
rights compared to Algeria’s FIS and Tunisia’s MTI?  
Since the early creation of JM, there were already many female activists who played active 
roles in the group’s discussions and activities (Interview, Mlouka, 2015, Oran). This was partly 
because Nahnah took a less conservative position towards women’s roles compared to the other 
Algerian Islamist groups. Another reason was that as its pro-regime and moderate positions 
made it suffer less from the regime’s apprehension than the Tunisian MTI did, the JM/II/HMS 
did not divide roles of husbands and wives into members and sympathizers like MTI, but gave 
many early female participants membership. Before the creation of HMS in 1991, the JM/II 
established an active women’s section which announced 13 commitments on women’s issues, 
including “condemning violence against women” and “demanding to reduce women’s working 
hours” (Al-Ahnaf et al., 1991, pp. 38-39). After HMS was created, it enhanced this trend of 
caring about women’s affairs and women’s rights, as the party saw it as an asset that 
distinguished it from the FIS. Unlike the FIS which considered that women were bound to look 
after families and advocated that women’s activities should be further restricted than they were 
in the Family Code (Joseph, 2000, p. 66), HMS protected women’s rights to work and lead a 
public life, and expressed its equal respect for housewives and working women (Al-Ahnaf et al., 
1991, pp. 38-39). HMS considered that women and men were equal “at work, in education, in 
the building of civilization” according to sharia (p. 116). To demonstrate its encouragement of 
women’s political involvement, HMS established 133 women’s sections at the municipal level 
across the country, accounting for nearly 15% of all the party’s offices in municipalities (p. 41).  
The HMS’ respect of women’s rights compared to other Algerian Islamist groups in the early 
1990s was noted and described by Al-Ahnaf et al. (1991, pp. 38-39), Kapil (1999, p. 45), and 
Hamadouche and Zoubir (2007, pp. 119-120). Yet, these works have not explained why the 
HMS failed to attract a greater number of women voters in 1991 by developing a favorable 
discourse for women. To answer this question, it is important to look into the electoral policies 
at the time. In fact, in the 1980s and 1990s, politics was largely considered as men’s business in 
Algeria. Not only were protests perceived as “men’s movements”, but women’s participation in 
voting was also minimal. In the local elections of 1990, it was commonplace to see husbands 
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and fathers voting on behalf of their wives and daughters in addition to casting votes for 
themselves (Evans & Phillips, 2007b, p. 169). Even after the regime enacted a law to prohibit 
“substitute voting” in 1991, it was not uncommon for women to vote under the instructions of 
their husbands and/or fathers (Interview, Sada, 2016, Algiers). Hence, the HMS’ close attention 
to women’s rights did not add much to its advantages in elections. 
When analyzing Islamist parties in Algeria, Roberts (1995, p. 239) and Shah-Kazemi (1998, p. 
89) viewed the HMS as an “elitist” party. Yet, when observing the HMS’ early mobilizational 
strategies, we find that it did not intend to cut itself off from the masses. As was above-
mentioned, the charity services provided by HMS and its relevant NGOs extended to remote 
regions and primarily targeted low-income individuals. Additionally, during the 1991 election, 
the HMS was already using the door-to-door campaigning method, aiming to reach out to as 
many voters as possible (Interview, Mlouka, 2015, Oran). This study considers that when trying 
to distinguish itself from the FIS by advocating a gradualist approach and moderate tones, HMS 
made itself more appealing to the well-educated urban middle class, especially intellectuals, who 
considered that socio-economic and political progress should be achieved by gradual reforms 
rather than fierce revolutions (Barka, 2012, p. 101). Nonetheless, the less educated and/or poorer 
social groups, including the urban unemployed youth and the low-income rural residents, aspired 
to see a swift change in their living conditions and were more attracted by FIS’ more radical 
positions. Meanwhile, a large number of small merchants and petty traders supported FIS’ 
proposal for “democratiz[ing] the opportunities to acquire wealth” by “chang[ing] the rules of 
games” (Martinez, 2000, p. 35). For social groups including the urban unemployed youth, rural 
residents and small merchants, the HMS’ moderate discourses and Nahnah’s deliberate 
avoidance of engaging in protests organized by other Islamist leaders seemed to show that the 
HMS had a weaker resolution to change the existing order implemented by the regime and bring 
true “benefits” for voters than the FIS. Therefore, it can be argued that the more “elitist” social 
base of the HMS in the early 1990s was an outcome rather than a cause of its image building as 
the more moderate Islamist party compared to FIS. Mourad Dhina, an activist of FIS and head of 
the party’s Executive Bureau from 2002 to 2004, summed up his comparison between the FIS 
and HMS pertaining to their discourses. He stated:    
 
I think the difference lay in the political message, which was very clear. The FIS had a 
radical message. It wished to change the regime which was, in their eyes, a totalitarian, non-
democratic and corrupt regime. There should be a dramatic change. Hamas never said 
something like that. It said, ‘No, we should change slowly” … The FIS responded to the 
people who participated in the great revolution in October 1988. People were fed up with the 
system of FLN. They wanted to change. The youth wanted a sort of revolution. But Hamas 




                                                                                               (Interview, Dhina, 2016, Skype) 
 
Hence, we find that unlike Tunisia where a single party, the MTI, represented 
institutionalized Islamism, Algeria’s field of institutionalized Islamism was much more 
fragmented. There were many Islamist parties in the Algerian political scene including the FIS, 
HMS, and MRI, and they each adopted different mobilization strategies. The FIS took a hardline 
position against the regime to show its intention to bring benefits (a change of the status quo) for 
citizens. The HMS constructed a new moderate, pro-government part of the field to reduce the 
risk of being repressed by the regime and show its willingness to reduce costs (potential of a 
reduction of freedom) for voters. The antagonism between these two parties became a useful 
element to define them each and their area of the field. For instance, HMS called FIS as the 
“Other” and labeled itself as the opposite to FIS. 
The HMS’s electoral mobilization in 1991 fit with the scenario of unsuccessful mobilization 
as its supply in many aspects dissatisfied citizens. Though Islamist parties were more tolerated 
by the regime and thus had more political opportunities in Algeria than in Tunisia, Nahnah 
created the structure for a kind of party different from Tunisia’s MTI or Algeria’s FIS, which 
tried to draw linkages with the government, be more open to women, and less committed to total 
revolution than gradual changes. Such a party took longer to construct, and did not have the 
same success as FIS achieved. Lacking anti-regime discourse and activities, and nationalist 
slogans as mobilization tools, the HMS failed to convince citizens that it was both willing to and 
legitimate to replace the regime party and bring them benefits. In the first round of the legislative 
election, while the FIS gained nearly half the votes, the HMS merely gained 5.3% of the valid 
vote share (JORA, 1992). 
  As Dahl (1971, p. 15) argues, “The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition 
increases as the expected costs of toleration decrease”. Similar to what occurred in Tunisia, the 
FIS’s electoral achievement was denied by a military coup in 1992, and it experienced 
clampdowns immediately after demonstrating mass popularity in the 1991 election. As for HMS, 
though its moderate approaches made it a less popular party, they brought fewer setbacks for it 
and enabled it to suffer less from the regime’s repressions compared to Tunisia’s MTI and 
Algeria’s FIS. Moreover, throughout the 1990s, the banning of FIS and the outbreak of Algerian 
civil war brought new opportunities for the HMS, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
    
Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the MTI/Ennahda and HMS’ first electoral trial against the backdrop of 
liberalization reforms followed by mass upheavals in the two countries in the 1980s. It suggests 
the necessity of exploring the electorate’s demands, and Islamist parties’ response to these 
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demands through their organizational and movement strategies.  
In sum, both Tunisia and Algeria witnessed a large-scale wave of discontent and anger with 
corruption, injustice, inequality, unemployment, and psychological alienation in the mid- and 
late-1980s. In the following years, both countries implemented political liberalization which 
offered Islamists an opportunity to participate in elections formally or informally. Although both 
the MTI/Ennahda and HMS imitated the MB to build multi-level party institutions, adopt multi-
tier recruitment, combine nationalist and religious discourses, and relate parties’ messages 
meaningfully to daily practices, there was a great discrepancy in their mobilization outcomes. 
Unlike in Tunisia where institutionalized Islamism was represented by one single party, in 
Algeria the field of institutionalized Islamism was divided and fragmented.  
In its first electoral trial in 1989, the MTI/Ennahda became the largest opposition force in 
Tunisia but still lagged behind the regime party, RCD, for not being permitted to campaign as a 
formal party and its inconsistency due to the lack of internal coordination mechanism. 
Comparing to the MTI, the HMS demonstrated smaller mobilization capacity in the 1991 
legislative election. This could largely be attributed to, compared with its rival, the FIS, 
Nahnah’s long delay of founding a political party, as well as HMS’ moderate strategies which 
turned out to be unpopular among the Algerian electorate aspiring for a radical change.  
Although the MTI/Ennahda was more successful in enlarging its support base than the 
Algerian HMS, it underwent a bloody crackdown and was excluded from the political scene in 
the 1990s and 2000s, whereas HMS lost its rival FIS and remained part of electoral politics in 
the same period. The next two chapters analyze the shifts in political environment for Islamist 















Chapter 5   
Drastic Changes 
 
This chapter compares the mobilization of Ennahda and the HMS in 1992-1998. It examines 
(1) the Tunisian and Algerian governments’ policy shifts in response to Islamist parties’ 
electoral trials in the late 1980s and early 1990s; (2) how the two parties viewed the new 
opportunities, and adjusted their organizational structure and movement strategies; and (3) how 
new mobilization dynamics corresponded to voters’ demands and affected the Islamist parties’ 
mobilization capacity. 
I argue that Ennahda’s mobilization in the 1990s fit the scenario of abeyant mobilization in 
which an Islamist party operates underground to maintain its organization, networks, and 
resources. As Ennahda demonstrated the strength of being the largest opposition force in 1989, 
Ben Ali replaced the party’s political opportunity of informal tolerance with total exclusion. Yet, 
instead of dissolving itself, the party worked in abeyance by moving its organizational structures 
from Tunisia to the West, centralizing the party’s power, adopting a less inclusive recruiting 
method, and creating a rich political culture among exiled Nahdaouis (Ennahda activists) to 
ensure continued commitment of its members. Furthermore, to compete with Ben Ali’s official 
ideology, exiled Nahdaouis demonstrated their flexibility by accepting Western concepts such as 
pluralism, freedom of speech and modernity, but interpreted these concepts from an Islamic 
perspective.  
The second argument addresses HMS’ mobilization in the 1990s, which fit the scenario of 
successful mobilization in which an Islamist party enlarges its support base. As it was the FIS 
rather than HMS that achieved the largest vote share in the 1991 election, the regime 
implemented a total exclusion policy toward FIS, while continuing its controlled inclusion 
policy towards HMS. This provided HMS with critical opportunities to develop. Additionally, in 
the context of the bloody civil war between armed Islamists and the military, Nahnah’s rhetoric 
of moderate Islam as the solution fit in with people’s aspiration for peace, which explained the 
HMS’ mobilizational success in the mid- and late-1990s.  
 
Exclusion of Ennahda from the Political Scene 
As Ennahda was completely banned and repressed by the Tunisian government after 1991, it 
received little media coverage in the 1990s and Nahdaouis’ activities in the period have been 
little studied. With rare exceptions, the few works (Allani, 2009, p. 265; Hermassi, 1995, pp. 
124-126; Louden, 2015, pp. 7-8; Mabrouk, 2012, pp. 57-61;) that refer briefly to Ennahda in this 
period focus on the repression it suffered under Ben Ali’s regime. Works of Tamimi (2001), 
Wolf (2017, pp. 79-102), and Cavatorta & Merone (2013) give more detailed analysis of 
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Ennahda’s development in this period but have specific focuses. For instance, Tamimi (2001), 
Cavatorta and Merone (2013) focus on Ennahda’s ideologies and discourses in the 1990s. Wolf 
(2017, pp. 79-102) provides more details of the party’s structure and debates. Based upon these 
works and the qualitative data acquired in my fieldwork, this section on Ennahda’s evolution in 
the 1990s illustrates a more comprehensive picture of the different development trajectories of 
Nahdaouis in exile and those in Tunisia, and analyzes the party’s mobilization dynamics when 
working in abeyance. It begins by describing Ben Ali’s exclusion of Ennahda from the political 
scene and prosecution of Nahdaouis, followed by an elaboration of the President’s official 
interpretation of Islam. Then, it examines the way Nahdaouis in exile and in Tunisia maintained 
the party’s structure and networks in unfavorable political conditions. Lastly, it analyzes how 
Nahdaouis in exile adjusted their discourse in a new political climate, which would have 
consequences for the party in the long term.  
 
Prosecution Wave 
 The 1990s witnessed a worsening political environment in Tunisia. The regime not only 
excluded Ennahda from the political scene, but designed official ideology to marginalize 
Ennahda’s interpretation of Islam.  
Although Ennahda failed to take first place at the ballot box on April 2, 1989, Ben Ali was 
still alarmed by the momentum it gained, and viewed it as his regime’s largest challenger. The 
FIS’ impressive victory in wilaya and communal elections in neighboring Algeria in the 
following year further alarmed Ben Ali and fortified his resolution to remove all Islamists from 
the country’s political sphere (Camau, 1997, p. 7). In 1991, the informal tolerance policy 
towards Ennahda was replaced by total exclusion, and political opportunities for Ennahda’s 
operation were completely closed. By late 1991, the party was banned, the Al-Fajr newspaper 
was closed, and related organizations and trade unions including UGTE were dissolved (Allani, 
2009, p. 265; Willis, 2012, pp. 167-168). House-to-house searches of Nahdaouis and torture of 
arrested members became commonplace ("Chronology January 16, 1992-April 15, 1992 ", 1992, 
p. 497). 
Outraged at the regime’s exclusion of Ennahda in the parliament and its refusal to legalize it 
despite its large vote share in the 1989 election, Nahdaouis intensified protests in the street 
(Gana, 2013, p. 109). In this context, the regime deliberately attributed certain attacks and plots 
to Nahdaouis to create pretexts for government officials to apprehend Ennahda activists. For 
instance, on February 17, 1991, three Islamists were reported to have attacked an RCD office in 
the Bab Souika quarter in Tunis. Three months later, the Interior Minister claimed to have 
discovered an Islamist arms cache collected for a plot to subvert the President (Alexander, 2016, 
p. 60). Though no hard proof was provided to show that Ennahda had organized or engaged in 
these incidents (Ibid), the security services arrested over 200 Nahdaouis who were later 
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convicted by a military court on charges of being related to the attacks on state buildings and 
plots of overthrowing the state. Among the convicted, 19 people faced the death penalty, 
including Rachid Ghannouchi, who was already in London at the time (The Guardian, 1992). 
Incarceration and sentences continued in the following years and by late 1990, the number of 
apprehended Nahdaouis had reached 10,000 according to official figures (Mabrouk, 2012, p. 60); 
Ennahda claimed that as many as 20,000 activists became prisoners (Interview, Attig, 2015, 
Tunis). Remarkably, for fear that his crackdown on political opponents would shake his regime’s 
legitimacy and damage his international image, President Ben Ali tried to justify his repression 
of Islamists. To show that the true intention of the regime was not to prosecute political dissent, 
the government claimed at the trials and in official propaganda that the Islamist party had to be 
banned because it menaced liberal political principles (Ritter, 2014, p. 117).  
After 1992, influenced by the escalation of Algeria’s civil war between armed Islamists and 
the military, Ben Ali’s repression of Ennahda and its supporters tightened. In his eyes, President 
Bendjedid’s biggest mistake was to legalize the FIS and allow its formal participation in 
elections. The lesson Ben Ali learnt from Algeria was to take harsh measures towards Islamists 
in Tunisia (Naylor, 2015, p. 495). Ben Ali dramatically expanded Tunisia’s internal security 
apparatus from 20,000 at the start of his presidency up to 80,000 to repress dissidents, and keep 
the country’s 9 million citizens under surveillance (Alexander, 1997, pp. 35-36; Globe and Mail, 
1996). The country became a “police state”, as any criticism of the regime’s policies or any 
coverage of human-rights abuses could lead to harassment, interrogation or even imprisonment 
(Perkins, 2014, p. 204; Globe and Mail, 1996). 
In addition to closing the space for Ennahda to operate, Ben Ali intensified the state’s 
monopoly over interpretation of Islam. He established the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
organized official Islamic conferences, incorporated Islamic education in official curricula, 
monitored preaching in the mosques, and appointed imams trained by the regime (Lal, 2004, p. 
159-160). Ben Ali likewise developed and promoted the official ideology to marginalize 
Ennahda’s interpretation of Islam. To this end, the regime took three initiatives which made the 
state appear simultaneously as “provider and protector of Islam and as the repressor of Islam” 
(Haugbølle, 2015, p. 327). First, it frequently stressed in official rhetoric that Islam was a 
religion that unified Tunisians (McCarthy, 2014, p. 743), which bolstered the regime’s claim that 
the country was linked by one common national identity (Haugbølle, 2015, p. 325). This enabled 
the regime to prohibit any unofficial interpretations of Islam under the pretext that they 
represented sectarianism and divided Islam (p. 326). Second, it emphasized that Islam 
represented the values of tolerance (McCarthy, 2014, p. 743). Ben Ali insisted that Islamist 
groups like Ennahda ran counter to the principle of tolerance, because it rejected cooperation 
with secular parties and propagated conservative discourses including the depreciation of 
women’s status as shown in the 1989 election, which meant that if Ennahda assumed power, 
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citizens were likely to suffer the cost of losing freedom. Third, Ben Ali merged Bourguiba’s 
emphasis on modernization with “scientific evaluation of the sacred texts” (Le Renouveau, 1995), 
suggesting that the anti-imperialist Ennahda denied Western science and would not help 
Muslims find “the authentic religious faith” (Ibid). Ben Ali’s official version of Islam prompted 
the claim that Islam was “unifying, a symbol of tolerance, and a force of progress” (Le 
Renouveau, 1992). By establishing official ideology, Ben Ali tried to compromise Islam as a 
political and national mobilizing factor, and made Islam — an ideology and popular belief 
system — a tool of authoritarian politics rather than a motivational rhetoric of Islamist parties.  
However, Ennahda actually benefited from the competition with the official ideology in two 
ways. Above all, Haugbølle’s (2015, pp. 327-328) study of Tunisians’ expressions of Islam finds 
that citizens’ individual pursuit of meaningful existence in the 1990s created a quest for values. 
Based upon Haugbølle’s analysis, I argue that while Ben Ali set out criteria to differentiate Islam 
from a “distorted” use of Islam by labeling the interpretations that rejected solidarity, tolerance, 
and science as “fake Islam”, the official interpretation of Islam never explained what Islam was 
all about. Attempting to take over the religion, redefine it, and distort it for political purpose, the 
regime interpreted it in a way that lost meaning for Tunisians, especially the educated middle 
class who were marginalized from political and civic life, and wondered what their places were 
in the society and how they should respond to the responsibilities of their existence. Although 
Ben Ali acknowledged Tunisians’ Islamic identity and embraced Islam as a core element of the 
state, he discouraged the individual pursuit of knowledge about Islam and the personal practice 
of religion. In my interview with Jabbar, a lawyer who came from Tozeur, he state, “I was 
arrested once in 1995 just because I did salat al-fajr (dawn prayer) in the mosque… because the 
police assumed the ones who got up and pray in a mosque early in the morning to be religious 
people who might support Ennahda” (Interview, Jabbar, 2015, Tunis). Eight more of my 
interviewees described similar obstacles they faced when praying in the mosque in the 1990s. 
Meanwhile, as TV programs, magazines and newspapers discussed little about Islam, citizens 
found it hard to learn about and discuss religion. Consequently, the way that the regime re-
interpreted Islam and controlled the religious sphere caused increased demands in society to 
know what the religious identity really meant to them, leaving a gap for other interpretive 
versions of Islam to fill.  
Moreover, Ben Ali’s religious ideology provoked a competition between official and 
Ennahda’s interpretations of Islam. This stimulated Ennahda to adjust and modernize its 
discourse to show that its interpretation of religion worked better than the official version and 
was better tapped into the citizens’ demands, which strengthened   the credibility, upon its return, 
of an Islamic political ideology that was one of the victims of Ben Ali’s toxic regime, as 




Nahdaouis in Exile and in Prison  
Throughout the 1990s and the first decade of 2000s, though confronting circumstances 
unfavorable to mass mobilization, Ennahda did not disappear, but developed what Taylor (1989, 
p. 761) termed “abeyance structures”. This means that it worked more clandestinely, and 
ensured the group’s continuance by preserving organizations, networks, and values. I argue that 
Ennahda’s organizational dynamics were characterized by four dimensions in the 1990s: (1) 
removing organizational structures from Tunisia to Western countries; (2) centralizing power 
within the party; (3) changing its recruitment strategy from a combination of inclusive and 
exclusive means to exclusive tactics; and (4) creating a rich political culture within exiled 
Nahdaouis to ensure continued commitment of members.  
During the persecution wave in the early 1990s, a number of Nahdaouis fled from Tunisia. 
According to Walid Benneni, co-founder of Ennahda and Vice-President of the party in the early 
1990s, most of the exiles first fled to neighboring countries, especially Algeria, since Algeria’s 
political environment was favorable for Islamists in 1989-1991 (Interview, Benneni, 2015, 
Tunis). After the coup d’état in Algeria in 1992, a remarkable number of Tunisian exiles sought 
refuge in Western Europe, North America and Australia.  
The first task that exiled Nahdaouis fulfilled was to establish organizational structures and 
branch offices in their residential areas. According to Ameur Laarayadh, senior Ennahda official 
and ex-Vice Secretary General of UGTE, the disbandment of Ennahda meant relocating its 
structures abroad. A Majlis Shura and an Executive Bureau were established in exile, even as 
regional bureaus remained. But instead of representing national subsidiaries in different 
governorates of Tunisia, regional bureaus were redistricted according to the countries and 
regions where exiles gathered, for instance, in the UK, Germany and France (Interview, 
Laarayadh, 2015, Tunis). Majlis Shura gathered every 4 or 5 months in a chosen European city 
with representatives from each country gathering to discuss the party’s strategies and 
development. According to Hussine Jaziri, spokesman for Ennahda in the 1990s, the party’s 
leadership was primarily exiled in the UK and France, and as the two countries were more 
tolerant of exiles’ political activities, they became hubs of exiled Nahdaouis (Interview, Jaziri, 
2015, Tunis). Meanwhile, Ennahda continued to hold its congress. The 6th congresses took place 
in Belgium in 1995, and the 7th and 8th in London in 2001 and 2007 (Allani, 2009, pp. 268-269).  
To support themselves and maintain Ennahda’s organizational operations, some Nahdaouis 
started businesses or set up charity organizations for fundraising. An example was Marhama 
created by Mohsen Jendoubi, a member of Ennahda’s Majlis Shura, in Germany (Soli & Merone, 
2013). Meanwhile, many more Nahdaouis actively engaged in various charity organizations or 
other NGOs founded by MB veterans already located in the West. These activities not only 
aimed to expand Ennahda’s networks and enhance its influence in Western countries, but to 
facilitate its access to financial resources from NGOs funded by MB or charity organizations in 
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Gulf countries including Qatar and Kuwait (Le Vif, 2016).  
As the Ennahda diaspora spread all over Europe, Australia and North America, senior 
Nahdaouis residing in different countries joined different organizations. Ghannouchi joined the 
central institution of Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), MB’s umbrella 
organization which loosely connected European NGOs established by MB veterans. As a well-
known Islamic scholar and leader of the Islamist movement in Tunisia, Ghannouchi frequently 
gave speeches at conferences and forums organized by NGOs such as the Union des 
Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) (Shadid & Koningsveld, 1996, p. 98; Milton-
Edwards, 2016, p. 120). Said Ferjani, a trusted confidant of Ghannouchi who also exiled in the 
UK, joined the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) in London and soon headed its department 
of policy, media and public relations. The organization was founded by Kemal el-Helbawy, 
former member of MB’s Central Guidance Bureau. It later became one of the four pillar 
organizations that founded the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) which 
received funding from the UK government to solve the problems of radicalization in British 
mosques (Brandon & Pantucci, 2012, p. 24). Oussama Al-Sghaier, from a young generation of 
Nahdaouis exiled in Italy with his parents, became an active member in Unione delle 
Communita e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (UCOII) (Espace de Libertés, 2016; 
Toronto, 2008, p. 77).  
In addition to re-organizing the party’s structures, another important shift was the party’s 
centralization of power. Ennahda previously had been plagued by the hardline-soft-line divide 
led by Mouru and Karkar. When the leadership of Ghannouchi was confirmed in the 1990s, this 
division was overcome. Mouru, who remained in Tunisia, was detained. Confronting the 
regime’s harassment toward himself and his family, he was forced to announce his departure 
from Ennahda (Pipes, 1992). Karkar successfully sought refuge in France, but his hardline 
positions and contacts with violent groups in Afghanistan and Algeria soon alarmed the French 
government. In 1993, he was accused of supporting terrorist groups by the French Ministry of 
the Interior, and was placed under house arrest (U. N. Doc, 2000). This not only kept him away 
from engaging in the party’s decision-making, but put other exiled Nahdaouis in an inconvenient 
position, as to support him increased the difficulty for other Nahdaouis to seek asylum in Europe 
(Wolf, 2017, p. 94). Consequently, Karkar’s position was gradually marginalized and Ennahda’s 
Majlis Shura finally put him on leave in the mid-1990s (Ibid). In my interview with a Nahdaoui 
in Switzerland, he criticized this decision, and claimed that he and a number of Karkar’s 
supporters left the party after Karkar was excluded (Interview, Said, 2015, Tunis). In any case, 
the departure of Mouru and the marginalization of Karkar provided opportunities for 
Ghannouchi to consolidate his leading position, build charismatic leadership, and more 
importantly, to direct the party to concentrate on a single strategy that would be carried out in 
the following decades.   
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Furthermore, as Mizruchi (1983, p.44) argues, the expansion-contraction of a group’s 
personnel can be understood as responses to changes in the political and social environments. 
When political opportunities were closed by Ben Ali’s regime in the early 1990s, Ennahda’s 
recruitment became more exclusive. Instead of attempting to attract new members, the party 
emphasized survivability, and tried to hold constant its membership to maintain what Taylor 
(1989, p. 768) called “a relatively homogeneous … [leading] activists suited to the limited 
activism undertaken”.  
In any event, as Ennahda suffered from severe repression by the Tunisian regime, motivating 
existing members to keep a high level of individual commitment to the party’s goals and tactics 
was not an easy task. In Taylor’s opinion (p. 769), an effective way for groups in abeyance to 
maintain membership commitment and involvement was to develop cultural frameworks to 
provide meaning for those in the organization. To do so, Nahdaouis in exile formed a 
community of Tunisian exiles in which they maintained Islamic practices and living modes. For 
instance, in the early years of the 1990s, overseas Nahdaouis lived close together in London, 
Paris, Geneva, Brussels, etc. Ennahda families held fasts, parties, celebrations, and weddings 
together. Meanwhile, meetings and seminars on religious topics were run regularly within 
diaspora communities (Interview, Jaziri, 2015, Tunis). The maintenance of Islamic living modes 
not only enabled exiled Nahdaouis to develop closer and deeper intimacy within a shared 
community, but linked their individual lives to their political commitments.  
Another aspect of creating a political culture among members was Ennahda’s training of 
members’ children to become new activists. In fact, the diaspora was not just a group of people 
escaping Ben Ali’s repression, but a group targeted by Ben Ali’s specific repression against 
them as Nahdaouis, something that defined them specifically as a community, and which their 
children were very aware of. So they were not just Tunisians in exile, but Nahdaouis in exile, a 
badge of honor, of sorts, and a self-labeling that gave different generations a sense not only of 
pride but of mission and linkage. In an interview, Saida Ounisi, a second-generation Nahdaoui 
who migrated to France as a political exile with her family at the age of 6, stated that in the 
1990s, Nahdaouis frequently organized Islamic education for their children in Europe and 
involved them in party affairs such as organizing and attending meetings (Interview, Ounisi, 
2015, Tunis). In this way, young generation Nahdaouis like her developed a sense of party 
belonging at an early age.  
With rare exceptions, the assumptions prevailing across the majority of the literature on 
abeyant structures adopt the perspective that abeyance is little more than a passive reaction to a 
hostile political climate (Bagguley, 2002; Taylor, 1989; Sawyers & Meyer, 1999). I argue that 
this assumption is only part of the story. In fact, by maintaining resources and networks, an 
opposition party in abeyance may actively work to improve its political opportunities — and the 
party abroad becomes a lifeline for the party at home. Throughout the 1990s, Ennahda’s 
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diaspora provided much support for Nahdaouis remaining in Tunisia (Willis, 2012, pp. 195-196). 
A department of internal relations was established and headed by Ameur Laarayadh, aiming to 
collect information about Tunisian Nahdaouis’ needs and difficulties, and formulate assistance 
programs (Interview, Laarayadh, 2015, Tunis). Contacting Nahdaouis in Tunisia was made 
possible by exchanging letters, pictures, and money with family members of imprisoned 
Nahdaouis through charity and human rights organizations in Europe (Interview, Ounisi, 2015, 
Tunis). Additionally, the diaspora assisted family members of Islamist political prisoners in 
Tunisia to contact Western media and international civil society organizations (Interview, 
Laarayadh, 2015, Tunis).  
Compared with Ennahda’s core members, the party’s sympathizers who supported and voted 
for Ennahda but did not have membership status suffered less from Ben Ali’s imprisonment and 
torture. Though many of them experienced short periods of custody which lasted from several 
months to one or two years, in most of the 1990s, they were under house surveillance. Despite 
the strict monitoring, dozens of Ennahda political prisoners’ wives had a little more freedom of 
action than their imprisoned husbands and contributed to Ennahda in two ways. First, as Gray 
(2013, p. 293) argued, the women’s networks contributed much to Ennahda’s continuance. 
Wives of political prisoners visited the prisons every week to swap information with their 
husbands. Sharing common experience, the wives sometimes gathered together and helped each 
other with childcare and housework. Meanwhile, they held secret meetings among themselves to 
continue the party’s existence and study the Qur’an. According to Yafout (2016, p. 7)’s research 
based upon interviews with women participants of Ennahda, these meetings were small in scale 
and only involved trusted individuals. Second, the wives also tried to contact multiple national 
and international media and NGOs. According to Sahbi Attig, a member of Ennahda’s Executive 
Bureau who was imprisoned for more than 16 years, such organizations included LTDH, 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Freedom Equity Group (Interview, Attig, 2015, 
Tunis). According to Monia Brahim, wife of an imprisoned senior official of Ennahda at the 
time, efforts were made to share stories of the Tunisian regime’s violence against Islamists, with 
an attempt to attract international attention and pressure Ben Ali’s regime to release apprehended 
Nahdaouis (Interview, Brahim, 2015, Tunis). Although in response, Ben Ali imposed 
punishment on some wives of political prisoners, the wives’ works attracted international 
attention to his regime’s abuse of human rights. The UN and Amnesty International, for instance, 
published reports on the torture of Islamist political prisoners (e.g. Amnesty International, 1995; 
United Nations, 1998). As discussed in Chapter 6, the reactions of the international community 
exerted pressure on Ben Ali’s regime in the late 1990s, which partially explained his relaxing of 
political control and persecution of Nahdaouis in the early 2000s. 
In conclusion, we can see from Ennahda’s organizational dynamics in 1990s that in face of 
harsh repression, its activists divided into two groups, namely Nahdaouis in exile and those in 
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prison. The next part describes how the exiled Nahdaouis shifted their religious discourse and 
how they started to differ from those in Tunisia politically and theoretically.  
 
Rethinking Islam, Democracy, and Western Philosophies  
  The debate over whether Islamist parties’ moderation of discourse, is a result of political 
inclusion or exclusion is a dominant theme of the literature on Islamist parties’ development. 
Benefiting from Huntington’s (1991, p. 169) theory that parties tend to abanon certain 
ideological platforms in exchange for legal status and electoral success, Schwedler (2006), 
Driessen (2012), Guazzone (2013) and Pevná (2014) argue that inclusion of Islamist parties in 
electoral politics induces moderation. This is because, they argue, the Islamist parties need to 
become institutionalized and adjust their policies in competition with other parties for popular 
support in elections. Yet, Wickham (2013) and Ashour (2009) criticize this argument, claiming 
that Islamist parties’ compromises may be a temporary, or makeshift response to circumstance, 
rather than a true sign of moderation. Further, Cavatorta and Merone (2013) contend, based on a 
study of Tunisian Ennahda, that some Islamist parties’ moderation is caused by their experience 
of exclusion from rather than inclusion in the political scene.  
  However, Islamist parties’ religious discourse can be analyzed from a different perspective. 
Rather than simply focusing on the impacts of political inclusion or exclusion, I view Islamist 
parties’ moderation of religious discourse as a result of the contest with official ideology, and 
argue that Ben Ali’s official interpretation of Islam had an important impact on Ennahda’s 
strategies. The President’s attempt to isolate all other Islamist groups by promoting official 
Islam which stressed unity, tolerance and modernity pushed Ennahda to avoid being labeled as 
advocators of a sectarian, intolerant and anti-modernity version of Islam. Meanwhile, the exiled 
Nahdaouis’ close contacts with Western politics and societies also affected their mobilization 
strategies and motivated them to self-represent as a political and modernist force.  
In the 1990s, Ennahda continued to combine religious and nationalist elements. Yet, unlike in 
the past when it viewed pluralist values such as diversity and tolerance as Western elements 
which were contradictory to Islamic principles, it now acknowledged these values and 
interpreted them from an Islamic perspective.  
In the book of Al-Hurriyat al-‘Ammah Fi Dawlah al-Islamiyya (Public Liberties in the 
Islamic State) (Ghannouchi, 1993b) that Ghannouchi published in his exile, he no longer put 
Western philosophies and Islam in opposition. Instead, he argued that there was the necessity to 
redefine and reassess whatever conception the West had to offer from an Islamic perspective 
(Tamimi, 2001, p. 76). Scholars including Pickard (2015, p. 644), Driessen (2014, p. 189), 
Cavatorta and Merone (2013, p. 858) note Ghannouchi’s change of attitudes towards various 
democratic values. Whereas Pickard (2015, p. 7) emphasizes Ghannouchi’s acceptance of 
elections, parliaments, and separation of powers, Cavatorta and Merone (2013, p. 858) stress his 
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embrace of democratic mechanisms of government elite selection, liberal rights, and market 
economy. In both Pickard’s (2015, pp. 7-8) and Drieseen’s (2014, p. 190) arguments, 
Ghannouchi combined democratic values and Islamic principles by claiming that democratic 
mechanisms such as parliaments offered approaches for practicing Islamic ideas such as shura 
(consultation), and that the implementation of Islamic sharia ensured the realization of 
democratic values by preventing corruption. However, what these works do not note is that 
Ghannouchi redefined democracy, and actually differentiated “democracy” from “Western 
democracy”. Instead of “wholeheartedly endors[ing] the mechanisms of Western democracy” 
(Pickard, 2015, p. 6), Ghannouchi argued in Al-Hurriyat al-‘Ammah Fi Dawlah al-Islamiyya 
that democracy was composed of form and essence, and that while Western democracy merely 
reflected the form of democracy, Islamic democracy reflected both the form and the essence of 
democracy (Ghannouchi, 1993b). 
When designing nationalist discourse, instead of simply attributing the regime’s 
misgovernment to its implementation of the Western, secular systems, it now emphasized that 
Western democracy was not real democracy, which, from its perspective, prevented Tunisia 
from having good governance. To do so, Ghannouchi criticized Western countries’ double 
standards, claiming that occidental states implemented the so-called democratic institutions 
within their own countries on the one hand, while brutally invading and colonizing other races 
on the other (Ghannouchi, 1993b, p. 84). In this way, Ghannouchi did not disagree with the 
values of tolerance and democracy in official Islam, but diverted the topic to dignity and social 
justice, and questioned the dysfunction of Western countries and Tunisia’s pro-West regime in 
these fields. 
Ghannouchi acknowledged the value of tolerance and admitted the importance of institutions 
like elections, pluralist political systems, and freedom of speech. Yet, he argued that such 
institutions merely ensured the form of democracy, but did not necessarily achieve the essence 
of democracy, which, according to Ghannouchi, meant respect for human dignity (Ghannouchi, 
1993b, p. 76). Based on this argument, Ghannouchi offered his solutions to the populace’s 
grievances: to replace the Western democracy with Islamic democracy and good governance 
which not only enables people to influence decision-making, but protects human dignity by 
guaranteeing the mechanism of social mobility from the bottom to top while eradicating 
cronyism and nepotism (Ghannouchi, 1993b, p. 77). 
 It is important to note that a great challenge facing politics of all kinds in North Africa stems 
from the colonial heritage that epitomized this double standard. In developing this new way of 
interpreting democracy, Ghannouchi was finding the language, and the perspective, to explain 
why his people felt the grievances they did, and by understanding this sense of betrayal by, or 
distrust in, existing forms of democracy, he was beginning to develop rhetorics that would be 
liberating, emancipating, and uniquely attuned to the Tunisian political experience. 
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Furthermore, in response to Ben Ali’s claim that Muslims needed to evaluate Islamic texts in 
a modern and scientific way (Le Renouveau, 1995), Ghannouchi advocated to analyze Western 
modernity from an Islamic perspective. As Ghannouchi commented in a lecture organized by 
Chatham House in London, “Once the Islamists are given a chance to comprehend the values of 
Western modernity … they will search within Islam for a place for these values where they 
implant them, nurse them, and cherish them just as the Westerners did before” (Wright, 1996, p. 
72).  
Ennahda’s change of slogans in the 1990s had two implications. First, it demonstrated that it 
did not represent what Ben Ali called the “distorted” use of Islam, and presented itself as a 
modern and moderate party that would not cost citizens freedom. Second, it offered the bridge 
between Islam and electoral, or pluralist politics that the country needed, based on its experience 
of having had both Bourguiba and Ben Ali impose Westernization upon the country, while 
remaining true to its Muslim identity. In other words, it tried to represent a solution to the split 
identity that the country was experiencing, and which the regime party and previous opposition 
groups had been unable to represent because they’d only ever adopted one or the other extreme.  
Yet, it is worth noting that the influence of Ennahda’s slogans was still limited in Tunisia in 
the 1990s. As the slogans were mainly spread via an internet site and a satellite television 
channel created by Ennahda’s overseas offices in Europe (Willis, 2014, p. 196), as well as via 
the media of other Arab countries epitomized by the television networks of Al Jazeera (Achcar, 
2013, p. 210), they were hardly accessible to the majority of Tunisians, due to the regime’s 
control of opinion and blockade of foreign media. It was not until the first decade of the 2000s 
when social media and satellite dishes became widespread that Ennahda’s slogans reached a 
wider Tunisian audience, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
One criticism often levied toward Islamist parties is that they are thought to be inflexible 
when Islam is interpreted as dogmatic (Muhammad & Kabbani, 2017). Yet, Ghannouchi broke 
the barriers down (he was not the first of course, but took this to a new level), looking at Islam 
as a flexible, malleable set of rules and beliefs that could reinterpret Western concepts, and thus 
itself define modernism. To do this meant that the party, though exiled, became more aligned 
with the Tunisian popular experience, more ‘Tunisian’, reflecting the fractured, competing lines 
of Western and traditional practices, and bringing them into some kind of harmony. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the Nahdaouis who were either imprisoned or under house 
arrest in Tunisia did not undergo this broadening of perspective, and instead remained fixed in 
their views, and wedded to the rigid practices of Islamist politics that had already compromised 
the party. A discrepancy thus formed between those exiled, whose discourse became more 
original and which synthesized the demands of modernity and Islam, and those imprisoned 
inside Tunisia. As elaborated in Chapter 7, such a discrepancy brought challenges for Ennahda 
to maintain internal unity and forced the party to form a mechanism to contain the divisions 
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when it returned to Tunisia two decades later.  
  In sum, Ennahda’s mobilization in the 1990s largely fit the scenario of an abeyant development. 
At the beginning of the decade, its political opportunities were much narrowed as Ben Ali’s 
regime excluded the Islamists from the political scene and tried to evoke a shared ideology of 
appropriateness and divinity. Ennahda thus adjusted its organizational structures and movement 
strategies in the face of the worsening circumstances. Exiled Nahdaouis installed parallel 
organizational structures in Western countries and established extensive networks with NGOs 
founded by MB in Europe. Meanwhile, the structure of role divisions between husbands and 
wives enabled the wives to maintain the party’s networks within Tunisia when their husbands 
were imprisoned. In the first decade in which exiled Nahdaouis resided in Western countries and 
were exposed to the Western political environment, they adjusted their discourses and responded 
to Ben Ali’s official Islam by admitting the importance of tolerance and modernity, but 
questioning Ben Ali’s approaches to achieve these values. Ennahda’s adjustments of 
mobilization dynamics, along with its further changes in the first decade of 2000s which will be 
elaborated in Chapter 6, enabled the party to work in abeyance, while getting prepared for a 
more favorable political environment in Tunisia. In this sense, the exile experience of Nahdaouis 
in the West turned out to be a blessing in disguise which Algeria’s HMS did not have. As the 
regime mainly targeted its rival, the FIS, and co-opted the HMS by including it in the parliament 
and government, the HMS avoided harsh repression and operated in more favorable political 
circumstances in the 1990s. Yet, it did not get a chance to experience Western democracy and 
adjust mobilization dynamics towards a more modern direction like exiled Nahdaouis. This fact 
had profound implications for the HMS’ long-term development and led Ennahda and the HMS 
to separate ways, as discussed below.  
  
HMS’ Rise in the Décennie Noir 
  The rise of armed Islamist groups and their confrontation with the military after 1992 is a 
dominant theme of literature examining Algeria’s Islamism in the 1990s (Hafez, 2000, 2004; 
Roberts, 1995; Thurston, 2017). Hamladji (2002) and Driessen (2014, pp. 136-180) are two 
exceptions, who respectively examined the HMS’ co-optation by the Algerian regime, and the 
HMS’ ideologies in the period. This section on the HMS’ electoral mobilization in 1992-1998 
views the HMS’ evolution in the mid- and late-1990s from a more panoramic perspective by 
analyzing how it interpreted its political opportunities in the decade, what strategies it took as a 
response, and how these dimensions affected its mobilization capacity. It begins by describing 
the political landscapes of excluding the FIS after the 1992 coup and the outbreak of battles 
between armed Islamists and the military in the aftermath. Then, it analyzes how these 
circumstances affected political opportunities for the HMS as an Islamist party second to the FIS. 
Next, it elaborates how the HMS interpreted the opportunities, and how it responded to citizens’ 
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demands and affected its electoral outcome. 
 
Coup d’État and Décennie Noir 
After the 1992 coup, there were two important themes in Algeria throughout the 1990s: 
repression of FIS, and eruption of battles between the military and armed Islamists.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the scenario that plagued Tunisia — political liberalization 
resulting in Islamist parties’ rise which was then suppressed by the regime — repeated itself in 
its western neighbor. Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002, pp. 342-343) argue, in a broad regional 
comparative study of elections under authoritarianism, that liberalization attempts in the Arab 
world mostly aim at creating “a pressure valve against mounting opposition during economic 
crises”. Algeria was no exception and the FIS’ outright victory in the first round of the 1991 
legislative election came as a shock to ruling elites who never wanted to see genuine power 
shifts. Whereas President Bendjedid might have thought of sharing power with Islamists as 
acceptable, as indicated in his talks with FIS on a framework for coexistence (Hermida, 1992, p. 
15; Rouadjia, 1995, pp. 94-95), the scenario of rule by ‘‘les barbus (the bearded men)’’, and 
more importantly, the prospect of power transfer, was unimaginable for most military leaders 
who not only feared that Islamist parties’ takeover would turn Algeria into a purist Islamic state, 
but worried that, once in power, the FIS would combat corruption by depriving the military and 
many FLN veterans of rich oil rents. To prevent the FIS from ascending to power through the 
second round of elections, a coup d’état was staged by officers of the Département du 
Renseignment et de la Sécurité (DRS) and the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) (Volpi, 2006, 
p. 444; Sassoon, 2016, p. 98). Blamed for paving the way for Islamists to flourish, President 
Bendjedid was forced to resign on January 11, 1992. Then, not only were the results of the first 
round of pluralist legislative election nullified, but the scheduled second round of legislative 
elections was suspended and a martial law was imposed by the military on January 12 (Khalil, 
2014, p. 91). The putsch brought the military officials to the front of the political scene, 
institutionalizing the military’s prominent political role. It allowed senior officials to take 
positions in Haut Comité d’État (HCE) and Conseil National de Transition (CNT) — two 
institutes newly set up to replace the President and the parliament after the putsch (Lowi, 2005, p. 
221).  
The following months saw a crackdown campaign towards FIS initiated by the transitional 
regime. The party was banned, and thousands of its members including the party’s interim head, 
Abdelkader Hachani, were incarcerated. In contrast to Tunisia’s repression of Ennahda, 
Algeria’s crackdown on the FIS’ core members and sympathizers was harsher, considering that 
the FIS demonstrated stronger mobilization capacity and appeared to pose more of a challenge to 
the regime. In February 1992, Algeria imposed a state of emergency which permitted 
derogations from the country’s laws and facilitated the arrest of citizens who were suspected to 
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have supported the FIS. Meanwhile, five detention camps were set up deep in the desert to 
detain up to 30,000 FIS activists, according to a report released by the FIS information director 
Abd al-Razak Radjam ("Chronology January 16, 1992-April 15, 1992 ", 1992, p. 486). In mid-
July, the FIS’s two charismatic leaders, Madani and Belhadj, were sentenced to 12-year 
imprisonment by the military court (Le Sueur, 2010, pp. 48-55).   
Unlike Tunisia’s Ennahda whose top leaders including Ghannouchi were mostly in exile, the 
FIS’ high-ranking leaders such as Madani and Belhadj were all in jail. Meanwhile Hachani, the 
FIS’ provisional President who led the party for a short period after Madani and Belhadj were 
arrested, was also imprisoned in late January of 1992. The internal disputes between hardliners 
and soft-liners within FIS deepened, as the military’s harsh treatment of the FIS even after it 
won elections seemed to corroborate the hard-liners’ view that Islamists could only achieve their 
goals through violent means. Under the banner of rescuing the FIS’ leaders from prison, more 
and more party activists migrated to armed organizations to take revenge. In the 1990s, many 
Islamists who advocated the use of violence and did not belong to the FIS also established armed 
groups, as FIS’ sufferings provided them with an excuse and a chance to take action against the 
regime. An example was the remnants of MIA, a violent Salafist group active in the 1980s. After 
MIA’s leader, Bouyali, was killed in confrontation with the military in 1987, the group members 
fell into silence for over five years before reactivating in 1992 under the leadership of 
Abdelkader Chebouti, who expressed his intention of pressuring the government to release 
detained Islamists. This plunged the country into a decade-long war between the military and 
armed Islamist groups. Algerians termed the decade the “décennie noir (black decade)”. Over 
200,000 people died and approximately 15, 000 disappeared during incessant battles (Al Jazeera, 
2010). According to the Global Terrorism Database, at the brutal peak of Algeria’s civil war, 
around 3, 584 lives were lost within a year in attacks by armed Islamists, implying that almost 
10 people were killed every day. The eruption of the civil war largely affected citizens’ demands 
by changing their priorities when calculating benefits and costs. Although socio-economic 
depression remained and was even aggravated in the mid- and late-1990s due to the economic 
stagnation and widespread poverty and unemployment resulting from the war (Joffé, 2015), 
citizens’ main concerns changed from socio-economic depression, to an end to the war. This was 
not only because the populace hated ruthless killings and massacres, but because they believed 
that the economic growth could only occur in a peaceful environment. In this setting, the ex-FIS’ 
constituency were driven to rethink the scenarios of the past few years, and reevaluate FIS’ 
radicalism, considering its horrible outcomes. Such a change of the demands of citizens, 
especially the ex-FIS’ constituency, provided “fertile soil” for moderate Islamist groups to grow. 
Meanwhile, the regime’s crackdown on the FIS and the outbreak of the bloody civil war also 





Opportunities for HMS 
The coup in 1992 and eruption of civil war changed political opportunities for the HMS in 
two ways. First, the HMS lost its largest rival in the Islamist camp and became the largest 
Islamist party allowed to participate in electoral politics. Second, the coup, along with battles 
between armed Islamists and the military, raised significant disagreements among government 
leaders, which made the HMS an important pawn for the military leadership to compete with the 
FLN civilian officials. 
In the literature analyzing political opportunities, there is a trend towards examining whether 
opportunities are favorable or not for a social movement as a whole (McAdam, 1982; Jenkins & 
Schock, 2003; Eligür, 2006). This is criticized by Meyer and Minkoff (2004, p. 1463), who 
contend that “employing a unidimensional conception of openings will lead to 
misunderstandings”. I argue that there may be more nuances to political opportunities, 
considering that the regime may adopt completely different strategies towards different groups 
within a social movement. The Algerian political climate after 1992 was a typical example. 
Confronting the upsurge armed Islamist groups following the coup, the military combined two 
methods, completely excluding and repressing FIS, while co-opting more moderate Islamist 
parties through controlled inclusion (Lowi, 2009, p. 133). At the same time as establishing an 
anti-terrorist force with 60, 000 soldiers (Gharib, 1997, p. 91), encouraging a total of 100,000 to 
300,000 civilian militias (Amnesty International, 2000) to repress ex-FIS activists and new 
armed Islamist groups, the regime kept more docile Islamist political parties, the HMS and MRI, 
in the game of pluralist party politics. The provisional government was said to have gone so far 
as to finance these two parties (Willis, 1996, p. 168). One aim of the military leadership was to 
let more moderate parties attract ex-FIS supporters and thus fractionalize the Islamist movement 
(Willis, 2008, p. 7). 
In 1992-1999, Algeria faced critical divides among its ruling elites, offering a political 
opportunity for “elite divisions”, as opposition parties were likely to be co-opted by certain 
ruling elites to confront their rivals in the regime. The 1992 coup provoked an intense dispute 
between two elite circles that came to be known as “Eradicators” and “Conciliators”. Analysts 
including Roberts (2003, p. 164), Mortimer (1996, pp. 18-39), Addi (1996, pp. 94-107) and 
Smith (1998, pp. 27-30) used the term “Eradicators” to describe the senior military officers who 
initiated the 1992 coup, and intended to eradicate the FIS activists and armed Islamists following 
the putsch. They used the notion of the “Conciliators” to describe the government officials who 
condemned the military’s interruption of the electoral process and its ousting of Bendjedid by 
force. The Conciliators were mostly FLN officials and backers of ex-President Bendjedid.  
With the dissolution of the FIS, the HMS and MRI were the only two electoral Islamist forces 
left in the spectrum of Islamist parties. The MRI’s President, Abdallah Djaballah, adopted a 
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discourse favorable to the Conciliators, and was firmly against yielding to the military junta. In 
response, military officers continued harassing and imprisoning the MRI members (Willis, 1998, 
pp. 53, 55) after 1992. In late 1996, internal strife within the MRI was encouraged by the 
military junta against the party’s charismatic leader, Djaballah. Lahbib Adami, an MRI leading 
activist and brother of the then Minister of Justice, Mohamed Adami (Roberts, 2002b, p. 29), 
openly challenged Djaballah and claimed that the MRI experienced heavy losses due to 
Djaballah’s anti-military strategies. Adami advocated learning from the HMS’ experiences and 
take a more pro-Eradicator position, which, in his argument, would bring more benefits to the 
party. In concert with Adami’s attack, an intensification of harassment and threats to MRI 
activists helped Adami evict Djaballah out of the party in 1999 and change the party from an 
opponent to an ally of Eradicators. 
The banning of the FIS, along with the fragmentation of MRI, created important opportunities 
for HMS. Although the space for political opposition in general was narrowed after the 1992 
coup, as the largest legal and unified Islamist party, and importantly, one willing to work with 
Eradicators, the HMS became a critical force for them to co-opt. Consequently, the HMS gained 
more operating space and got more involved in government affairs. In the immediate aftermath 
of the coup, it was invited to join the Conseil Consultatif National (CCN), an advisory body to 
the legislature established in April 1992 (Werenfels, 2007, p. 45). Meanwhile, the military which 
controlled access to state institutions after the 1992 coup (Hamladji, 2002, p. 6) offered the HMS 
ministerial portfolios. In 1992-1995, Sassi Lamouri, a member of the HMS-related NGO, II, was 
assigned Minister of Religion (p. 26). In 1996-1997, the HMS acquired two cabinet portfolios. 
In 1997-1999, it kept seven positions in the cabinet, including Minister of Industry and 
Restructuring, Minister of Small and Medium Firms and Industries, Minister of Tourism and 
Craftsmen, Minister of Transport, Secretary of State in charge of Craftsmen, and Secretary of 
State in charge of Fisheries (Ibid). The next section considers how Nahnah interpreted the 
regime’s co-optation policies, and how the Algerian regime and international society reacted to 
his moucharaka strategy. 
 
Moucharaka Strategy 
 The HMS interpreted the military’s co-optation policies as not only an opportunity to 
strengthen the party’s role in government, but an opportunity to answer the citizens’ demands for 
peace by representing itself to be a mediator between opposition parties and the regime. The 
party used the opportunities to strengthen its organizational strength, and explain its moucharaka 
strategy. In the process, it attempted to prevent the party from being discredited by collaborating 
with the military, and appealed to the ex-FIS constituency’s demands for an end to the civil war.  
The military junta’s combination of hard and soft methods worked effectively to ally the 
HMS with Eradicators. For fear of being excluded from the political scene like the FIS, and 
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viewing the military’s co-optation policies as a chance to strengthen the HMS’ political 
influence, Nahnah adopted the moucharaka (participatory) strategy, meaning that his party 
would participate in dialogue, elections, and government affairs in peaceful ways even if there 
was ongoing fraud and unfairness within the government. Instead of engaging in a face-to-face 
confrontation with the military, the HMS accepted the olive branch thrown by the military and 
took the ministerial positions it offered. Meanwhile, it refused to attend two meetings in Rome, 
in which leaders of the FLN met with the FIS in an attempt to instate it and sign an agreement, 
known as the San’Egidio Platform, which called for the relegalization of the FIS, a return to 
elections, and an interrogation into human rights abuses — a platform condemned by the 
government. During an interview with the Algerian newspaper on March 19, 1995, Nahnah 
commented that this platform was drafted by parties that “did anything but positive things” (El 
Watan, 1995a). Additionally, HMS did not criticize military officers as did most Algerian 
political parties, including the FFS and MRI, and RND, in publications and statements. Instead, 
Nahnah said, “We must all respect this [the rule of law and the Algerian constitution], including 
the opposition, the military and the Algerian authorities” (Darif, 2014, p. 70). This position 
helped the HMS gain more access to media outlets under the control of the military (Hamladji, 
2002, p. 11) and acquire the freedom to organize campaign rallies (Eur, 2003, p. 109). Also, the 
military offered more ministerial portfolios for the party as rewards for its support.  
Nahnah’s non-violent positions likewise gained his party the recognition and trust of the U.S. 
and European countries such as France (Maréchal, 2008, p. 145) which were worried about the 
rise of radical and violent Islamism in Algeria and the consequences it could have for the 
Mediterranean’s regional security and international affairs (Cavatorta, 2001, p. 177). Nahnah’s 
moderate discourses and his willingness to compromise with the Algerian regime helped 
convince Western countries that supporting the HMS would help curb violent Islamist trends 
(Zoubir, 2008, p. 272). In 1995, Martin Indyck, advisor on the US National Security Council 
held talks with Nahnah (Ibid). In August 1998, the Panel of Eminent Personalities established 
by the Secretary-General of the U.N. held a meeting with Nahnah during their visit to Algeria 
(UN Press Release, 1998). Encouraged by Washington to conciliate with and include non-
violent Islamists (Zoubir, 2008, p. 273), the Algerian military officers established an even closer 
relationship with the HMS. 
Whereas the HMS’ co-optation by the military enabled the party to operate in the political 
scene, to propagate its views to a wider audience in a relatively closed political environment, and 
to attract international support, a challenge for the party in 1992-1999 was how to justify its 
close relationship with the military officers as an opposition party. Hamladji (2002, p. 11) argues, 
based on an empirical assessment of the HMS in state institutions throughout the 1990s, that 
Nahnah’s tactic was to interpret his moucharaka strategy as “a way out of the Algerian crisis”. 
Specifically, the HMS described itself as the conscience of the government, which prompted the 
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latter to promote Islam, socio-economic reforms, and peaceful dialogue. It paid close attention to 
popular economic malaise, offered socioeconomic solutions, and presented itself as the bridge 
between Islamists and secularists. 
In an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro in 1997, Nahnah explained:  
 
We want through this government to change the way we think of Algerian officials. The 
priority of this government should be to put an end to bloodshed and the process of 
unemployment. 
                                                                                                                       (Le Figaro, 1997) 
 
Thus, the HMS tried to reassure citizens that rather than being part of the regime, it played the 
role of watchdog and pressure group to promote pluralism and economic reforms. This was 
manifest in Nahnah’s statement during his interview with the Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs (WRMEA) in 1994, 
 
I spoke with Liamine Zeroual when he was defense minister, and again as president of state … 
He says he supports democracy and elections. Other leaders of the opposition and I are taking 
part in a dialogue conference on the subject of elections. 
                                                                                                                            (WRMEA, 1994) 
 
To justify his intimate relationship with Western countries, Nahnah stressed that the aim was 
to improve the international image of Islamists: 
 
There are two schools of thought in the Clinton administration…One says it is necessary to 
dialogue with the Islamic movement, while adherents of the other are against dialogue because 
they feel all Islamists are extremists…We encourage them [U.S. government officials] to engage 
in dialogue with Islamists who are moderate, democratic, open and against violence.  
                                                                                                                                                   (Ibid) 
 
Meanwhile, Nahnah stressed that to build good relationships with Western countries did not 
mean that he would import Western culture and living modes. In the same interview, he stated 
that “We can’t break away from the Islamic way of life” (Ibid). 
As the military was busy dealing with power struggles and the civil war, the HMS seized the 
opportunity to enlarge its networks with NGOs in Algeria and in Europe after 1992 to get more 
human resources, and charity funding, which, was critical for party operation and mobilization, 
especially in a period when the country’s economic production stagnated and non-regime parties 
generally lacked financial resources. Well-known charity associations in Algeria that had formal 
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or informal links to it at the time included the Islamic Charitable Association in Belcourt and 
Chemseddine (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003, pp. 92-94). Meanwhile, the extension of HMS’ 
Islamist networks was also attributed to the active work of its student union, UGEL, in the 
international scene. A number of UGEL members joined European Islamist groups and thus 
established bonds with European NGOs. Among them, the most influential figures included 
Okacha Ben Ahmed Daho and Fethi Belabdelli. Both of them got involved in UGEL activities at 
an early age, and while studying in France, they joined Étudiants Musulmans de France (EMF), 
the student union affiliated with Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) created 
by MB activists in France (Boubekeur, 2007, p. 6). While linkages with NGOs in Algeria helped 
the party recruit members and conduct charity services, those with NGOs in Europe facilitated 
the transfer of funding from the MB and Gulf countries to the HMS. In addition to expanding 
networks, the HMS still needed to formulate platforms that resonated with citizens’ demands in 
order to enhance its mobilization capacity, as explained below.  
 
Enlargement of Support Base 
Although the Eradicators condemned the FLN, FIS and other parties’ protests against military 
rule, they could not ignore the deterioration of the transition regime’s legitimacy in the midst of 
the civil war. To re-legitimize itself and show its willingness to return to elections and dialogue, 
the regime launched a presidential election on November 16, 1995, the first multi-party 
presidential election since independence. Two years later, multi-party parliamentary elections 
were restored. As one of the two remaining legal Islamist parties after the FIS was excluded, the 
HMS participated in both elections and tried to enhance its clout by seeking support from ex-
constituents of the FIS. During its electoral campaigns in the mid- and late-1990s, the HMS 
conducted campaigns across the country, delivering speeches on TV, radio and newspapers, and 
handing out leaflets. 
In literature on movement strategies, attention is focused on explaining why and how certain 
strategies promote mobilization processes (Beck, 2008; Franceschet, 2004; Karagiannis, 2009; 
Snow & Byrd, 2007). The literature largely neglects the question of why similar strategies may 
yield completely different mobilization outcomes in different circumstances. A comparison of 
the HMS’ mobilizations in 1991 and 1995-1997 offers an example. 
Although the party presented itself as a representative of moderate Islam in both periods, its 
mobilization in 1995-1997 turned out to be much more effective than in 1991. I contend that in 
various contexts, citizens have different calculations and society calls for different platforms. In 
1991 when the electorate were most concerned with socio-economic grievances, the HMS’ 
slogan of “Islam is the solution” was also used by its rival, the FIS, and its moderate discourses 
appeared to be unattractive to citizens who aspired to radical change in their living conditions. 
Yet, as citizens started to prioritize peace during the civil war in mid- and late-1990s, its claim 
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that moderate Islam was the solution to social conflicts and wars, advocacy of dialogues between 
Islamists and secularists, and self-labeling as a mediator between them, resonated with many 
citizens’ aspirations for peace.  
Specifically, the HMS’ platforms after 1992 were marked by two dimensions. First, the party 
claimed that bloody Algerian battles resulted from the polarization between Islamism and 
secularism, and between the regime and opposition forces. For instance, after the coup took 
place in January 1992, Nahnah was reported to have claimed, “The Algerian people were about 
to be torn to pieces. Had the situation kept deteriorating, there existed the possibility of a foreign 
power intervening…” (Darif, 2014, p. 70). 
The HMS also emphasized that true Islam did not advocate violence and, therefore, the FIS 
should not be perceived as the representative of Islam in Algeria. It condemned the violent 
attacks conducted by armed Islamist groups which involved many FIS activists. In an HMS’ 
public statement released on its website and cited in various media in 1993, it claimed, 
“Terrorism and violence are not the values of Algerian people, nor are they dignified behaviors 
of citizens who believe in Islam…” (El Watan, 1993a). In his 1994 interview with the 
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Nahnah emphasized that violence “is no solution; it 
only produces lots of blood, victims and revenge” (WRMEA, 1994). In this interview, Nahnah 
denounced violence in religious discourses and stated that the armed Islamists’ killings of 
Muslim citizens were an even greater tragedy because it’s between Muslims…In the Qur’an, 
God says, ‘if a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell…and a dreadful 
chastisement is prepared for him’” (Ibid). 
Second, the HMS asserted that the political conflicts in Algeria could only be solved by 
moderate Islam. During the presidential campaign of 1995, Nahnah delivered a speech in Ain 
Temouchent, claiming, “Islam is the religion of all Algerians, and it alone can reunite the 
country, and November 16 [the date of presidential election] is the hour of total change” 
(Huband, 1999, p. 65). To take a step further, Nahnah stated in an interview with the Algerian 
newspaper, Liberté, on March 11, 1993:  
 
“I hope that Islamists and secularists can meet together for a scientific, cultural and 
civilizational confrontation to single out the common points that unite us, in order to establish a 
society that does not turn its back on history and does not spit on its own future.” 
                                                                                                                          (El Watan, 1993b) 
 
HMS’ non-violent positions were disapproved of by many armed Islamist groups who 
perceived Nahnah as a traitor. Several hours before Nahnah launched his campaign in Jijel in 
1995, a bomb was defused beneath a bridge that Nahnah was about to pass over (Huband, 1999, 
p. 68). Confronting an enormous threat from armed Islamists, Nahnah refused to give up his 
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campaign and insisted on delivering a speech at a cinema in Jijel (Ibid). Upholding its non-
violent and moderate agenda, HMS even lost several members, including the party’s co-founder, 
Mohammed Bouslimani, a party high official, Ali Ayeb, and Nahnah’s driver, Hajj Omar, who 
were assassinated by GIA in 1994 (WRMEA, 1994). To a certain extent, these events related 
parties’ messages meaningfully to their practices, demonstrated the party’s contribution to peace 
building, and aroused much sympathy from the electorate.  
In this way, by formulating a moucharaka strategy and moderate discourses, the HMS 
attempted to send the signal that it approved of the FIS’ intention to bring changes to society, but 
disagreed with its approaches which had dragged the country into war. Contrary to the FIS and 
armed Islamist groups’ violent approaches, it advocated a more gradual and peaceful method of 
changes, namely to participate in and monitor the country’s decision-making process as an 
insider. This indicated that the party intended to bring benefits to voters and avoid causing high 
costs of social instability like FIS. Although the HMS’ moderate discourses did not work to its 
advantage in the 1991 election, the slogans it used after 1992 turned out to be effective as the 
political context of Algeria changed dramatically. Capitalizing on the populace’s general 
aspiration for an end to the bloody violence, HMS’ proposal for boosting changes via peaceful 
and gradual means was not only welcomed by its original supporters — well-educated urban 
intellectuals who disliked extremism, but attracted the bourgeoisie and small merchants to 
transfer their support from FIS to HMS (Martinez, 2000, pp. 181-182; Kepel, 2002, p. 254). 
Although the bourgeoisie and small businessmen originally hoped that FIS could bring them a 
fairer economic system and thus became an important support base of FIS in 1990-1991, they 
faced repression from the regime after 1992 for having voted for the FIS, and serious threats 
from armed Islamist groups such as the GIA which extorted them and asked them for protection 
fee in the mid- and late-1990s (Martinez, 2000, p. 214). In this context, as the HMS advocated to 
influence the regime’s decision-making through peaceful means, promised to promote the state’s 
economic reforms as a watchdog in the government, and put its promise in practice by heading 
several economic ministries, it resonated with the bourgeoisie and small merchants’ demands for 
change with little cost. Research conducted by Djabi (1998) showed that approximately 17% of 
the HMS parliamentarians in 1997 were freelance businessmen. Additionally, a number of 
businessmen who used to give financial support to FIS in the early 1990s started to support 
HMS in the mid- and late-1990s by offering significant levels of zakat to the party. Among them 
was Djillali Mehri, Chairman and CEO of Pepsi Algeria (L’Express, 1997), who became head of 
an independent list supported by HMS in El Oued and was elected to the legislative assembly in 
1997 (Tahi, 1997, p. 128).  
In sum, the HMS’ mobilization in 1992-1998 fit the scenario of successful mobilization in 
which an Islamist party attracts more support. This was attributed to the following reasons: 1) It 
was allowed more participation in formal politics while its major rival, the FIS, was excluded, 2) 
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it increased its organizational strength by co-operating with more Algeria’s and international 
NGOs, and 3) it labeled itself as the party that was most likely to mediate the conflicts between 
the regime and Islamists, and thus bring peace to the country. These elements helped the HMS to 
appear as a party that could bring benefits with smaller costs than the FIS. In the 1995 
presidential election, Nahnah came in second only to the Zeroual, winning 2,971,974 votes 
(JORA, 1995), or over a quarter of the valid votes. Bearing in mind that the FIS acquired a little 
more than 3 million votes in the first round of legislative elections in 1991, we can see that the 
HMS appropriated a principal part of the social base. Further, in the 1997 legislative election, 
the HMS became the second largest party in parliament behind only RND which was a regime 
party created by President Zeroual.  
The remarkable increase of the HMS’ support rate alarmed the military officers who regarded 
the party as nothing more than a card serving their interests which should pose no challenge to 
their own primacy, and the tension between the party and the regime thus came to the surface. 
The next chapter discusses how the military’s increase of restrictions on HMS drove the party to 
be co-opted by a new ruling elite circle led by Bouteflika, and how the HMS’ deeper co-
operation with this new President discredited its image as an opposition party and triggered its 
internal disputes.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes Ennahda and the HMS’ development in the decade after their first trial 
in elections. It indicates that in an unfavorable political climate, an opposition party can work in 
abeyance and maintain its structures and networks to ensure its continuance and change its 
political opportunities. It also suggests that in various contexts, citizens may have different 
calculations of benefits and costs, and thus call for different slogans, which explains why similar 
movement strategies may yield completely different mobilization outcomes.  
Islamist parties generally experienced outstanding performances at the polls in both Tunisia 
and Algeria at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. However, both regimes responded by 
launching cruel crackdown measures towards Islamists. Ennahda became Ben Ali’s major 
repression target, with many of its ranks forced into exile. Its response was to work in abeyance 
and ensure its sustainability by changing recruitment strategies and rebuilding its organizational 
structures abroad. Importantly, its leader Ghannouchi began to develop a new approach to 
modern Islamist politics, his distance from Tunisia, and his proximity to Western democratic 
political practice enabling him to synthesize the experience of colonization, authoritarianism and 
Tunisian nationalism into a new set of discourse that more accurately reflected the Tunisian 
populations’ need for a politics that incorporated tradition, Islam, modernism, and pluralism — 
revealing an ability to be flexible, and pragmatic.  
In Algeria, the regime adopted a combination of hard and soft methods towards different 
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Islamist parties. While harshly repressing the FIS which finally provoked a decade-long war 
between the military and armed Islamists, the regime continued the controlled inclusion policies 
towards the HMS, providing favorable opportunities for HMS. As its biggest rival, FIS, was 
excluded from the political scene, and as the HMS itself became the major co-optation target of 
the military which took control of the regime after the 1992 coup, the party expanded its 
organizational networks and exposure in the media. In the context of the civil war, HMS’s 
moucharaka strategy of bridging secularism and Islam for popular participation, and its exercise 
of moderation, in which it interpreted Islam as against violence, and the only solution to the civil 
war, resonated with voters’ demands, which allowed the party to reach a climax of popularity in 
1995-1997.  
During this period, the two parties revealed flexibility, pragmatism, and the ability to 
compromise by adjusting their organizational structures and movement strategies. Yet, the two 
parties’ experience had conspicuous differences, leading them to follow different development 
trajectories. The repression experience and exiled Nahdaouis’ exposure to Western democracy 
prompted Ennahda to confront Tunisia’s regime as a more modern Islamist party which became 
more tolerant of Western values. By comparison, the HMS lacked involvement in real 
democracy, and was co-opted by certain ruling elites as a tool to counteract other elites and 
manage oppositions, which, though helped the party avoid repression and temporarily enhance 
political influence, trapped it in a dilemma between pro- and anti- regime positions at its later 
evolution stage. The next chapter further examines the development of Ennahda’s mobilization 
dynamics while in abeyance, as well as the challenges faced by the HMS when deepening its co-















Chapter 6  
Co-optation or Resistance? 
 
This chapter compares the mobilization of Ennahda and the HMS between 1999-2010. It 
examines (1) new dynamics of the political landscape in each country and how they shifted 
political opportunities for the two parties; (2) the contrasting ways in which Ennahda’s 
mobilization dynamics made it a more moderate and modernized opposition force, whereas the 
HMS continued along the path of regime co-optation, aggravating party fragmentation and 
triggering party inconsistency.  
I begin by arguing that Ennahda’s development in the first decade of 2000 fit the scenario of 
abeyant mobilization in which a group operated and grew underground in unfavorable political 
environment. In the context of a slight if elusive political openness initiated by Ben Ali as a 
result of both domestic and international pressure, the Nahdaouis in Tunisia had more 
opportunities to engage in civil society activities. This enabled exiled Nahdaouis to rebuild their 
networks with those remaining in Tunisia. The growth of second-generation of Nahdaouis who 
were involved in Western politics provided new organizational dynamics and new perspectives 
for the party. Furthermore, the party diverged from the MB model and began to adopt the then 
AKP model’s respect for pluralist rules, making compromises with political opponents and 
potential political allies, and self-representing as a conservative rather than purely religious party. 
All these aspects prepared Ennahda to return to the Tunisian political scene when the time 
became favorable. 
I then argue that the HMS’ approach fitted the scenario of unsuccessful mobilization in which 
it failed to enlarge its support base. The period was marked by a shift from being a semi-
opposition party to a semi-regime party. Instead of remaining a collaborator of the Eradicators, 
which was dominated by military officers, HMS turned to support the Conciliators, who were 
led by President Bouteflika. This trend partly resulted from its attempt to increase political 
opportunities after military officers tightened their control over the HMS in the late 1990s. 
Against the background of an internal power struggle after the founder and driving force behind 
HMS, Mahfoud Nahnah, died in 2003, the new party leader, Bouguerra Soltani, decided to join 
the Presidential Alliance to openly support Bouteflika’s policies and bid for re-election as 
Algeria’s President in 2004 in exchange for Bouteflika’s support for his leadership within the 
HMS. Yet this led to a failure by HMS to justify its strategies and maintain its consistency, with 
the result that it held a small voting share in 2002 and 2007 elections.  
 
Ennahda’s Evolution in Abeyance 
Studies of North Africa in 1999-2010 largely ignore Ennahda. As the party had already 
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suffered from two decades of repression, most of the literature on Tunisia analyzes the resilience 
of Ben Ali’s authoritarianism (Cavatorta, 2001, pp. 183-185; Entelis, 2007; Hibou, 2006; Sadiki, 
2002b) and reveals little expectation that Ennahda would get the chance to return to Tunisia’s 
political scene. The studies that do exist were all written after departure of Ben Ali and 
Ennahda’s return. These include McCarthy’s (2018) analysis of Ennahda’s grassroots activities, 
Wolf’s (2017, pp. 79-102) discussion of its structures, and Cavatorta and Merone’s (2013) study 
of its ideologies. Overall, little in-depth analysis exists that explores how Ennahda changed 
during the decade between 1999 and 2010 or how these changes prepared it to return to Tunisian 
politics and reconstruct itself after the Tunisian Revolution in 2011. With this in mind, this 
section on Ennahda’s development in 1999-2010 begins by describing the façade of political 
openness initiated by Ben Ali’s regime. Next, it examines how Nahdouis in exile and in Tunisia 
rebuilt the party’s networks. Lastly, it analyzes Ennahda’s movement strategies, as influenced by 
the Turkish AKP model.  
 
Façade of Political Openness 
In 1999-2010, domestic and international events led Ben Ali to make several policy 
adjustments. On the domestic front, Tunisia faced two growing grievances.  
First, Ben Ali’s economic liberalization policies led to an intensification in the imbalance 
between the rich and poor. The poor were increasingly excluded from the benefits of rapid 
economic growth and faced marginalization (Amin, 2013, p. 102). In 2008, the country 
witnessed the most heated rebellions since the 1984 Bread Riot. Thousands of unemployed and 
temporary mining workers in the potassium-rich area of Gafsa launched large-scale protests 
lasting six months. According to Gobe (2010, pp. 4-8), a Tunisian sociologist, having long been 
economically and socially sidelined, protesters complained about poor living conditions, and not 
being able to enjoy the same benefits of development as residents in richer governorates.  
Second, middle class citizens’ dissatisfaction with the official ideology as discussed in 
Chapter 5 was aggravated as new channels opened up to learn about Islam. New satellite 
channels from the Gulf, especially al-Majd (The Glory) and Iqra (Read), and the growth of 
social media exposed Tunisians to various interpretations of Islam that had not previously been 
available (Chomiak & Entelis, 2013, p. 53). Moreover, the social media and foreign satellite 
channels facilitated the transfer of Ennahda’s message to Tunisia and allowed it to reach out to a 
wider population, as Ennahda leaders were interviewed from exile, and they were included in 
talk show and political programs. In my interview with Kaarina, a university undergraduate who 
later joined Ennahda when it was reconstructed in 2011, she stated, “My family watched Al-
Jazeera, Al-Hiwar, and other banned channels. For instance, I watched Rachid Ghannoushi on 
the Al-Jazeera channel before the revolution” (Interview, Kaarina, 2015, Tunis). Under the 
influence of Saudi teen soap operas, Qatari religious programs, and chats on religious topics at 
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Facebook and Twitter, Tunisia witnessed an increase of Islamic awareness and practice at the 
individual level in the first decade of the 2000s. Ramadan fasting and mosque attendance 
became increasingly popular. Meanwhile, there was a conspicuous increase in the wearing of 
hijab among Tunisian women (Powel, 2009, p. 201). For Ben Ali, such expressions of personal 
piety were alarming as they indicated Tunisians’ growing discontent with official interpretation 
of Islam (McCarthy, 2014, pp. 746-747).  
Ben Ali also faced international pressures for change in his human rights policies. Efforts 
being made by family members of imprisoned Nahdaouis to reveal the regime’s human rights 
abuses in the 1990s were at last having some effect. With the help of Nahdaouis residing in the 
West, and the NGOs they engaged with, such as the MAB, the accusations made by wives of 
political prisoners were conveyed to international human rights organizations. Brahim stated in 
an interview that Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Red Cross, and other 
international human rights groups had started to visit members of the Ennahda diaspora in the 
West, contact and interview family members of political prisoners when they traveled to Tunisia 
(Interview, Brahim, 2015, Tunis), and report the human rights abuses in Tunisia to the 
international community. The Human Rights Watch World Report (2002, p. 473) of 2002 stated, 
“suspected members of the banned Islamist movement, Ennahda, remained the chief target for 
repression… [though the arrested activists] had not been linked to any act of violence”. Such 
statements attracted much attention in the EU. From the year 2000, the EU put Tunisia’s human 
rights on the agenda of EU-Tunisia Association Council (Youngs, 2001, p. 77). The EU’s 
Tunisia Strategy Paper produced through the Euro-Med Partnership for 2002-2006 criticized 
“Tunisia’s impatience with respect to criticism by the EU concerning matters of human rights” 
(Human Rights Watch World Report, 2003, p. 494).  
To deflect domestic and international pressures, Ben Ali adjusted his policies in two ways. 
First, to build Tunisia’s international image as an economically successful country in which 
democratization was being progressively implemented, he created the façade of improving 
pluralism and freedom. He revised the electoral law and allowed leaders from other legalized 
political parties to run for presidential elections. In 1999, the country held its first multi-party 
presidential election, though there was a huge disparity between Ben Ali and the other two 
candidates, Mohammad Belhadj Amor and Abderrahmane Tlili, as the latter two were weak 
candidates designated by the regime and campaigned little (Sadiki, 2002, p. 129).  
Meanwhile, as many of the international condemnations of Ben Ali’s regime focused on its 
neglect of human rights and abuse of imprisoned Nahdaouis, he relaxed policies towards 
Ennahda. In 1999, Ben Ali released almost 600 imprisoned party memebers. In the following 
years, more Ennahda prisoners were freed, including Habib Ellouz, Mohammed Akrout, Hamadi 
Jebali and Ali Larayedh, all Ennahda’s senior members, the latter two becoming future Prime 
Ministers after Ben Ali’s fall (Middle East Online, 2006). Additionally, according to Monia 
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Brahim, the regime loosened surveillance and control over dozens of political prisoners’ families 
(Interview, Brahim, 2015, Tunis). 
In this way, Ben Ali offered Ennahda more operating space, enabling those released to 
reunite and rebuild their networks. However, Ennahda was still excluded from the political scene. 
In 2007, Bechir Takali, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, announced that Ennahda would 
never be allowed to enter the Tunisian political scene as a legal party (BBC Monitoring, 2007). 
Furthermore, the regime’s attitudes towards Nahdaouis oscillated “between occasional leniency 
and heavy-handedness” (BBC Monitoring, 2009). The heavy-handedness often took the form of 
rearrest after prisoners had been released. Abdallah Zouari, previoulsy a journalist for Ennahda’s 
newspaper, Al-Fajr, was rearrested two months after being released from an 11-year sentence, 
following his travelling from the southeast to the northeast of the country to visit his family (Al-
Bawaba, 2002). Similarly, several months after being released from a 15-year sentence, Chourou, 
Ennahda’s in-country leader, was imprisoned for a second time for holding an “illegal gathering 
at home” (BBC Monitoring, 2009). 
Ben Ali’s second policy adjustment addressed the dual domestic challenges of Tunisians’ 
growing levels of Islamic practice and the Gafsa protests. His strategy adopted a combination of 
policies and approaches. In October 2006, the government launched a campaign against public 
religious practice particularly veiling, on the grounds that wearing headscarves was a regressive 
behavior (Power, 2009, p. 201). During the campaign, the police were reported to have forced 
veiled women to bare their heads and pledge that they would never wear a hijab again (BBC 
News, 2006a). The hijab ban was criticized by many Gulf media such as Al-Jazeera. In response, 
Tunisia closed its embassy in Doha on October 19th (Al Jazeera, 2006). The following year, as a 
counter-move to the Gulf’s media influence, Mohamed Sakhr El Materi, Ben Ali’s son-in-law, 
launched Tunisia’s first Islamic radio station, Radio Zitouna, which became the regime’s 
propaganda tool to expand dissemination of the official interpretation of Islam.  
In response to the 2008 Gafsa uprising, the President sent security forces to arrest large 
numbers of protesters. To prevent witnesses from spreading what happened on the scene via 
social media, Ben Ali shut down Facebook on August 18, 2008 (Chomiak & Entelis, p. 17). This 
however added to the protesters’ grievances, as now, in addition to demanding improved living 
conditions, they sought freedom of speech as well.  
Ben Ali’s handling of the hijab tide and the Gafsa upheaval were destined to trigger a 
backlash, as he continued to ignore the grievances of the poor and the middle class, and instead 
planted the seeds of a further governing crisis. By imposing the hijab ban and restricting 
people’s access to foreign interpretations of Islam, the President denied their expression of 
religious identities, which actually increased their demands for meaning and values, leaving a 
vacuum that was readily filled by Ennahda, which emphasized the need for Islamic practices. In 
2007, the Ennahda leadership published a declaration in Europe which criticized the regime’s 
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repressive politics and stated that the “closed situation has negatively impacted the overall 
quality of social, economic and cultural life” (Wolf, 2017, p. 126). At the same time, the 
government never addressed the socio-economic discontent of the poor and marginalized. Such 
grievances spread from Gafsa to other parts of the country and eventually ignited the Tunisian 
revolution of 2011, as discussed in Chapter 7. How Ennahda’s mobilization strategies changed 
in the face of these new opportunities is discussed below.  
 
Ennnahda’s Organizational Dimensions  
In 1999-2010, Ennahda’s organizational strength developed when working in abeyance in 
two aspects: (1) Networks between members in exile and in Tunisia were rebuilt; (2) The 
second-generation Nahdaouis who were still in exile grew up and became a new emerging force 
within Ennahda, bringing it new dynamic.  
Responding to the regime’s amnesty policies, Ennnahda considered ways to seize upon the 
opportunities offered, however slight. In April 2001, dozens of activists exiled in various 
countries attended Ennahda’s 7th congress in London. The congress affirmed Ennahda’s 
objective of achieving political reconciliation with Ben Ali by diaglouing with him (Wolf, 2017, 
Appendix 4), and made the decision to undertake a “slow and cautious return in Tunisia” 
(Guazzone, 2013, p. 43). The congress was followed by a tide of returning expatriate Nahdaouis. 
Networks were soon rebuilt between Nahdaouis who were returning from exile, those still in 
abroad, released Ennahda political prisoners and their families.  
The network reconstruction affected the party’s development in two ways. First, released 
political prisoners could now work with their wives to pressure the government to further reduce 
repression of Islamists and improve political openness for Ennahda. In 2002, several Ennahda 
activists and their family members in Tunisia formed a support network, the Association 
Internationale de Soutien aux Prisonniers Politiques (AISPP). Accoridng to a report published 
on the website of a French NGO, Ban Public, AISPP was chaired by Ennahda veteran, 
Mohamed Nouri, and it aimed to defend human rights and push the government to release more 
prisoners by revealing practices of torture in Tunisia (Ban Public, 2004).  
Second, the reconnection of Nahdaouis in exile and in Tunisia laid the organizational 
foundation for Ennahda’s reconstruction and resurgence. Returned Nahdaouis not only 
transported funds to support Ennahda related NGOs in Tunisia including AISPP, but worked 
with local Nahdaouis to contact people in grassroots neighborhoods, which later became 
branches and recruiting offices when Ennahda returned to Tunisian politics in 2011.  
In 2000-2009, Ennahda witnessed another shift in organizational structure, with the coming 
of age of second-generation Nahdaouis in Europe.  
Within the large body of literature that has developed over the past several decades on 
European-based Muslims, Cesari (2005, pp. 1017-1020), Leiken (2011, pp. 262-263), Nelsom 
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(1997, pp. 137-138) criticize European-based Muslims’ preference for living in isolated 
communities with little involvement in or commitment to Western politics, culture and values. 
The activities of Nahdaouis suggest this is not necessarily the case. Although exiled Ennahda 
leaders spent much of their time engaging with Islamic NGOs in Europe, they started to study 
Western political theories and observe Western political systems upon their arrival, which 
inspired them to adjust their movement strategies in the 1990s. The second-generation exiled 
Nahdaouis were even more exposed to Western culture and motivated to participate in Western 
politics. Having received Western educations, and learned Western languages, they were 
comfortable working with people from different backgrounds. Unsurprisingly, they developed 
understandings of identity, religion and values different from that of their parents. For example, 
the younger-generation were not enthusiastic about following the stricter regulations of sharia, 
such as gender separation in public areas, and were more willing to accept the values of their 
adoptive states. Ounisi, a younger generation member of Ennahda in exiled in France with her 
parents, explained the generational differences this way:  
 
After a certain period, we created our own youth branch and we organized ourselves at 
the social and political levels. We were always concerned with the situation in Tunisia and 
with integration in France…We were the generation ready to talk about integration, French 
Islam, and diversity. 
                                                                                          (Interview, Ounisi, 2015, Tunis) 
 
The second-generation Nahdaouis’ intention to participate in socio-cultural innovation and 
to follow their own paths toward identity led them to break away from NGOs created by older 
generations of Islamists, and establish their own societies. For instance, Al-Sghaier and Imen 
Ben Mhamed, both children of Nahdaouis, established Giovani Musulmani d’Italia (GMI), no 
longer wishing to attend the existing UCOII. Unlike the UCOII, the GMI was flexible toward the 
issue of unveiled Muslim women and held conferences attended by both men and women. 
Additionally, the GMI used Italian rather than Arabic as the language of communication in both 
public or private settings, and co-organized interreligious activities with Christian and Jewish 
youth groups at local, national, and international levels (Toronto, 2008, p. 77).  
When analyzing the new-generation Islamists, Roy (2012, p. 12) observes that many Arab 
baby boomers had more connections with the outside world than their parents did, and as such, 
“br[ought] along their critical approach and reluctance to blindly follow an aging leadership” 
when engaging in Islamist activities. My research on the younger-generation Nahdaouis, 
especially those who grew up in Europe, corroborated this argument. Unlike their parents, 
second-generation Nahdaouis critically analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of Islamic 
traditions, rather than accepting a tradition simply because it was regulated in Islamic texts. An 
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article by Soumaya Ghannouchi, daughter of Rachid Ghannouchi, for The Guardian, who grew 
up in England, explained her views regarding the niqab (face covering),  
 
I am no fan of the niqab. I feel it turns the wearer into a blank space, an anonymous mass, a non-
identity. I, like many, feel quite uneasy about the covering of faces and suppression of all traces 
of individual identity it entails. But I have no right to interfere in other people's personal 
preferences…The risk of intervention and coercion is all the more worrying if it comes from the 
state, its officials, or institutions. 
                                                                                                                         (Ghannouchi, 2006) 
 
Arguing that the state should not interfere with women’s choice of clothes, Soumaya 
criticized France’s ban of the hijab and niqab “in the name of secularism” as much as Saudi 
Arabia’s enforcement of wearing hijab “in the name of religion” (Ghannouchi, 2006).  
In addition to adopting elements of Westrn culture, several young Nahdaouis actively 
engaged in Western politics. Al-Sghaier co-founded the Partito Democratico (PD) of Italy 
(Hamid, 2014, p. 192). In the UK, Seifeddine Ferjani, son of Ennahda’s senior theoretician, Said 
Ferjani, joined the Conservative Party (Interview, Ferjani, 2015, Tunis). Soumaya Ghannouchi 
took an active role in protests against the Iraq War in the UK in 2003-2005 (GMBDW, 2013), 
and delivered speeches in front of protesters in London (Youtube, 2006). Another of the 
Ghannouchi daughters, Intissar Kherigi, co-organized the “Islam Expo” at London’s Alexandra 
Palace in 2006 that brought together Islamist scholars including her father, and Oxford Professor 
Tariq Ramadan, grandson of Hassan al Banna. This event, according to Intissar, was important 
in promoting genuine dialogues between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Britain (BBC 
News, 2006b). These second-generation Nahdaouis’ brought to Ennahda fresh ideas about how 
the democratic system actually functioned, prompting it to become more adaptive of pluralist 
politics. This led the party to adjust its strategies when working in abeyance, as discussed further 
below.     
 
Ideology and StrategyIn this section, I analyze how Ennahda made key changes in its 
ideology by shifting from an emphasis on Islamic principles to laying equal stress on Islamic and 
pluralist values, and how it changed strategy, by moving away from the Egyptian MB model and 
toward the Turkish AKP model in the first decade of 2000. Thus, I argue, abeyant mobilization 
can be understood as a process of ongoing momentum that incorporates changes necessary for a 
party to reflect current electoral demands, and develop new mechanisms of supply, so as to be 
well-prepared for action when the opportunitiy for political engagement presents itself. Ennahda 
was able to do this because it had retained its organizational strength abroad; and it had 
sustained active party linkages with Nahdaouis — and the larger electorate — in Tunisia. This 
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also meant it had retained the confidence of its funders, giving it the financial capacity to 
continue its mobilization activities while in abeyance. At the beginning of the 21st century, 
Enanhda began to adjust its slogans. Ennahda claimed that a problem with Tunisia’s 
Westernized autocratic regime was its breaching of the separation of state and religion by 
manipulating the country’s religious sphere and intervening in people’s religious life. As 
previously, it utilized a strategy of mixing diagnostic and nationalist slogans. In a chapter 
Ghannounchi wrote in Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (2000, p. 97), for example, he 
argued, “in the Arab Maghreb, it is the state, which is run by a secularist elite in every case, that 
controls religion and runs its institutions… The state here is a superior and capable power… It is 
above society”. As in the past, claiming that Western democracy only reflected the form of 
democracy, rather than the essence of democracy, Ennahda attributed the social grievances 
caused by corruption, lack of freedom and social justice, etc. to a plot by Western countries and 
Ben Ali’s regime to prevent the implementation of true democracy in Tunisia. Elaborating this 
view in an article in the independent Bahraini newspaper Al Wasat (2009), Ghannouchi stated 
that Tunisia’s problems were caused by “the Western bet on achieving its interests in the region, 
not through accommodation with the will of the peoples, i.e. democracy, after that became 
associated with the quicker road for Islam and Islamist rule, but with … its allies from corrupt 
dictatorships”.  
Based upon these arguments, Ennahda formulated its prognostic slogans, suggesting the 
autocratic regime’s misgovernment could only be solved through a democratization process that 
involved all political forces. At the 8th Congress of the party held in London in 2007, Ennahda 
clarified in its platform that it was ready “to work together with … all the genuine opposition 
forces so as to achieve political openness in the country” (BBC Monitoring, 2007).  
Although Ennahda continued to combine prognostic and religious slogans in 1999-2010, it 
did this in a different way than it used to. Rather than claiming that the current system should be 
replaced with an Islamic system as it had before, it now presented itself as a protector and 
defender of pluralism, religious freedom, and separation of state and religion. To do so, it 
adopted two approaches that combined the pluralism slogans with a continuity of Islamic 
principles and practices. 
 First, it emphasized citizens’ freedom to pursue Islamic values and access to various 
interpretations. In Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, Ghannouchi (2000, p. 97) asserted 
that the government should withdraw “from the spiritual sphere, leaving it in the hands of the 
religious establishment”. 
Second, Ennahda expressed its intention to engage in Tunisia’s democratization process and 
respect pluralist principles, in an effort to demonstrate that it would not enforce Islamic laws in 
the political domain. To do so, it adopted AKP-like practices of using pluralist language and 
accommodating the secular. In the literature analyzing Islamist parties after 2011, White (2013, 
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p. 190) and Marks (2017a), in their analyses of Islamist parties after 2011, note that Ennahda 
likened itself to the AKP, yet all fail to clarify what the AKP model7 exactly meant. Based upon 
analyses of Turkey and the AKP’s early political strategies by Çavdar (2006) and Dede (2011) 
and Yavuz (2009), I argue that the Turkish AKP model was at the time characterized by three 
features: (1) respecting pluralist rules and participation in a democratization process; (2) 
promoting economic growth; and (3) self-representing as a conservative rather than religious 
party. These characteristics not only enabled the AKP to reduce tensions with the secular 
establishment in Turkey, but helped it reach a broad support base ── all of which resonated 
with the Ennahda leadership in exile. 
Ennahda’s actual shift can be attributed to several factors. In addition to the need to 
compete with Ben Ali’s official ideology, the growth of second-generation exiled Nahdaouis 
more supportive of pluralist rules prompted Ennahda to adjust its strategy. At the same time, the 
AKP’s landslide victories in 2002 and 2007 encouraged Islamist parties throughout the Arab 
world to adopt its tactics. Importantly, the AKP’s governance after its electoral victories, 
certainly in its initial stages, seemed to prove Ghannouchi’s argument that Western politics were 
not the only and authentic representatives of pluralism and freedom. This was manifested in 
Ghannouchi’s response during an interview in 2011 when asked about his long-term vision for 
Tunisia and whether he envisaged promoting Western-style liberal democracy in Tunisia: “The 
best model I can think of is the one adopted by the [ruling] AKP in Turkey” (Religioscope, 
2011).    
The AKP model’s impact on Ennahda was displayed in two ways. First, Ennahda presented 
itself more as a party of conservatives than of Islam. In an interview with a journalist from Al-
Jazeera, Ennahda’s spokesperson, Ali Laraayedh, claimed that a religious party was a Western 
concept associated with the idea of negating reason, denying law, and ruling in the name of God. 
Ennahda, he argued, emphasized the rule of law, the power of reasoning, and respect for 
individual and public freedoms (BBC Monitoring, 2007).  
Second, Ennahda expressed its intention to operate within the boundaries of pluralism by 
showing more willingness to make compromises. Joffé (2015) argues, in a broad regional 
comparative study of Islamist parties in the 21st century, one thing learnt by the Ennahda 
leadership during the decades when it was banned was how democratic systems actually worked 
and how important a role compromises played in the democratic game. The most important 
compromise Ennahda made was to go beyond the Islamism–secularism divide and work with 
secular non-regime parties. Having long been excluded from the political scene, Nahdaouis 
                                                   
7  The discussion about the AKP model here refers to the AKP’s performance before 2015. Since 2015, 
the AKP has shown less respect for pluralist rules and democratization, and Ennahda has referred much 
less to the AKP model since then.  
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clearly knew that they could have little influence on Tunisian politics unless they allied with 
secular opponents. This was despite many Ennahda activists’ dissatisfaction with leftist parties 
which, in their eyes, did not offer much help to Nahdaouis when they were repressed (Interview, 
Brahim, 2015, Tunis). In 2000-2001, several human right ativists were harassed and prosecuted, 
including Fathi Chamkhi, President of the Rassemblement pour une Alternative Internationale 
de Développement, Omar Mestiri, a leading member of Conseil National des Libertés en Tunisie 
(CNLT), and Mokhtar Trifi, President of Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH). 
Ennahda and the socialist party MDS expressed support for theses activists, and intended to 
attract both national and international attention to Ben Ali’s restriction of citizens’ political 
rights by publishing a joint announcement on March 19, 2001, one day before the 45th 
anniversary of Tunisia’s independence (RFI, 2001). The seventh and eighth clauses indicated 
that both parties affirmed each other and other opposition groups’ suffering at Ben Ali’s hands, 
and that both sides would collaborate against the regime: 
 
The repression suffered by the … LTDH and CNLT is a striking illustration of this offense 
[prosecution of human rights activists], which resulted in an upsurge of harassment and 
persecution, even brutal physical assaults on the streets. 
On this occasion, we reiterate our full support for these two national institutions … Just as we 
reaffirm our strong solidarity with more than a thousand political detainees of the Ennahda 
movement who have faced a deliberate process of slow death in jails for a decade… Our 
solidarity also encompasses the activists of the Communist Workers' Party of Tunisia (CPOT) 
and those of Student Organizations which faced persecution and repression from the regime. 
                                                                      (Ghannouchi & Moaada, 2001, translated by author) 
  
In October 2005, the Ben Ali government decided to host the World Summit of the 
Information Society, leading to a short period in which pressure against opposition forces was 
reduced, and internet communication across the country was encouraged as part of an attempt by 
Ben Ali to show himself a legitimate and democratic leader to the outside world. This offered an 
opportunity for opposition groups to make a move. On October 18, representatives from various 
Tunisian non-regime groups including the leftists, unionists, socialists, and Islamists gathered in 
Tunis. The social democratic Ettakatol, liberal PDP, Marzouki’s CPR, and Ennahda drew up a 
joint platform, and announced the formation of the “October 18 Alliance”. Houcine Jaziri, 
Ennahda’s spokesperson in France who came into Tunis for the occasion (Ennahda France, 
2014), together with Ameur Laarayedh, Head of the Ennahdha Executive Bureau, and Samir 
Dilou, a member of Ennahda’s Executive Bureau and Head of its External Relations 
Commission, signed the platform on behalf of Ennahda. Calling for freedom of speech and 
political liberty (Allani, 2009, p. 265), the alliance staged a hunger strike the same day (Le 
120 
 
Temps, 2012). Althougth the police originally tried to destroy the strike, the event soon attracted 
much attention from oversea government officials including the then Ambassador of the UK. 
The alliance finally stopped the strike after 32 days when an international delegation presided 
over by the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Shirin Ebadi, promised to pressure the Tunisian 
government to improve citizens’ rights (Business News, 2016).  
Ennahda’s emphasis on both religious freedom and pluralist principles had important 
implications. First, its criticism of the regime’s restrictions on religious liberty helped it discredit 
official criticism that Ennahda represented extremism and sectarianism. Additionally, 
downplaying religious doctrines helped Ennahda create the impression that supporting itself 
would not cost Tunisians any freedom, and enabled it to reach out to broader social groups 
including those who previously supported secular opposition parties. Second, Ennahda’s 
willingness to collaborate with secular parties demonstrated its tolerance for diversity and its 
commitment to the country’s unity. This allowed for the formation of a united force composed 
of Tunisian Islamists, human right activists and secular opposition parties, which played an 
important role in promoting the creation of a pluralist system after the Tunisian revolution of 
2010-2011. As discussed in Chapter 7, the symbiosis between Ennahda and other opposition 
forces continued after the revolution, reflected in Ennahda’s decision to co-govern with the 
secular nationalist CPR and the socialist Ettakatol after it won election (Marks & Ounissi, 2016). 
Third, by making frequent reference to the Turkish model (Lynch, 2011), Ennahda showed that 
it intended to become a party like the AKP that respected at the time both Islam and pluralist 
principles. This was an effect Ennahda leadership anticipated to achieve, as they referred to the 
reforms in Turkey under AKP’s governance and stressed Ennahda’s admiration of the AKP 
model on many occasions. In a 2011 interview with Al Jazeera (2011), for example, Ghannouchi 
stated “the Turkish experience remains the closest to the Tunisian situation, culturally, 
politically and socially…so al-Nahda… cannot be compared to the Taliban or Iran, the closest 
comparison would be to the AKP”.  
In sum, Ennahda’s mobilization in 1999-2010 fits the scenario of what I label ‘abeyant 
mobilization’. In this period, political opportunities for Ennahda remained unfavorable if slightly 
improved. Whereas Ben Ali still refused to legalize Ennahda and include it in the political arena, 
he relaxed repression agaisnt it and released many of its members from prison. Benefiting from 
the reduction in repression, the released Ennahda members started to engage in Tunisia’s civil 
society activities by establishing organizations such as AISPP. Meanwhile, some exiled 
Nahdaouis returned to Tunisia to establish connections between Nahdaouis in Tunisia and those 
abroad. Along with the rise of second-generation exiled Nahdaouis who were more tolerant of 
Western political structures and culture, Ennahda adjusted its slogans. Further, it adopted the 
AKP model.   
Although Ennahda could not have anticipated that a revolution would erupt in 2010, and 
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thus, had not done real preparatory work to replace Ben Ali’s regime altogether, I contend that 
two initiatives taken by Ennahda when it was excluded from the Tunisian political scene played 
key roles in its rapid reconstruction after the Tunisian uprising. First, it mobilized in abeyance, 
and maintained its organizational structures and networks. Second, in shifting from the Egyptian 
MB to the AKP model, it labeled itself a conservative party willing to work within the 
boundaries of pluralism. Both dimensions allowed Ennahda to grow and develop even in 
unreceptive political environments, and laid important foundations for it to reconstruct itself and 
gain ground once favorable opportunities emerged. These dimensions also enabled Ennahda to 
become better adapted to modern electoral politics, and strengthen its mobilization capacity.  
By comparison, rather than self-represent as a modernized opposition party, the HMS 
tightened its linkages with the Algerian presidency and regime parties, and became less 
appealing to the population due to its discourse inconsistencies. This aspect will be discussed 
below, in the examination of the HMS’ development in the same period.  
 
HMS: Engagement in the Presidential Alliance 
The 1999-2010 period is critical to understanding the HMS’ evolution, due to two events: (1) 
the death of its founder and leader, Mahfoud Nahnah; and (2) its participation in the Presidential 
Alliance. Several studies examine HMS in this period (Boubekeur, 2009; Catalano, 2010, p. 540, 
547-548; Driessen, 2012; Driessen, 2014, pp. 136-180; Holmsen, 2009), which for the most part 
focus on HMS’ ideologies and discourse. What is missing in the literature is a comprehensive 
perspective for understanding the party’s development as a result of its interpretation of the 
available political opportunities, or the background and details of its mobilization dynamics. 
Specifically, the above scholarship does not analyze the party’s significant turns in this period, 
nor how this provoked debates and affected its mobilization capacity. This section on HMS’ 
development in 1999-2010 attempts to bridge this vacuum. It begins by describing changes in 
the political landscape that brought HMS closer to President Bouteflika. It then examines how 
the HMS’ new chief, Bouguerra Soltani, interpreted the opportunities in the context of the 
acrimonious internal party disputes following Nahnah’s death. Lastly, it analyzes how Soltani’s 
deeper collaboration with Bouteflika affected the HMS’ mobilization dynamics, and how it 
damaged the party’s mobilizational capacity.  
 
The Post-Civil War Era: A Changing Landscape 
   In the first decade of 2000, Algeria entered the post-civil war era. After Bouteflika was elected 
president, the government adopted a combination of hard and soft tactics by giving amnesty to 
armed Islamists who surrendered and launching hard military operations against those rejecting 
capitulation. The result was a period in which the country witnessed a remarkable decline of 
violence. Large numbers of armed insurgents were disarmed, and the most brutal and violent 
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group, GIA, was hunted down and rendered almost extinct by 2005 (El Watan, 2005a).  
   As the décennie noir came to a close, the concerns of the majority of Algerians shifted from a 
quest for peace to a desire for more liberty and relief from socio-economic hardship. In response, 
Bouteflika took three measures. First, economic. As Algeria was a rentier state which derived a 
large proportion of revenues from oil (Dillman, 2000b), the rise of oil prices in the international 
market in the first decade of 2000 led to a three-fold increase in GDP, which jumped from 56.76 
billion USD in 2002 to 171 billion USD in 2008 (Trading Economic Data). This gave Bouteflika 
the means to increase the national minimum wage from 8,000 DA in 2001 to 12,000 DA in 2007, 
according to Office National des Statistiques, and launch the National Housing Program, a plan 
to alleviate the country’s housing shortages by constructing one million low- and middle-income 
units by 2009 (Bellal, 2009, pp. 99-100).  
   Second, Bouteflika developed a personality cult and used the public media as loci to promote 
the president’s positive image as a savior who brought Algeria peace. In 2001, the regime 
implemented a new law which stated that defamation against Bouteflika would result in 
imprisonment and fining (DeRouen, 2008, p. 41). From 2005 onward, the regime started to use 
its diplomatic networks to promote Bouteflika as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize (Le Soir 
d'Algérie, 2005), in order to strengthen the president’s popularity and legitimacy at home. 
Third, Bouteflika developed what Joffé (2015) termed a “façade democracy”, implementing 
authoritarian rule while offering many personal liberties to citizens. Bouteflika encouraged 
media debates of issues ranging from social problems to opposition parties’ proposals that did 
not threaten his legitimacy, leaving a limited space for freedom of speech. Unlike Ben Ali who 
banned Al Jazeera and Facebook, Bouteflika was open to foreign and social media, although he 
used the state-owned media to advertise that only he could offer citizens social stability and 
freedom (Naylor, 2015, p. 228). Bouteflika stressed, for example, that by ending the civil war, 
he had saved women from the Islamists’ hand. To show his respect for women’s rights, the 
president co-opted prominent feminists such as Khalida Messaoudi, criticized the Islamists’ 
view of women (Salhi, 2003, p. 34), and amended the conservative Family Code of 1984 to 
increase women’s rights.  
  These measures yielded two consequences. On the one hand, despite the grievances over 
unemployment and corruption in society, the memory of the civil war, together with the 
improvement in social welfare and personal liberties, demotivated citizens to pursue larger 
benefits, such as changing the regime, as the potential scenario of returning to chaos and 
instability seemed so much worse than maintaining the status quo. On the other hand, there was 
a growing fear of the costs that might be brought by Islamist groups, such as the loss of freedom, 
peace, and stabiliy. These dynamics increased the obstacles to the HMS’ mobilization. 




Shifting Political Opportunities 
In the post-civil war era, three factors profoundly affected the Algerian political landscape 
and the HMS’ political opportunities: (1) the end of collaboration between the HMS and the 
Eradicators; (2) the power struggle between the Conciliators, represented by the new President, 
and the Eradicators, represented by the military leadership; and (3) Bouteflika’s encouragement 
of competition between religious groups as a way of opposition management.  
As described in Chapter 5, the Eradicators’ co-opted the HMS specifically to increase their 
counterweight against the Conciliators, who were first led by the leader of FLN, Abdulhamid 
Mehri, and then by President Zeroual, but not in order to turn the HMS into a second FIS, able to 
challenge the regime’s hegemony. Thus, when HMS demonstrated increasing mobilizational 
capacity in the mid-1990s and become the largest opposition party in the 1995-1997 elections, 
the military grew cautious about Islamist political participation, and combined legislative and 
covert methods to control them. Although the Eradicators continued to offer the HMS controlled 
inclusion and cabinet portfolios in return for its support, the positions on offer, such as Minister 
of Tourism and Craftsmen and Secretary of State for the Environment, were non-weighty ones 
(Hamladji, 2002, p. 4). Meanwhile, HMS members were, from early 1996 onwards, no longer 
appointed to the position of Minister of Religious Affairs. 
 In 1997, new regulations were introduced to interdict reference to religion in any political 
party’s name or platform. These provisions forced the HMS to change its name from Hamas to 
the Movement of Society for Peace8. Moreover, shortly before the 1999 presidential election (in 
which Bouteflika was eventually elected), the constitutional council denied Nahnah’s 
qualifications for competing because he lacked proof of ‘‘participation in the Algerian War of 
Independence’’. The disqualification was seen as an intentional action aimed to oust Nahnah, 
who had the potential to become a real presidential competitor, from the election (Willis, 2002b, 
p. 6).  
Along with the mounting restrictions, the HMS’ political opportunities decreased. The only 
way to reverse the situation seemed to its leadership to be cooperation with other official 
government factions. The power struggle between military officers (the Eradicators) and the 
Conciliators led by the newly elected Bouteflika, offered it such an opportunity.  
After assuming office in 1999, it did not take long for Bouteflika to realize that he was 
being used as a puppet president and that the military had seriously interfered with the 
government’s personnel assignments and decision-making (Holm, 2005, p. 120). For instance, 
the military nominated one of their confidants, Ali Benflis, to become Prime Minister in 2000 
and one year later assisted him in taking over the FLN’s leadership. Declaring that he did not 
accept being a ‘‘three-quarters president’’ (Ibid), Bouteflika took two initiatives to resist the 
                                                   
8  As the name was Harakat Mujtami’a al-Silmin Arabic, the party continued to call itself HMS. 
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military’s maneuvers. First, he negated the military’s eradication policy toward Islamist groups. 
As reconciliation had worked better than confrontation in alleviating the country’s threat from 
violent Islamist, he maintained his predecessor’s (Zeroual’s) dialogue initiatives by introducing 
the Law on Civil Harmony in July 1999 (Volpi, 2000, p. 36), and implementing the grace 
amnistiante in January 2000. Second, in the following years, he initiated several reshuffles to 
strengthen his grip on power. This culminated on May 5, 2003, in Bouteflika dismissing Benflis 
as Prime Minister and replacing him with Ahmed Ouyahia, head of the RND, the second largest 
political party and potential rival to FLN. This drew the RND closer to the President’s side. In 
2004, Bouteflika forced the resignation of General Lamari who was a core member of the 
Eradicators. 
From 1999 to 2010, HMS’ political opportunities changed in two important ways. First, 
Bouteflika viewed the HMS as a potential ally and during the 1999 campaign reached out to 
Nahnah who had just been deprived of the right to run for election. Bouteflika promised to 
reward HMS with political resources if the party supported his presidential bid. After the HMS 
accepted, and supported his candidacy, Bouteflika offered it three important cabinet positions as 
soon as he took power (Driessen, 2012, p. 180). In May 2005, Bouteflika increased the HMS’ 
ministerial positions including a ministership without portfolio to draw Nahnah’s successor, 
Bouguerra Soltani, to his side.  
Second, Bouteflika’s methods of regulating Algeria’s religious arena had implications for 
the HMS’ political opportunities. Chapter 5 argued that a tactic adopted by the government was 
to challenge the Islamists’ interpretation of Islam by establishing an official ideology. In fact, as 
Eligür (2010, p. 214) and Wiktorowicz (2004a, p. 18) argue, competition was not only between 
official discourse and Islamist groups’ discourse, but between different Islamist discourse. Yet, 
these scholars claim that the Islamist inter-group discourse contests arose spontaneously, while I 
argue that government officials used covert means to encourage inter-group competition to 
weaken the Islamist field. Unlike Ben Ali who acted as the dominant figure in Tunisia’s Islamic 
sphere by creating an official interpretation of Islam and marginalizing all other interpretative 
versions, Bouteflika became the organizer of Algeria’s Islamic marketplace by keeping an open 
attitude towards as many religious currents as possible, with the exception of the FIS and violent 
groups. To do so, he expanded his predecessors’ covert means of divide-and-rule towards 
Islamist parties and organizations, and specifically supported the growth of Sufism and Salafiyya 
‘ilmiyya in Algeria.  
Joffé (2009, p. 947) argues, in a broad comparative study of North African regimes’ 
strategies for centralizing power, that Bouteflika attempted to revive Sufism “as an antidote to 
Islamist extremism”. Sufism spread to Algeria in the Middle Ages and was historically popular 
among the Berber population. In the 19th century, several Sufi orders such as the Qadiriyya led 
by Abd al-Qadr were devoted to the anti-French struggle (Shillington, 2005, p. 97). These were 
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marginalized in the 20th century with the rise of Arab nationalism, which neglected non-Arab 
ethnic groups, and the upsurge of Islamism, which generally viewed Sufism as a non-authentic 
form of Islam. Entering the 21st century, Bouteflika started to court the Sufi orders. According to 
Roberts (2008, p. 152), this was motivated by the need to attract Berber support and reduce their 
antagonism towards the government. Muedini (2015, pp. 43-66) argues that Bouteflika also 
intended to seek help from Sufi groups to undermine the influence of Islamist extremism. 
Further, I contend that Bouteflika’s policies were also driven by another concern. As Sufism is 
apolitical in nature, the President might have hoped to depoliticize Islamism by encouraging 
Sufism to join the competition. In 2006, the President sent a message of support to a colloquium 
organized by the Sufi Tijaniyya Order, and asked Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkadem to deliver 
a speech at the gathering. Belkadem stressed the need “to use this meeting and the zawiya (Sufi 
lodges) as a center of influence and as platforms from which the precepts of our religion can be 
propagated” (Magharebia, 2006). In 2009, Algeria’s Ministry of Religious Affairs gave its 
approval to Sufi orders to distribute publications and CDs of Sufism to schools and mosques 
(World Tribune, 2009).  
In addition to Sufism, Bouteflika also backed Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya, a branch of Salafism 
inspired by Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. Unlike the other tendencies of Salafism which called 
for violent activities or political participation, Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya advocated political quietism, 
rejected political activities, and advised its followers to respect the government (Boubekeur, 
2008, pp. 13-16; Boukhars, 2015, p. 2). Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya was first introduced in Algeria during 
the 1920s by Tayeb al Oqbi but was soon marginalized by the AUMA which advocated 
nationalism. The renaissance of Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya in Algeria started in the first decade of 2000s, 
resulting from the return of many young Algerians who had pursued religious studies in Saudi 
Arabia (Boubekeur, 2008, pp. 13-14). As this tendency not only diverted people’s interest from 
politics, but challenged the violent groups, Bouteflika encouraged its rise to further divide 
religious groups. Hence, imams of Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya were encouraged to preach in mosques or 
Qur’an schools, and young adherents were given financial support by the state (Muedini, 2015, 
pp. 43-66). As discussed in later sections, Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya became an important competitor of 
HMS and narrowed the opportunities for Algeria’s Islamist parties in general. The growing 
influence of both Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya and Sufism of concentrating on individual religious practice 
and not engaging in political activities contributed to the maintenance of the Algerian regime 
and the decreasing popularity of Islamist parties. How such changes in the political landscape 
were interpreted by the HMS, and how the new political opportunities affected its mobilization 
dynamics are addressed below.  
 
Joining the Presidential Alliance 
   When Bouteflika first reached out to HMS in 1999, Nahnah agreed to co-operate with the 
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President, much as he had with the military officers. Nahnah’s intentions were to continue the 
moucharaka (participatory) strategy to maintain his party’s influence in Algeria’s political scene 
by taking cabinet positions and participating in government affairs. Meanwhile, Nahnah also 
approved of the civil reconciliation program proposed by Boutflika that aimed to terminate 
Algeria’s civil war by pardoning the jihadists who surrendered (Roy & Sfeir, 2007, pp. 55-56). 
Although Nahnah initially hoped to maintain the ‘‘third way between regime and opposition’’ 
(Willis, 2012, p. 189), his successor Soltani, went a step further after Nahnah died in 2003, 
collaborating with Bouteflika and joining the Presidential Alliance.  
   According to Max Weber (1978), charismatic authority inspires intense commitments and 
maintains unity, but its negative effect is that once a charismatic leader dies, the new leader 
faces problems of commanding similar loyalty and commitment and quelling disputes. Weber’s 
theory applies well to the case of HMS. On June 19, 2003, as Nanah, the party’s founder and 
spiritual leader, Nahnah, died of leukemia, an important shift in the HMS’ structure took place. 
For HMS, the loss caused by Nahnah’s death was significant. As one of the most famous and 
prestigious religious theorists in Algeria, and the HMS’ founder and soul, Nahnah had served as 
a strong bond for party unity. As he had almost total control of the party, the other members 
were largely to be insignificant in comparison. The difficulty was that Nahnah had not groomed 
anyone to replace him, or even pointed to a possible successor, let alone anointing one, before 
his death. Consequently, a power vacuum emerged within the party when Nahnah died 
(L’Expression, 2003a). As none of his most likely successors, the three standing vice presidents, 
had been tested in any practical sense, and no one really knew what they stood for, the 
contenders could not offer any level of charisma, count on their own popularity or comand 
credibility. Even as the national membership was still immersed in mourning, the HMS 
leadership split into two power coteries and a power struggle erupted between two of the three 
Vice Presidents.  
The first contender was Bouguerra Soltani. Born in 1954, Soltani had a similar resumé to 
other HMS members. He held a Master’s degree in Arabic literature at the University of 
Constantine, and had assumed important positions at an early age. In the 1990s, he headed the 
HMS’ Majlis Shura. He was Minister of Small and Medium Enterprise in 1997-1999, and 
Minister of Labor in 1999-2001 (Liberté, 2003). Well-known for his openness for dialogue, 
Soltani was backed by another Vice President at the time, Abderrezak Mokri (who was not in 
contention for the party leadership), and the head of Majlis Shura, Mohamed Megharia (Ibid).  
The other contender was Abderrahmane Saidi, a Vice President of HMS who was eight 
years younger than Soltani. Like Soltani, Saidi also assumed important positions at an early age 
and used to be a parliamentarian (Info Soir, 2003). With the support of Mokri and Megharia who 
were reported to have helped Soltani lobby within the party and divide supporters of Saidi (Ibid), 
Soltani won the Majlis Shura election on August 8, 2003 and became the HMS’ new leader. 
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Saïdi, Mokri and Abdelmadjid Menasra became Vice Presidents, and Megharia remained to be 
head of Majlis Shura (Liberté, 2003). As Soltani received only 105 out of 205 votes inside the 
Majlis Shura, 10 votes more than Saidi, Soltani’s position was unstable and the internal power 
struggle did not end. As Arous Zoubir, Professor at University of Algiers 3 specializing in 
Islamist parties in Algeria, observed ‘‘several second-generation leaders [of HMS] had similar 
profiles… This planted the seeds of party fragmentation” (Interview, Zoubir, 2016, Algiers).  
The prime concern for Soltani after assuming HMS’ presidency was to consolidate his 
power within the party. As Nahnah died just a few months prior to the general Algerian 
presidential election, Soltani attempted to tie in his own party platform to that of Bouteflika’s, in 
order to strengthen his party’s standing. To this end, he sought to join Bouteflika in exchange for 
the latter’s support. In return, President Bouteflika offered Soltani media exposure opportunities, 
and invited him to attend many national events such as the prayer events on Eid al-Adha as an 
important political and religious figure, to increase his influence both inside and ouside the HMS 
(Liberté, 2004). In Feburary 2004, two months before the presidential election, the HMS, along 
with two regime parties, RND and FLN, established the “Presidential Alliance” to back 
President Bouteflika’s re-election (Info Soir, 2004). Soltani’s collaboration with Bouteflika may 
have gained him more personal resources, and may indeed have thereby increased his advantage 
over rivals within his party. But it put his party in an awkward position, as it marked a shift in 
the HMS profile from being a semi-opposition party to a semi-regime party, arousing doubts 
among the public about the party’s credibility and commitment, thereby undermining the party’s 
organizational strength by instigating new internal divisions. For many HMS members, Soltani’s 
increasing affinity with Bouteflika was treacherous, arbitrary and contradictory to Nahnah’s 
approach. The party’s new Vice President, Menasra, told the Algerian newspaper El Watan 
(2008a) in April 2008 that there was a section within the HMS which intended “to cleanse the 
ranks of the movement of indecent and opportunist behaviors. We represent an Islamist party 
that has principles and must not be sullied by these acts”. At the time a key campaign issue 
centred around the Constitution’s two-term limit, restricting Bouteflika’s ability to run for re-
election, as he had already served two terms. Bouteflika was therefore seeking allies to help him 
remove this clause from the constitution. This offered Soltani the political opportunity to join 
Bouteflka, support his program to recast the presidential mandate, and gain HMS standing in the 
government. Yet, in doing so, Soltani faced feroucious opposition from party members led by 
Menasra who claimed that the HMS should select its own presidential candidate to compete with 
Bouteflika (El Watan, 2008b). The confrontation escalated on the eve of the HMS’ 4th Party 
Congress on April 29, 2008 when Menasra publicly made a leadership bid and claimed within 
the HMS that he should be elected to replace Soltani as the party’s President (L’Expression, 
2008). In a last-hour negotiation, Menasra abandoned his leadership bid in exchange for 
Soltani’s resignation as Minister of State (El Watan, 2008c). Though Soltani made verbal 
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promises to meet Menasra’s request, he did not resign the post in the end (Liberté, 2008a) under 
the excuse that he needed more time to “do things [in the government] because a reshuffle [by 
Bouteflika] would soon occur” and purified his party’s leadership by marginalizing his 
opponents from Majlis Shura (Le Midi Libre, 2008). Several days after Soltani was re-elected, 
Menasra announced his withdrawal from the party. Condemning Soltani for having misdirected 
the HMS “from the line drawn by its founder, Sheikh Nahnah” (L’Expression, 2009a), Menasra 
formed a new party, Mouvement pour la Prédication et le Changement (MPC) in 2009, which 
drew former HMS activists including delegate mayors, elected officials, and 28 out of 51 HMS 
parliamentarians as members (Ghanem-Yazbeck, 2014). According to Menasra, he brought close 
to 10,000 HMS activists with him, though Mohamed Djoumoua, the HMS communication 
manager under Soltani claimed those numbers were exaggerated, and that no more than 3,000 
HMS members left with Menasra (Le Temps, 2009). In any event, Menasra’s departure was the 
most severe split in the party’s history and inflicted heavy losses on it.  
In thre first decade of 2000s, disputes also erupted between the HMS to its related NGOs, 
including II. Following the death of Bouslimani who used to chair the II after the HMS was 
created in 1993, Aissa Ben Lakhdar became II’s new leader. Yet, after Soltani assumed 
presidency in the HMS, he started to extend his control to II and supported his confidant and 
HMS parliamentarian, Nasreddine Chaklal, to challenge Ben Lakhdar’s leadership and intervene 
in II’s affairs such as member promotion (Liberté, 2008b). In early June 2008, the II held a 
general election in Birkhadem to select its new leader. Although Ben Lakhdar acquired the 
majority of votes, the electoral outcome was denied by her rivals who claimed the number of 
voters was less than the minimum requirement of 132 according to the II’s charter (Le Soir, 
2008). It was reported that Ben Lakhdar’s rivals held another assembly of their own at midnight 
of June 11-12 during which Nasreddine Chaklal was elected the II’s head. Shortly afterwards, 
Soltani declared that “the authorities (of HMS) do not recognize Ben Lakhdar”, and openly 
announced his support for Chaklal. According to Soltani, “the little output of the II in the era of 
Ben Lakhdar” proved that the latter was not suitable to “continue leading the association” (El 
Watan, 2008d). Condemning HMS’ “shameful interference in the internal affairs of a charity 
group” (Ibid), Ben Lakhdar left the association along with her followers and founded a new 
charity called Al-Irchad (Liberté, 2008b).  
Following Ben Lakhdar’s departure, a new round of disputes erupted between Chaklal and 
Cheikh Hamadouche, a veteran of II who was dissatisfied with Soltani and Chaklal’s 
manipulation of II as their political tool. In October 2009, Cheikh Hamadouche claimed to 
Algerian newspaper Horizons (2009), “We refuse to work under the umbrella of a political party. 
It’s the charity actions whose credit goes to those charitable souls who contribute to assisting 
poor people. We hope that these are pure actions and we hope to stay away from political bias”. 
Like Ben Lakhdar, Hamadouche also created a new charity organization under the name of Al-
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Irchad el-Khairia (IK) in Blida.  
Such fragmentation of the HMS and its related NGOs as reflected in leadership struggles, 
new leadership supporting Soltani, and old leadership departure setting up unrelated NGOs 
undermined the HMS’ mobilization capacity in the late 2000s and early 2010s, as the departurers 
brought with them much of the HMS’ fund and supporters. Meanwhile, the emergence of 
Menasra’s MPC which represented itself as the real follower of Nahnah’s path meant that HMS 
had to face a new competitor. In addition to intensifying internal splintering within HMS, 
Soltani paid another high price for joining the Presidential Alliance, namely the party’s loss of 
credibility and fall in support, as elaborated below.  
 
HMS’ Mobilization Failure 
The moucharaka strategy was a fresh, untested approach, which worked at the mobilization 
phase for Nahnah, but not in the instrumentalization phase of government influence, as it turned 
out that the HMS contributed little in the late 1990s to promoting economic and political reforms 
though several party members took ministerial positions and more members became 
parliamentarians. Hence, the approach was rapidly discredited as a strategy device in action, 
leading to the HMS’ loss of appeal even before Nahnah’s death. In the 2002 legislative election, 
this trend was clear when the HMS won just 7.1 % of the votes (JORA, 2002), which was less 
than half of its vote share in 1997 and a quarter of Nahnah’s vote share in the 1995 presidential 
election.  
The incongruence between HMS’ discourse and practice caused by the moucharaka 
strategy as a flaw in the party profile increased after Nahnah’s death. Rather than adopting a new 
approach, Soltani compounded the problem by (1) continuing the promise to influence the 
government from within which had already been discredited, to the party’s disadvantage in the 
polls; (2) extending the approach by joining the Presidential Alliance, which was bound to fail 
HMS.  
Soltani repeated Nahnah’s rhetoric that the aim of working with ruling elites was to 
pressure the government to reform and change. When discussing his party’s policies in the 
Algerian radio program “Shifts”, in September 2003, Soltani commented:  
 
The debate today is not about the strategy of participation. It’s about the criteria for 
participation. We want to give participation a new flavor … When we take part in a 
government we feel it’s our duty to present to our government what has been overlooked by 
others. 
                                                                                                             (BBC Monitoring, 2003) 
 
Meanwhile, Soltani followed Nahnah’s steps in designing the party’s slogans. Like Nahnah, 
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Soltani diagnosed Algeria’s biggest problem as social fragmentation and political polarization, 
and promoted moderate Islam as an important tool for overcoming these divisions and 
strengthening the country’s cohesion. But Soltani also considered that Bouteflika highlighted 
national solidarity, and that political parties should support rather than impede the President’s 
program of improving national cohesion (El Watan, 2005b). This, he claimed, was the logic 
behind his support for Bouteflika’s national reconciliation programs and the general amnesty 
policy which aimed to pardon armed Islamists who voluntarily laid down their arms. In his 
interview with the Algerian newspaper, L’Expression, in December 2004, Soltani explained how 
this corresponded with the HMS’ goals: 
 
The general amnesty is the promotion of national reconciliation. It’s an extension of civil 
concord and the movement [HMS] fully adheres to it. Once implemented, it could bring peace 
to the country, stabilize, and consequently ensure sustainable development. 
                                                                                                                      (L’Expression, 2004) 
Nonetheless, Soltani’s rhetorics were problematic. First, he never explained why the HMS 
should join the Presidential Alliance rather than stand in a more neutral position to play the role 
of a pressure group. Second, emphasizing the need to support Bouteflika’s agenda actually put 
HMS into a subsidiary political position, as HMS failed to identify its own ways to influence the 
government from inside. This gave the public the impression that it was not necessary to support 
the HMS, as it offered little value-added, and instead a vote for Bouteflika in the presidential 
elections would support his agenda, and vote in the legislative elections for the regime parties, 
FLN and RND, would carry out his policies.   
In essence, the party made little effort to distinguish itself from the mainstream secular parties, 
and hence, both its independence and character became blurred. The little amount of pressure 
that the HMS exerted on government policies aroused suspicion that the party lacked either the 
intention or the capacity to stand as an independent force and promote changes to the status quo. 
The HMS agreed with almost all the President’s policies (Dessì, 2011, p. 10). Although Soltani 
promised that his party would “present to the executive our [HMS’] ideas about the moralization 
of society” (BBC Monitoring, 2003), the HMS’ performance under Soltani’s leadership did not 
live up to this promise. 
 This was particularly manifest in its abandonment of the anti-corruption initiative proposed 
by Soltani, which was a significant social issue and a key element of the HMS’ platform. In 
2003, soon after Nahnah died, the biggest bank scandal in Algeria’s history was exposed. The 
corruption involved 20,000 employees of the Khalifa Bank and other financial institutions of the 
corporate group led by Rafik Khalifa, son of FLN heavyweight Laroussi Khalifa, who was 
involved in creating the intelligence service, DRS (Libération, 2002). At first, Soltani put anti-
corruption on top of his agenda. Shortly after the exposure of the corruption scandal, Soltani 
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claimed in an interview in November 2003 the necessity to combat corruption and “clean up the 
environment” (L’Expression, 2003b). In June 2005, Ahmed Dane, an HMS parliamentarian, 
expressed his support for the implementation of an anti-corruption law and claimed that the 
government should encourage journalists to report corruption cases during a meeting of the 
parliament (El Watan, 2005c). During a meeting of HMS’ Executive Bureau in November 2006, 
Soltani said that the real danger in Algeria was that “corruption tend[ed] to be structured”, and 
then went on, “I call for the revelation of the files of ministers, walis and military officials. All 
forms of immunity and protection must be lifted” (Le Soir d'Algérie, 2006). Soltani claimed he 
held files of high-ranking leaders’ corruption and would make them public (Corruption Algérie 
Archive, 2010). In December 2006, Bouteflika hit back, demanding Soltani choose either to 
release the files and take the risk that his party would be thrown out of government or keep 
silent—a good example of Bouteflika’s ‘façade democracy’ (L’Expression, 2007a; Joffé, 2015). 
Reluctant to break with the regime, Soltani buckled, and never brought up the corruption files 
again (Corruption Algérie Archive, 2010). In February 2007, three months before the legislative 
election, Soltani announced at a press conference that “the discussions on corruption cases were 
closed” (Liberté, 2007). Soltani’s lack of nerve aroused discontent within the HMS, and many 
members criticized his abandonment of the “stop corruption” campaign that he’d proposed just a 
few months previously, and rumors started about Soltani’s own involvement in the corruption 
case. To quell the criticism, Soltani initiated a purge within the party’s leadership by prohibiting 
many of the HMS parliamentarians who disagreed with him from running for legislative 
elections again (Le Soir d'Algérie, 2007), and then lied, telling the media that the decision to stop 
releasing corruption files was made by the Majlis Choura (Info Soir, 2007). These actions not 
surprisingly further discredited Soltani, and intensified internal divides within the party, deeply 
affecting its organizational strength and image to the electorate. At a press conference, 
Abdelkader Semari, head of HMS’ parliamentary bloc, brought this division into the open, 
saying “Mr. Soltani is free to propose what he wants, and from our side we have the right to say 
what we think” (Le Soir d'Algérie, 2007).    
In addition to the mismatch between HMS’ rhetoric and actions, the discourse it formulated 
under Soltani’s leadership were also characterized by apparent self-contradictions. My analysis 
suggests that incongruence of the HMS discourse could largely be attributed to the complex 
contest between the many Islamic groups in Algeria in the first decade of 2000s. Back in the 
early 1990s, along with the emergence of anti-regime Islamist parties such as the FIS and 
Djaballah’s MRI, and the rise of violent Islamic groups, the HMS had labeled itself as a 
representative of moderate Islam with a focus on peaceful, gradualist and more pro-regime 
approaches. Emphasis on moderate Islam not only distinguished the HMS from other Islamist 
groups, but helped it attract citizens who wanted peace, as explained in Chapter 5. This strategy 
no longer worked in the first decade of 2000, as the spectrum of Islamic groups became much 
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more complicated. Many other Islamist groups were now claiming to be moderate, with several 
copying the HMS model, as shown in Figure 1. With a growing number of Islamic groups 
joining the contest resulting from Bouteflika’s divide-and-rule policies, the HMS faced several 
challenges. First, it was no longer the only Islamist party to demonstrate the intention to dialogue 
with government officials. After Lahbib Adami usurped Djaballah’s leadership in the MRI in 
1998, he changed strategies and imitated HMS, taking a pro-Bouteflika position (Africa Analysis, 
1999). Second, it became more difficult for the HMS to prove that it was the representative of 
non-violent Islam, as the newly rising Sufism and Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya both advocated peaceful 
approaches. Additionally, as Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya emphasized dogmatic practices of Islam at the 
individual level, it challenged the HMS in terms of authentic Islamic representation. Third, the 
HMS also faced competition from Movement du Renouveau National (MRN), the party newly 
created by Djaballah after he was ousted from the MRI. For fear of being isolated and harassed 
by ruling elites as in the past, Djaballah changed his anti-regime positions and started to ally 
with certain ruling elites in the first decade of 2000. But instead of cooperating with Bouteflika 
who was supported by the MRI, Djaballah allied with Bouteflika’s rival, Benflis, who was 
backed by the military. This made Djaballah more audacious than HMS in criticizing 
Bouteflika’s policies, especially his religious policies.  
 
Figure 1  The Spectrum of Islamic Groups in Algeria in 1999-2008 
 
These contests trapped the HMS in a dilemma. While it needed to compete with the Salafiyya 
‘ilmiyya current to show that it was no less authentically Islamic, it also had to compete with the 
MRI to show that it was even more pro-Bouteflika to ensure it would not lose benefits such as 
ministerial positions. It was in this context that the HMS’ discourse oscillated. 
The HMS’ discourse inconsistency was manifest in its debate with Bouteflika over his 
amendment of the 1984 Family Code in 2004, which caught Soltani having to defend Islam 
against him. Bouteflika’s initiative was to secularize the code by removing two key clauses, the 
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tutor regulation and the regulation on second marriage. The marriage tutor regulation meant a 
marriage contract which, at that point, could only be signed in the presence of the bride’s male 
guardian who had to be either her father or brother (Driessen, 2014, p. 181). The second 
marriage meant that men could marry a second wife as he wished (Khannous, 2016, p. 432).  
When the amendment draft was announced, many Islamists groups such as the MRN 
expressed their dissatisfaction. In March 2004, during a meeting with journalists of national and 
foreign newspapers, Oum Mossaâb, Djablla’s wife and a member of the MRN’s Majlis Shura, 
said that the Family Code inspired by the Qur’an should not be amended because “society must 
accept all that is dictated by Allah” (La Liberté, 2004). During a party meeting held in 
Boudouaou in September, Djaballah claimed, “The Family Code is the last citadel of sharia in 
Algeria and must be preserved”, and stated he considered those who wanted to amend the 
Family Code to be Westernists and enemies of Islam (L'Expression, 2004a). The apolitical 
Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya made no public comment on government policies including the amendment of 
the Family Code, but when preaching in mosques and Quranic schools discouraged the populace 
from changing their lifestyles at the individual level. In an interview, a murshid (guide) who ran 
a private Quranic school of Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya in the suburb of Oran, claimed, “We should not 
comment on, criticize or protest against the government… If the government imposes a wrong 
policy and brings fitna (disorder)… we should bear it. And if we are pious enough and practice 
Islam, Allah will save us from disasters.” (Interview, Akilah, 2015, Oran). Instead of protesting 
against the policy, she encouraged women in her Qur’anic school to follow the sharia and 
religious traditions, such as wearing both hijab and niqab, and keeping their home as their focus 
(Ibid).  
Against this backdrop, Soltani did not want his party to trail his competitors and leave the 
impression that it had less intention to defend Islam. The party thus expressed resolute 
opposition to the amendment on the grounds that it violated Islam and Algerian tradition. During 
a press conference in August 2004, Soltani said, “The traditions of Algerian society impose the 
presence of the guardian even for the man before proposing marriage” (Liberté Algérie, 2004a). 
In a meeting at the Ibn Khaldoun Hall in Algiers in September, he claimed, “By suppressing the 
guardian, the girl is dishonored and exposed to all perils” (El Watan, 2004a). However, despite 
taking this uncompromising position at the beginning (Driessen, 2014, p. 181), it did not take 
long for the HMS to soften its tone. This was partly attributed to the contest with the MRI, 
whose leader, Lahbib Adami, supported the amendment on the grounds that “it was not inspired 
by the West” (L’Expression, 2004b; La Liberté, 2004). Furthermore, the HMS also faced 
pressure from Bouteflika who threatened that further criticism of the amendment would lead to 
the exclusion of HMS from the Presidential Alliance (Liberté Algérie, 2004b). The HMS then 
organized a gathering in Salle Rouiched in Rue Tripoli in Algiers, where Soltani stated that he 




The presidential alliance is more important than Family Code … The presidential alliance is not 
at all threatened. We do not intend to withdraw. We are not in a hurry to break [with the 
government] and we have no interest in doing so.  
                                                                                                                                                (Ibid) 
 
To show the regime that he was ready to compromise, Soltani stated that the HMS would 
accept the new code if Bouteflika lifted the state of emergency which had been imposed when 
the civil war erupted in 1992 (El Watan, 2004b). In February 2005, the amendment was finally 
implemented. The state of emergency was not lifted, and Bouteflika’s accession to Soltani’s 
concerns was relatively minor: the stipulation that women’s male guardians should be present at 
the signature of a marriage contract remained (Driessen, 2014, p. 181), but the role of a guardian 
was reduced to a symbolic status, as the new Family Code allowed a woman to choose her 
guardian, which made it possible for a woman to marry someone disliked by her father or 
brother (Khannous, 2016, p. 432). Soltani welcomed the new code, and highlighted that the 
continued presence of male guardianship was “the victory of Algerian people” during a 
conference of the HMS’ central body (Liberté Algérie, 2005).    
The inconsistency between the HMS’ discourse, and between what was said and done, had 
two implications. First, the HMS’s oscillation between opposition to and support for the 
amendment of the Family Code damaged its image as a party that protected women’s rights. Its 
support for both marriage guardianship and polygamy at the outset aroused criticism from 
secular organizations. This was not just because of the Islamic dimension, but because HMS had 
carved out a position for itself within the Islamist landscape of protecting modern women’s 
rights. Nadia Ait Zai, an Algerian lawyer and women’s rights activist, wrote in El Watan in 
September 2004, that the HMS performed no better than MRN when dealing with the 
amendment of the Family Code: 
   
  Those who insult us have reached their limits…In lack of objective arguments to express their 
position… they chant the sharia to reject any evolution of the family legislation…For the HMS 
official, ‘polygamy is a human right in sharia’. 
                                                                                                                             (El Watan, 2004d) 
 
Given the increase of women’s consciousness in Algeria in the 1990s against the backdrop of 
growing suffering by women caused by armed Islamists through kidnapping, rape, and 
assassination (Bouatta, 1997, p. 22), despite the change in its tone, the HMS’ opposition to the 
amendment at the beginning created the impression that it was in essence no different from other 
Islamist groups such as the FIS in terms of undermining gender equality, and thus aroused 
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suspicion among citizens, especially women, about the credibility of the slogan it had chanted 
for decades that it would bring few costs to supporters as it protected women rights and people’s 
freedom.  
  Second, mismatch between the HMS’ discourses made it less likely to resonate among the 
electorate, and made its mobilization more problematic. Critically, whatever promises HMS 
made, voters questioned their credibility. To attract citizens to vote for it in the 2007 legislative 
election, the HMS stated in 2006 and early 2007 that one of its core missions was to pressure the 
government to lift the state of emergency (Info Soir, 2006). Soltani announced during a press 
conference in July 2006, “The state of emergency has been established by political means and its 
lifting can only be done through political means. The administration has no excuse” (Ibid). Yet, 
such discourses lacked credibility, as the HMS did nothing after Bouteflika ignored its proposal 
to lift the state of emergency in exchange for its support for the Family Code amendment. In the 
process, the apparent duplicity of the HMS’ discourses and performances aroused questions 
about its intentions and capacity to bring “benefits” by prompting government reforms. As the 
Algerian newspaper L’Expression commented, HMS “has not yet got a clear idea of the political 
themes of the day... HMS will never tell you things clearly” (L’Expression, 2007b). Moreover, 
the fact that the HMS joined the Presidential Alliance and gave up the campaign against 
corruption seemed, for many, to have verified the rumor that the party’s leadership was not only 
manipulated by the regime, but was also involved in the government’s corruption scandal. 
Although it is unclear to what extent such allegations are true, such accusations largely 
discredited the HMS. During an interview with El Watan (2004c), several civil observers stated 
that the HMS was just trying to “conceal its true features as an ‘opportunist’ party”, and that it 
“clung to the system in place and walk[ed] under its umbrella because it ha[d] felt weak and 
deprived of its mobilizing capacities”. 
    The HMS’ discourse inconsistency disappointed a number of social groups that supported it, 
especially the bourgeoisie and small businessmen who originally expected that through its 
control of several ministers in the economic clusters and its moucharaka strategy, it could 
promote economic reforms to combat corruption and increase the role of markets in the state’s 
economy. However, they were deeply dissatisfied with its compromise to the regime regarding 
corruption issues and the little contribution it made to offer them access to fairer economic 
opportunities (Ouaissa, 2016, p. 16) 
In brief, HMS’ electoral approaches in 1999-2010 fit with the scenario of unsuccessful 
mobilization in which it failed to get more citizens on board to vote for it. The main reasons 
were: 1) the decrease of political opportunities as Bouteflika provoked competition between 
Islamist groups by covert means; 2) party splintering due to the leadership struggle after 
Nahnah’s death and Soltani’s lack of charismatic leaders and choice to engage in the Presidential 
Alliance; 3) the failure to maintain its discourse consistency, arousing doubts about its intention 
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to bring benefits (changing the status quo) and cut costs (freedom) for supporters. These 
elements made the HMS less likely to be an effective alternative to the ruling parties. 
Consequently, the HMS performance in the 2007 legislative election merely received a vote 
share of 9.7% (JORA, 2007). As there was an absence of a party that seemed to be an effective 
alternative to the regime parties, many citizens chose to abstain from voting or cast blank votes 
to express grievances about socio-economic problems and corruption. The voter tournout in 
legislative elections decreased dramatically from 65.6% in 1997 to 35.7% in 2007, and the 
number of invalid votes increased from 502,787 to 965,064 in the same period (Ibid). In the 
following years, the HMS’ deterioration appeared to be irreversible, and as argued in Chapter 7, 
even its attempts to form an Islamist coalition and rebuild an image of an opposition party in the 
early 2010s could not prevent the decline in its support and influence.   
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter compares the development of Ennahda and the HMS in the second decade after 
their first electoral trials. It highlights how government officials can encourage inter-group 
competition to weaken Islamist groups.  
In 1999-2010, although both Ennahda and the HMS tried to be flexible and improved their 
relations with their governments, the contexts and specific strategies they adopted differed 
profoundly, leading to different mobilization outcomes. While Ben Ali continued in excluding 
Ennahda from formal politics, Bouteflika co-opted the HMS to counteract the military. Although 
Ennahda learned to respect pluralist rules and compromise with other political forces, not least 
because of the exposure to European systems experienced by its members in exile, it remained a 
steadfast opposition party. In contrast, the HMS became a semi-regime party.  
Nahdaouis’ common goal of working against Ben Ali’s abuse of human rights helped to 
maintain Ennahda’s unity during the long period of exclusion from formal politics. Ennahda’s 
political flexibility not only allowed it to collaborate with secular opposition parties in Tunisia, 
but to reach out to people from different social groups. By comparison, Soltani’s engagement in 
the Presidential Alliance triggered drastic internal debates which led to party splintering. 
Moreover, the HMS’ image was discredited, as it failed to justify its intimacy with the President 
and maintain its discourse consistency in the context of discourse competition with other 
Islamist groups. The situation inside Tunisia and Algeria, of course, was quite different in terms 
of the numbers of Islamist parties competing for electoral favor, and this too must be seen as a 
factor — the HMS was one of many government recognized Islamist parties, most of which 
were undergoing identity shifts, adapting their discourse and impinging on each other’s turf 
during this period, a situation Ennahda did not face. Yet the fact remains, the HMS failed to 
develop a system of consistent discourse that would not only secure its identity as distinct from 
the others, but maintain the government leverage it had gained in the 1990s while going forward 
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into the first decade of the 2000s. As explained in Chapter 7, the gap between the two parties in 
mobilization capacity would become clearer and sharper in the early 2010s against the backdrop 
of the Tunisian regime’s collapse in 2011, whereas Algeria’s electoral authoritarian regime 
































Entering the 2010s 
 
This chapter compares Ennahda and the HMS’ mobilization in 2010-2014. It focuses on (1) 
the different political landscapes and political opportunities for Islamist parties in Tunisia and 
Algeria; (2) the two parties’ mobilization dynamics; (3) the two parties’ different mobilization 
outcomes.  
In 2010-2011, a revolution erupted in Tunisia leading to the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime. The 
abrupt change in Tunisia’s political landscape brought sudden political openness, free elections, 
and a splintering old regime. Seizing the opportunity, Ennahda rapidly moved to reconstruct its 
organizations, resources and networks, and responded to the protesters’ demands by appearing to 
be the party most likely to bring benefits at minimal costs.  
Unlike Tunisia, Algeria did not experience a revolution that toppled its regime. Not only did 
the electoral authoritarian system remain, but the regime used covert means to consolidate 
authoritarian rule. Although the HMS tried to increase its chances of enlarging its support base 
by leaving its government alliance and returning to the opposition camp to ally with other 
Islamist parties, its efforts failed because of the fragmentation of Algerian Islamist parties and its 
own equivocal, inconsistent and oscillatory discourse.  
 
Tunisia: Ennahda’s Ascent to Power 
  The Tunisian revolution which toppled Ben Ali and Ennahda’s victory in the first post-
revolutionary election were two dominant themes of Tunisian politics in the early 2010s. 
Literature on Tunisia in this period examines the background and processes of the revolution 
(Aleya-Sghaier, 2014; Chomiak, 2011; Kerrou, 2013; Mabrouk, 2011; Miladi, 2011), or the 
reasons for Ennahda’s rise (Churchill, 2011; El Amrani & Lindsey, 2011; Haugbølle & 
Cavatorta, 2011; Lynch, 2011; McCarthy, 2015; Sayare, 2011; Wolf, 2013), but mostly 
considers the two events as separate except for recognizing that Ben Ali’s downfall enabled 
Ennahda to be legalized. I, by contrast, emphasize the necessity to connect the two events, as 
analyzing citizens’ demands reflected in the revolution is key to understanding what Ennahda 
offered that other parties couldn’t, how Ennahda’s platform resonated with the citizens’ demands 
and how the electorate responded. This section on Ennahda’s electoral mobilization in 2011 
begins by describing the nationwide grievances which drove Tunisians to protest and topple Ben 
Ali’s regime. Next, it analyzes the new political opportunities in the post-revolutionary era 
which offered Ennahda much more space to operate and grow. Then, it examines how Ennahda 
reconstructed itself, expanded its organizational structures and alleviated internal disputes in the 




Revolution for Dignity and Freedom  
As Ennahda struggled to survive in Europe, in Tunisia, the situation was deteriorating, as 
unemployment, particularly of the youth, rose dramatically, poverty grew, and corruption among 
the elites came to dominate. These factors, laid out in detail below, all served to impact on 
Ennahda’s options and the requirements it faced, once it returned to Tunisia during the 
revolution.  
In December 2010, protests erupted in Tunisia which escalated into attacks on government 
buildings after Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in the southern town of Sidi Bouzid. In his 
research on the Tunisian uprisings in 2010-2011, Aleya-Sghaier (2012) divided the revolt into 
three phases: the first phase was from December 17, 2010 to January 14, 2011 the second from 
January 14, 2011 to March 4, 2011, the third from March 4, 2011 to May 7, 2011. While protests 
in the first stage toppled longtime president Ben Ali, those in the second and third stages 
respectively led to the resignation of the interim Mohammed Ghannouchi government, and the 
promulgation of an electoral law for a Constitutive Assembly. In this section, I define uprisings 
in the first phase as the Tunisian revolution as it led to the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime, and 
define the second and third phases of revolt as post-revolutionary protests.  
A debate has emerged over whether the revolution was provoked by economic reasons or 
political factors. El-Khawas (2012), Iqbal (2011), Stampini and Audrey (2011), Verdier-
Chouchane, Obayashi and Castel (2011) attribute the revolution to poverty, unemployment and 
food inflation. In contrast, Nachi (2011) considers the upheaval to have been a protest against 
Ben Ali’s autocracy. I aruge that neither is persuasive, as there were few political slogans when 
demonstrations first erupted, and many protesters ranging from middle-class professionals to 
civic groups such as human rights lawyers were not simply driven by socio-economic concerns.  
I analyze protesters’ demands from two perspectives. One the one hand, protesters from 
various social groups have different concerns. For instance, as in the case of the Gafsa revolt in 
2008, low-and middle-income groups such as mining workers from central and southern Tunisia 
complained about economic inequality (Al Jazeera, 2011b). The educated youth were concerned 
with their poor living conditions caused by unemployment and worsened by the doubling and 
even tripling of commodity prices in 2000-2010 (Perkins, 2014, p. 216). The salaried middle 
class, as discussed in Chapter 6, was dissatisfied with Ben Ali’s autocratic governance and the 
official interpretation of Islam which lost meaning to them (Haugbølle, 2015, pp. 330-332).  
On the other, protesters from various social groups also had universal slogans and common 
demands: dignity and freedom. In an analysis of the Tunisian revolution’s causes, Willis (2016, 
p. 49) stresses that aspiration for dignity was the “overarching motive” that brought social 
groups ranging from the unemployed to lawyers and businessmen “together to remove the 
established regime”. This viewpoint was shared by Mabrouk (2011, p. 633) who considers that 
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the uprisings “sought to replace regional and local loyalties with the dignity of share protest”. 
Based upon Willis’ and Mabrouk’s work, I emphasize that the quest for dignity can be divided 
into two categories: aspiration for human rights and social justice. First, almost all social groups 
disliked the ruling system and its reliance on repression by security and police services which 
brutally humiliated citizens (Willis, 2016, p. 52). Second, the corruption of Ben Ali’s family and 
associates was widely hated as they deprived citizens of the opportunities to move from lower- 
to upper-class and compete fairly in the market (p. 54). Adding to the quest for dignity was the 
common aspiration for a proper outlet for grievance — the freedom to express opinions and 
complaints in the press, publications, blogs, and social media. This was an opportunity for 
mobilization that was recognized early on by Ennahda members.  
 
Political Opportunities for Ennahda 
For Ennahda, the dramatic change in Tunisia’s political landscape after Ben Ali’s downfall 
brought two political opportunities: abrupt political openness and weakness among Ennahda’s 
political rivals.  
   Ben Ali’s collapse in 2011 shifted the political openness for Ennahda from total exclusion to 
total inclusion. On February 18, 2011, the interim government implemented a general amnesty 
to release political prisoners including thousands of Nahdaouis (Lynch, 2011). Meanwhile, all 
exiled Nahdaouis could now return to Tunisia. On January 30, two weeks after Ben Ali fled to 
Saudi Arabia, Rachid Ghannouchi, who had been exiled for 22 years, returned to his home 
country from London. Thousands of citizens went to welcome Ghannouchi at the airport, and the 
pomp was choreographed much like a savior arriving on the beaches to take up his leadership, 
which was similar to Bourguiba’s return to Tunisia. A month later, Tunisia’s interim government 
legalized Ennahda, which had been banned for over two decades, and allowed it to stand in 
elections (BBC News, 2011a). These developments provided opportunities for Ennahda to 
quickly rebuild its organizational structures in Tunisia from the networks re-activated around the 
country over the previous decade, and to take a role in the country’s political future.  
   Moreover, Ben Ali’s downfall and the RCD’s dissolution left a political vacuum in the post-
revolutionary era. Fragmentation of the political landscape occurred as Tunisia ushered in a 
“spring” for political parties, with over a hundred emerging on the scene (Pickard, 2011, p. 646). 
The parties can be understood as falling into four groups: local parties, RCD-derived parties, 
holdover parties, and opposition parties. The first and second categories were newly created 
parties that emerged once the RCD crumbled. The third category were minor parties that were 
legalized in an earlier period to show that the regime was “democratic” and co-existed with Ben 
Ali’s RCD in as partliamentary parties (Tessler, 1986, p. 219). Ennahda belonged to the fourth 
category of parties which already existed but had suffered long-term repression by Ben Ali.  
(1) Local parties: This was the largest category, but the parties were generally small and 
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comprised of only a few members who shared family, neighborhood, or clan ties. Instead of 
exerting national influence, such parties merely aimed to express a set of ideas and contribute to 
local development. A large number of these parties chose not to run in the National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA) election because they lacked interest in national representation or political 
activism. 
(2) RCD derived parties: These were created by small groups previously part of Ali’s RCD 
who hoped to keep engaging in political affairs following the uprisings, and included Al 
Mudabara (The Initiative) and Al Watan (The Nation). Yet, these parties were small, as the RCD 
fragmented after Ben Ali fled, and many ex-RCD members avoided working with their old 
colleagues to make a clean break with the ancien régime (old regime).  
(3)     Hold-over Parties: These parties were never allowed to play substantial roles in Ben 
Ali’s era, but the fact that they were part of the ancien régime damaged their image and aroused 
suspicion about their determination to bring changes and initiate reforms. These medium-size 
parties included MDS, and Pôle démocratique moderniste (PDM) — a party born out of the 
center-left Ettajdid. 
(4)      Opposition Parties: The best-known in this category were Ennahda and Congrès pour la 
République (CPR), led by Moncef Marzouki, a recognized human-rights activist. These parties 
both had laid a foundation and gained a support base before the revolution. Having long been 
repressed by the ancien régime, they were considered as the “cleanest” and most credible parties 
as neither had been involved with the regime’s corruption, and their past suffering earned them 
the image of fighters against Ben Ali.  
The fragmentation of the political spectrum and the fragility and small size of the first three 
party categories provided an opportunity for Ennahda. Yet, it also limited Ennahda’s operating 
space as secular parties began to target it in various media. In her analysis of Tunisia’s media 
sector, Farmanfarmaian (2014, p. 674) notes that “polarization has marked the Tunisian media 
landscape” in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure. Lacking top-down instructions about what 
should be reported or not, the country’s media sector became increasingly fragmented and each 
party started to use certain media to serve its own mobilization needs. Also, after the revolution, 
a debate erupted over the role of Islam in politics, conducted largely in the media, and Ennahda 
itself had to find common ground between the more conservative Nahdaouis who had remained 
behind, and those more liberal who had been in the diaspora abroad. This latter was often 
exemplified in the different attitudes toward issues such as the role of sharia and veiling as 
expressed in the mosque meetings of Ennahda, versus in public programming on television. 
Ahmed Ibrahim, Secretary-general of Ettajid, claimed “On television they (the Nahdaouis) come 
off as soft, but in the mosques, it is completely different” in an interview with the magazine of 
The New York Review of Books (2011) in September 2011. It was in this context that Ennahda 




Ennahda’s Role in Tunisian Uprisings 
When the Tunisian uprisings first erupted, the protestors employed little Islamist rhetoric and 
Ennahda played no important role in the protests (Reuters, 2011b). Although certain Ennahda 
activists engaged in the protests, such participation was not under the party banner. This was 
both because most Nahdaouis were still in prison or in exile, and because, as Rachid 
Ghannouchi (2016, p. 62) expressed it five years later in an article he contributed to Foreign 
Affairs, Ennahda wanted to avoid “giving the regime an excuse to paint the demonstrations as 
the work of an opposition group seeking to take power”.  
After the implementation of the general amnesty, Ennahda became a stronger presence in the 
second (January 14, 2011-March 4, 2011) and third stages (March 4, 2011 to May 7, 2011) of 
the protests and capitalized on the new political opportunities. For instance, it actively protested 
against Mohammed Ghannouchi’s interim government on the grounds that it mainly comprised 
ex-RCD members and excluded other political actors including Ennahda. Sadok Chourou, a 
senior Ennahda leader, engaged in rallies demanding a new government be formed that did not 
include former Ben Ali’s ministers (The Guardian, 2011a). During an interview with Al Jazeera 
(2011a), Rachid Ghannouchi commented, “The dictator has been toppled, but the remains of the 
dictator are still there…This government still has the same features of exclusion and 
containment that caused the revolution”. In the first few months after Ben Ali stepped down, 
Ennahda allied with leftist groups and labor unions. Ghannouchi stated, “There must be a real 
national unity government that includes all political parties as well as civil society institutions, 
including the trade unions, and the union of lawyers, without excluding anyone” (Ibid) 
In February 2011, Ennahda joined the Committee for the Protection of the Revolution along 
with 27 other groups including the largest labor union, UGTT. Ennahda’s alignment with secular 
opposition groups against ex-RCD members had three implications. First, the committee forced 
the resignation of two cabinets dominated by former RCD officials, enabling a coalition of 
different opposition groups to promote the launch of Tunisia’s first pluralist election. Second, by 
actively allying with secular groups, Ennahda demonstrated its tolerance of non-religious groups. 
Third, by criticizing the interim government’s lack of inclusion Ennahda demonstrated it 
supported the revolution. Such rhetoric resonated with many protesters who were disappointed 
with the lack of change after the revolution. Before elaborating on the details of Ennahda’s 
movement strategies, I analyze how Ennahda rebuilt its organizational structures when it 
returned to Tunisia.  
 
Ennahda’s Return 
  Several studies attribute Ennahda’s 2011 electoral success to its organizational strength, 
especially its large membership and nationwide branches. El Amrani and Lindsey (2011), for 
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instance, state that Ennahda reconstituted a large national network within ten months after the 
revolution. Kaminski (2013, p. 256) emphasizes that Ennahda maintained a strong presence in 
rural areas, though Hababou and Amrouche (2013, p. 745) observe that it gained an impressive 
support base among both the urban governorates and in poor and rural ones. Rachid Ghannouchi 
(2016, p. 62) was proud of Ennahda’s grass-root networks and considers them as key to its rise 
after 2011. Yet, elaboration of other aspects of Ennahda’s organizational strength is lacking. 
This section gives a more comprehensive picture by examining the networks Ennahda developed 
with NGOs and its adoption of an inclusive recruitment strategy.   
As noted in Chapter 6, the Nahdaouis in exile ran businesses and received funding from Gulf 
countries and Islamic organizations in the West through various charity organizations, enabling 
Ennahda to maintain its organizational structure and operations while banned. In the early 2010s, 
when Ben Ali’s rule was threatened by the protests, various international political actors tried to 
benefit from the chaos in Tunisia and used their money to interfere with its domestic and 
external decisions (Kausch, 2013). According to Boubekeur (2016, p. 120) based on her 
interviews, Ennahda’s financers from Gulf countries, especially, increased their investment to 
the party to help it prepare for a return to Tunisia’s political scene.  
Having set up several Islamic NGOs in Europe while working in abeyance as discussed in 
Cahpter 5, Ennahda members now opened new branches in Tunisia, or established entirely new 
NGOs there, taking advantage of the abrupt change in political openness to use NGOs to transfer 
funds, reconstruct Ennahda, revitalize its operations and campaigns, and provide social services 
for the poor and deprived in exchange for their support. One example was Marhama (Mercy), a 
branch of the Marhama in Germany created by Mohsen Jendoubi, who was a member of 
Ennahda’s Majlis Shura, in 2011. Another was the Association Tunisienne de Coopération et de 
Communication Sociale established in late 2010 by Mohamed Néjib Karoui, the son of a former 
Minister Hamed Karoui, who became a leader of Ennahda’s predecessor, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya 
in the 1970s (Jeune Afrique, 2017). Patrons of these NGOs included the Qatar Charity based in 
Qatar, the Sheikh Abdullah al-Nouri charitable society and the International Islamic Charity 
Organization based in Kuwait, Islamic Relief based in the UK, and the Helping Hand for Relief 
and Development based in the USA (Soli & Merone, 2013).  
Abundant financial support transferred through numerous NGOs strengthenedEnnahda’s 
advantage over its secular rivals in two aspects. First, foreign funding provided ample financial 
means to operate and expand its branches immediately. Second, the wide networks of Ennahda-
related NGOs helped recruit members at the grassroots level when offering charitable services 
such as organizing collective wedding for the poor directly to neighborhoods (Tunisie 
Numérique, 2011).  
The second shift in Ennahda’s organization was a change in recruitment strategy in response 
to the new political opportunities. As political process theorists (Alexander, 2000, p. 468; 
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Gamson & Meyer, 1996, p. 278) claim, mobilizers’ tactics of marshaling resources are likely to 
change when new opportunities are presented. When the political openness in post-revolutionary 
Tunisia shifted from total exclusion to total inclusion, Ennahda’s priority was no longer to 
preserve its endurance and survivability by holding constant its most committed membership, 
but to absorb as many new members as possible to maximize its mobilization capacity. Thus, it 
adopted a more inclusive, ‘all-welcome’ approach; this translated into two initiatives. First, it 
reduced the threshold for recruitment: according to Sayida Ounisi, a young Ennahda member, 
the party’s previous tazkiya process — the procedure whereby senior partisans would have to 
vouch for new applicants — was transformed into a simple reference (Ounisi, 2016, p. 4).  
Second, it blurred the difference between committed members and sympathizers. Specifically, 
wives of party veterans who had worked for Ennahda as sympathizers, registered membership 
one after another after 2011, including Monia Brahim and Kalthoum Badreddine who ran for 
NCA election as Ennahda candidates and were later elected as parliamentarians. Part of the 
reason was that in the post-Ben Ali era, party members no longer needed to divide roles between 
husbands and wives to reduce repression against their families. Meanwhile, the party was 
anxious to capitalize on its large number of female activists in order to attract more women 
supporters and assure voters that it would protect women’s freedom such as their freedom to 
work. During the Tunisian revolution, female protesters were very visible and women’s rights 
became a heated topic (The New York Times, 2011a). A debate soon emerged between political 
parties on whether or not to implement the gender parity law, which encouraged political parties 
to achieve gender parity in elections by submitting a list with equal numbers of men and women 
candidates (Election of NCA, 2011). Interestingly, according to Petkanas (2013, p. 8) based on 
her interviews, whereas Ennahda highly supported the law from the very beginning, several 
secular parties, especially the CPR, initially opposed to it, as they did not have a large female 
membership as Ennahda. A study of Tunisia’s gender politics conducted by Dahlerup (2012, pp. 
5-6) based on her analysis of Tunisian electoral data shows that although most parties including 
the CPR finally voted for the law, Ennahda nominated much more women as heads of candidate 
lists than the secular parties, which, due to a lack of members in general, especially women 
members, merely nominated a handful of women as heads of lists. By capitalizing on its large 
numbers of women activists and putting large numbers of female candidates to the head of lists, 
Ennahda tried to show that it actually emphasized more the women’s role in politics and had 
higher capacity to protect women’s issues than secular parties including the CPR, in order to 
reduce the general fear among the electorate that if Ennahda was elected, there might be a 
reversal of women’s rights.  
In addition to offering female sympathizers membership, Ennahda blurred the difference 
between young sympathizers and older members, and offered the youth more promotion 
opportunities. In a break from past practice when young activists needed to spend years taking 
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courses, conducting internships and passing tests to be promoted from sympathizers to full 
membership, Ennahda not only made the process easier, but encouraged young activists to join 
its leadership groups, which were dominated by veterans. According to Zied Boumakhla, 
director of Ennahda Youth, 18 young members were included in the Majlis Shura and two in the 
Executive Bureau (Interview, Boumakhla, 2015, Tunis). Further, to get the youth fully involved, 
different generations were encouraged to work together. Kaarina, a child of the Ennahda family 
who joined the party immediately after it was legalized, recounted: 
 
There was a policy that all Vice Presidents of committees in local offices must be young people. 
So I became the Vice President of the training committee shortly after I joined 
Ennahda.…They [Ennahda’s leaders] often said, “We need to involve them [the youth] more”. 
                                                                                                (Interview, Kaarina, 2015, Tunis) 
 
As such, Ennahda absorbed large numbers of young activists including second-generation 
Nahdaouis who had exiled with their parents in the previous decade and started engaging in 
party affairs at an early age as discused in Chapter 6. For Ennahda, promoting young activists 
meant they could design discourse appealing to the youth, who had been key protagonists of the 
revolution (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012, p. 30). 
Zald and Garner (1966, p. 331) contend that while inclusive recruitment tactics can enhance 
mobilization capacity as it helps attract members from various backgrounds, such tactics may 
likewise increase membership instability as new recruits are not required to commit much time 
and energy, and can easily leave the group. Ennahda’s experience followed this model, as the 
party at first attracted a large membership after it reconstructed itself, but then witnessed many 
members’ departure after it was elected to govern due to internal disputes (Interview, Kaarina, 
2015, Tunis). In addition to increasing membership instability, inclusive recruitment increases 
the range of the group’s internal debates as members from various social groups with different 
backgrounds have different expectations and goals, as examined below.  
 
Internal Debates and The Consensus Principle  
  As explained in Chapter 2, political settings determine the mobilizers’ range of strategic 
choices available to organize their structures. The year of 2011 was a period of flux – and 
discovery, and decision making, and not an easy one Ennahda. Farmanfarmaian (2017, p.1043), 
based on her fieldwok in Tunisia, notices that although the sudden liberated political scene 
brought political activists freedom of speech, how such a freedom “was constituted grew 
increasingly contentious”, and “disharmony of competing symbolisms” soon took place. For 
Ennahda, this led to soul searching and internal discussions about a range of issues, including the 
reflection of the oneness of God in modern pluralist governance, the importance of establishing 
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new Islamic red lines that reflected the Tunisian identity, and most importantly, what Ennahda 
really was and stood for. The situation was further complicated by Ennahda’s large and diverse 
target populations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Although abundant funding resources and adoption of inclusive recruitment strategies allowed 
Ennahda to expand its membership and branches, ideological disagreements soon emerged 
between Nahdaouis who had left and those who had stayed that proved difficult to overcome. 
Young members differed from elder Nahdaouis in their knowledge of the party’s structure and 
goals. Yet, the main divide can be seen to have fallen along religious lines: plurality, vs 
conservative continuity and narrow promotion of Islam. The debate over whether the party 
should prioritize pluralist values (tolerance, dialogue, and compromise with different political 
currents) or Islamic renaissance (emphasizing Tunisians’ Islamic identity, encouraging the 
society to practice Islam and follow religious principles) provoked divides regarding topics 
ranging from blasphemy and alcohol to gender roles.  
In mid-2011, Ennahda comprised various membership types, which can be divided into four 
strata: 1) Nahdaoui returnees from exile; 2) activists that had stayed in Tunisia including many 
ex-prisoners; 3) second-generation Nahdaouis, especially those who had exiled; and 4) new 
recruits with no history of involvement in Ennahda. The structure was further complicated by the 
fact that Ennahda included certain non-Islamist political activists that were not Ennahda 
members to show its tolerance of people with diverse views and ideological stances. One 
example is Souad Abderrahim who, always appearing in the public unveiled and in smart suits, 
tried to represent modern and working women. As party activists’ experiences differed greatly, 
sharp divides surfaced over Ennahda’s identity and the meaning of being Islamist in the new 
political environment. Some leading members advocated pluralistic values and emphasized 
religious identity less. This viewpoint was reflected in Ghannouchi’s statement during a 2011 
interview with Le Temps that “polygamy has been determined to be illegal…stoning and 
amputation cannot be carried out as punishments” (Basly, 2011). Houcine Jaziri, Ennahda’s 
spokesman who had been exiled in France for 20 years, expressed similar opinion. In an 
interview with Le Monde (2011) in the same year, he claimed, “It is not appropriate to impose 
sharia in Tunisia today”. On the other side of the debate, some activists considered that new 
strategies and policies undertaken should not deviate from Ennahda’s original goal — the 
renaissance of Arab-Islamic identity and strict religious practice. This was manifested in a 
statement posted on the Facebook page of the Ennahda: “… any constitution which does not 
have reference to the Holy Qur’an and the Islamic law… will be refused by people”, according 
to Business News (2011), an electronic newspaper of Tunisia.  
Supporters of the first viewpoint included several party members who had been exiled in the 
West such as Jaziri, second-generation Nahdaouis including Al-Sghaier and Ounissi, and non-
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partisan independents working for the Ennahda bloc such as Abderrahim. Advocates of the 
second opinion included many Nahdaouis who stayed in Tunisia as political prisoners such as 
Chourou, and some newcomers including middle class protesters who participated in the 
revolution and then joined Ennahda in pursuit of identity and meaning. 
Literature on Ennahda often divides its members into conservatives and moderates 
(Alexander, 2013; Guazzone, 2013, p. 39). However, such categorization oversimplifies the 
problem, as Ennahda activists who seemed to be on the same side of the debate often had 
different understandings of specific issues (e.g. family values, women’s role, implementation of 
sharia), and hoped to gain different values and benefits from the party. Consequently, not all 
Ennahda members who are considered as moderates take the same position on the same issue, 
and though they take soft-line attitudes on many topics, they may become hardline when it 
comes to the values they care most about. For instance, whereas both Abderrahim and Ounissi 
represented the “liberal” side of Ennahda and considered themselves as feminists, they had 
completely different understanding of feminism and had distinct opinions regarding women 
issues. Abderrahim, a political activist that had close relationship to leftist parties, did not define 
herslf as Islamist and had never resided in Western countries, was famous for appearing unveiled 
in public. She always chanted the slogan “Ennahda will not force people to wear the veil or to go 
to prayers” (The Sunday Times, 2011) when giving public speeches, and considered that being 
unveiled is a symbol of modernized women. Yet, she expected that Ennahda would advocate 
conservative family values that strongly discrouages divorce and premarital sex, which 
explained why she worked with an Islamist party rather than a feminist organization. Shortly 
after she was elected as a parliamentarian, Abderrahim stated on Radio Monte Carlo Doualiya, 
“family should not be formed outside of marriage”. She believed that “full and absolute freedom” 
proposed by feminist groups was “a project of Western, French, inspiration”, and that single 
mothers “are an infamy and a plague for Tunisian society” (Washington Post, 2018). By 
comparison, Ounissi who had grown up in France as a second-generation exile child was more 
open to the issues regarding divorce, and claimed to me that “Ennahda should compares itself to 
international standards in terms of gender equality… Tunisian women should have the same 
rights as Western womens … to marry or divorce” (Interview, Ounissi, 2015, Tunis). Yet, she 
was more conservative on the hijab issue, and emphasized the importance for Muslim women to 
wear hijabs as “this was a sign of our identity” (Ibid). Such different views were not only caused 
by Ennahda members’ different personal experience an expectations, but resulted from, 
according to Petkanas (2014, p. 694), the more multiplied and fragemented expressions of 
Tunisian womanhood and identities in public in post-revolutionary era as the singular paradigm 
of the Tunisian woman enforced before 2011 no longer existed.  
Facing the internal divides, the Ennahda leadership developed a mechanism to keep disputes 
at bay after 2011. Guazzone (2013, p. 48) argues, in her analysis of the party’s governing 
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experience after it was elected to office, that a significant feature of Ennahda was its policy of 
prioritizing consensus and unity rather than efficiency. This policy had been adopted even before 
Ennahda was elected. For fear that internal disagreements would undermine its cohesion, 
Ennahda used two methods to reach consensus. One was to formulate ambiguous religious 
slogans, and avoid talking about sensitive topics such as implementation of sharia and women 
roles directly by either remaining silent or criticizing these topics as of importance only as 
formulated by the West. Ennahda’s intention to circumvent sensitive and controversial issues 
was reflected in the fact that when Ennahda reconstructed itself in 2011, it stated little about 
religion in its party statement (Business News, 2011b). Another example was that the Ennahda 
newspaper, Al Fajr, did not have any page reserved for religion after it re-published in March 
2011 (La Presse, 2011a). Additionally, when asked about the separation of politics and religion 
during an interview with La Presse (2011a), Samir Dilou, an Ennahda spokesman, simply 
answered that the debate was “imported from the West”.  
The other method was to put off debates and create the impression among party members and 
supporters that sensitive questions would be fully studied and discussed later, and that the main 
target for the time being was to maintain internal unity and win elections. Several leading 
members of Ennahda including Attig, Al-Sghaier, and Mohamed Ben Salem mentioned in 
interviews that when debates arose during Ennaha meetings prior to the 2011 election, 
Ghannouchi often emphasized that Ennahda’s pressing task was to run for the election 
(Interviews, Attig, Al-Sghaier, Ben Salem, 2015, Tunis), and that “we can keep debating on 
controversial issues after the election” (Interviews, Attig, 2015, Tunis). 
However, such ways of achieving consensus planted seeds of fragmentation. As it created 
ambiguity on many issues, it led each party member to assume that there was a chance his/her 
expectations could be met at a later point. This was reflected in the statements of Hazem, an 
undergraduate who joined Ennhada in 2011, in an interview, “I joined Ennahda…in the hope 
that it would implement the Islamic law…the leading members said…this would be put on 
agenda if it could be elected to govern the country” (Interviews, Hazem, 2015, Tunis). Abdallah 
Zouari, a member of Ennahda’ s executive committee who spent 12 years in prison in Tunisia, 
expressed similar expectation during in an interview with the New York Times (2011b) in May 
2011, “Ennahda would not force women to veil themselves…nor would it immediately seek to 
ban alcohol, which Islam forbids... a ban might be a goal in years to come”. Yet, after Ennahda 
won the 2011 election and head the government, especially when it drafted the constitution, it 
could no longer take ambiguous positions and had to clarify its attitudes on controversial issues. 
And once the Ennahda leadership took positions on issues regarding women’s roles and 
implementation of sharia, it could no longer keep internal debates at bay, nor could it meet all 
voters’ expectations, as elaborated in a later section. But before moving to this topic, it is 
important to note that, to a certain extent, prioritizing consensus, as a difference-settlement 
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mechanism, helped Ennahda mute internal disputes in the short term and allowed it to maintain 
its unity before the 2011 election, as discussed below. 
 
Running for Elections  
  Although it had been widely anticipated that Ennahda would do well in the 2011 election, the 
plurality of seats Ennahda gained nationwide came as a surprise to many scholars (Abbiate, 2015, 
p. 71; El Amrani & Lindsey, 2011). The literature dedicated to the rise of Ennahda in 2011 
attributes Ennahda’s electoral success to specific factors such as its voter outreach methods 
(Churchill, 2011), and brand recognition (Fair, 2011, p. 41). When reviewing Ennahda’s 
electoral triumph, Tunisian political activists including Nahdaouis themselves also single out 
particular factors. For instance, in an interview with the New York Times (2011c), Soumaya 
Ghannouchi, stressed Ennahda’s acceptance of pluralism, diversity, and collaboration with a 
variety of political forces such as CPR. In an interview with The Guardian (2011b), Lilia Alouni, 
a candidate who ran on a secular list who was not elected, considers that Ennahda’s victory 
depended on its close contact with voters on the ground through face-to-face communication 
conducted by its branch offices in almost every city. My analysis builds on the above secondary 
literature and primary sources such as newspaper interviews and speeches, focusing on how 
Ennahda met the populace’s pressing needs to see a change after Ben Ali. It examines how 
Ennahda conducted its successful electoral mobilization by labeling itself as the defender of 
Tunisian revolution, to create an impression that it had the capacity, willingness, and legitimacy 
to bring changes aspired to by voters at minimal costs.  
  As discussed above, Ennahda had maintained a presence through its religious organizations 
prior to the revolution, and accumulated enormous financial and human resources to mobilize 
citizens across the country within months. Hence, as most political parties were small and lacked 
organizational resources, it was the only party parties that had nationwide branches and could 
launch door-to-door campaigns in small neighborhoods in almost every city (Interview, Soula, 
2015, Tunis). In August 2011, two months before the election for a Constitutional Assembly in 
Tunisia, Ennahda was reported by Tunisian weekly newspaper Al Moussawar to have 850,000 
members (L’Expression, 2011). In the election, only 5 out of the 115 parties permitted to run for 
election had the capacity to field candidates in all 33 constituencies: Ennahda, CPR, Ettakatol, 
PDP and PDM (Bustos, 2011, p. 5). Ennahda and CPR had profound networks in overseas 
Tunisian expatriate communities, which were built when their members were in exile, enabling 
the two parties to gain half of the seats in six overseas constituencies including two 
constituencies in France and one in Italy (Tunisia Live, 2011). Yet, whilst the CPR and Ennahda 
shared many similarities regarding their members’ imprisonment and exile experiences, the 
CPR’s funds and networks were incomparable to Ennahda’s, partly because it had refused to 
accept external funding to ensure its independence (Al Jazeera, 2011d). 
150 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, extensive funds, resources, and networks help mobilizers spread 
its discourse. With more financial sources, Ennahda desmontrated stronger ability to spend 
money on campaign materials, election rallies, and informal meetings. According to a working 
paper about the Tunisian 2011 election published by the Carter Center which came to the scene 
to observe the electoral campaigns and election process, although most parties used their 
websites, Facebook, pamphelets, and posters to mobilize supporters during the electoral 
campaign in October, Ennahda printed a great many brochures which not only described its 
programs and Ennahda’s meeting dates and places, but introduced general knowledge about the 
2011 election including voting regulations. Meanwhile, Ennahda displayed much more posters 
than other parties in cities and towns across the country (The Carter Center, 2011, p. 40). Also, 
Ennahda was reported by Tunisian media such as La Presse to have organized large-scale rallies 
to support its candidates in many constituencies including Bizerte and Gafsa, and held press 
conferences to propagate its programs (La Presse, 2011b; The Carter Center, 2011, p. 39). On 
the election day, the Carter Center visited 272 voting bureaus, and observed that while Ennahda 
was able to have sent scrutineers to 242 of these bureaus, the PDP, CPR and Ettakatol only sent 
representatives to 59, 20 and 18 bureaus (The Carter Center, 2011, p. 37).  
Although the old regime was gone and the 2011 election was free, the mentality of casting a 
“protest vote” remained and what voters cared most about was to prevent the ancien régime’s 
return. To do so, the simplest way was to support a party with the strongest intention of bidding 
farewell to Ben Ali’s era to take power. In this context, Ennahda’s higher organizational strength 
compared to the other parties including the CPR contributed much to its electoral success, and 
explained why the CPR lost to Ennahda in the 2011 election, despite the popularity of CPR’s 
President, Moncef Marzouki.  
  Saladin, a computer programmer in his thirties who described himself as a secularist and fan of 
Marzouki explained why he voted for Ennahda in 2011 instead of the CPR or any other secular 
party:   
 
Although secular parties claim that they are against the old regime, many of them received 
money from the old regime. Other secular parties like CPR are smaller parties compared to 
Ennahda and can hardly win…I do not want to disperse our ballots. Why disperse our votes by 
voting for different parties but not gather our votes and let one party win in the election? 
                                                                                                 (Interview, Saladin, 2015, Tunis) 
 
Nine out of 30 of the citizens interviewed for this study shared this viewpoint. This 
phenomenon demonstrates many voters’ intention to support a party with the most likelihood to 
win, to make the best use of their vote, and reduce vote splitting, reducing the probability for an 




In addition to establishing extensive organizational structures, Ennahda still needed to fashion 
shared understandings of the condition and convinced citizens that it would help them achieve 
their goals in order to convert favorable opportunities into successful mobilization. In particular, 
Ennahda should compensate for not having been in the streets during the actual uprisings, if it 
was to effectively build up its mobilization capacity. The reconstructed Ennahda demonstrated 
that it was a savior of Tunisia, prioritized Tunisia’s interests and aimed to overthrow the ancien 
régime, rather than a power seeker that wished to replace the old autocratic regime with another 
autocratic regime. This was reflected in Ennahda’s formulation of its discourse. First, it 
criticized the autocracy and Ben Ali’s misgovernment. Its electoral program stated that Ben 
Ali’s dictatorship had “deviated the State from its mission and ha[d] dedicated it instead to the 
repression of freedoms and aspirations and the protection of corrupt gangs” (Ennahda Movement 
Program, 2011, p. 4).  
At the same time as diagnosing the problems with the ancien régime, Ennahda also 
emphasized its own sufferings for being the biggest fighter against Ben Ali, to demonstrate 
that it was the most legitimate party to defend the revolution. After Ennahda was 
reconstructed, Ghannouchi visited various regions in Tunisia to meet local residents and 
disseminate Ennahda’s ideas. Each time when he visited a place, he honored the martyrs in 
the protests that ousted Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime. He then narrated how Ennaha did the 
same over the past decades, suffered from repression and became the party that had the largest 
number of prisoners, exiles, and mayrtyrs. Next, he promised that as the party sharing similar 
experience to protesters in the revolution, Ennahda would keep fighting for justice and dignity 
to achieve the reovlution’s goals (Tunis Afrique Presse, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). The same 
message was also delivered by other leaders of Ennahda. For instance, during an interview 
with Jeune Afrique (2011) five months before the election, Hamadi Jebali, Ennahda’s 
Secretary-General, claimed, “Ennahda is one of the movements that has suffered the most 
from the [Ben Ali] regime’s wild offensive…Others have suffered with us ... This is what 
prepared the revolution”. By stressing that Ennahda sacrificed much more than other parties to 
oppose to Ben Ali in the past, it showed that itself was the party willing to devote the most to 
changing the status quo of the old regime.  
 Meanwhile, Ennahda conveyed the message that it intended to bring benefits to citizens by 
achieving the revolution’s goals. To cater to Tunisians’ aspirations to completely get rid of the 
old regime, Enanhda not only stated in its agenda that it would achieve the revolution’s goals 
by establishing a system that “breaks with tyranny, founded on the basis of citizenship, 
freedoms, dignity…” (Ennahda Movement Programme, 2011), but promised that it would 
punish former corrupt officials and prevent them from returning to the political scene. 
Ghannouchi declared, in March 2011, during a party meeting in Sidi Bouzid, that Ennahda 
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would like to “investigate the circles of corruption and malfeasance, and to punish those 
responsible for these practices, especially the deposed President” (Tunis Afrique Presse, 
2011d).  
Compared with other parties such as the CPR which also highlighted the revolution’s goals, 
Ennahda expressed its commitment to satisfying the demands of revolutionaries by providing 
detailed and concrete development plans during the electoral campaign. Ennahda realized that 
although all parties chanted slogans that promised to promote employment and regional 
development, most of them lacked concrete reform plans, and that Ennahda was likely to copy 
AKP’s success if it could offer what the other parties couldn’t. This was manifested in Al-
Sghaier’s statement in an interview with Osservatorio Iraq (2011), “We knew from the 
beginning that the problem was not just winning this round, but also showing everyone how to 
govern. The construction of a structured agenda was necessary because the country needed 
immediate answers”. According to Al-Sghaier, to formulate such a structured agenda before 
the election, Ennahda invited the significant Tunisian economist, Reda Saydi, to guide the 
formulation of its economic agenda, with the engagement of over 180 experts (Ibid). 
Ennahda’s 2011 electoral program elaborated extensively the 5-year (2012-2016) 
development model it proposed which highlighted expansion (of economic partenship), 
diversification (of productive sectors), and (economic) integration between various regions in 
Tunisia (Ennahda Movement Program, 2011, pp. 26-31). It specified the aim of creaing “590 
thousand jobs so as to reduce the unemployment rate to 8.5% by the year 2016” (p. 29), and 
achieving a growth rate of “8% by 2016, averaging an annual rate of 7%” in 2012-2016 (p. 
30). To reach these goals, it gave 365 proposals including “multiplying investments to reach 
163,300 million dinars” in 2012-2016, 67% of which coming from national savings (p. 30); 
“adopting a new policy based on the competitive advantage of skilled rather than cheap labor 
and directing it towards projects in the knowledge economy, innovation, and intelligence” (p. 
28); and reducing “the tax … related to families from 150 Dinars to 300 Dinars for the head of 
household, 150 dinars for any child in their charge, and 150 to 300 dinars for any parent in 
their charge” (p. 32). Although the other parties such as the CPR and Ettakatol also promised 
in their programs to stimulate economic growth, they lacked concrete plans. Both Ettakatol 
and the CPR gave fewer than 100 economic proposals, and neither party quantified their goals 
or measures (Business News, 2011c).  
Third, Ennahda continued the strategies it used in the previous decade, as it continued seeking 
a balance between respecting Islamic values and complying with pluralist principles. It 
continued its advocacy of Islam as a personal belief, and claimed in its electoral program that 
“Islamic thought is in need of constant innovation …Islam accepts anything that is beneficial 
and encourages it such as the international conventions on human rights, which are generally 
compatible with Islamic values and objectives” (Ennahda Movement Program, 2011, p. 10). 
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Hence, the party demonstrated that its interpretation of religion was flexible and would not 
impose any codes upon the population. Ennahda likewise showed it respected pluralism and 
promised during its campaign that it would accept the electoral result even if Ennahda was not 
the winner, and that it was ready to co-govern the country with secular parties. By adopting this 
line, it tried to enhance the credibility of its slogan of “al-hurriyyah awwalan (freedom first)” 
(Al Jazeera, 2012b). Compared to Ennahda’s slogan of “Islam is the solution” when it first 
participated in elections in 1989, its current proposal of “respect for both Islamic values and 
pluralist principles is the solution” which had been adopted since the early 21st century as was 
discussed in Chapter 6 helped it discredit criticism from Tunisia’s secular groups that it aimed to 
create an Islamic State based on sharia, and reassure many citizens that voting for Ennahda 
would not cost them freedom.  
 In sum, by adopting consensus policy to handle internal and inter-group relationships, 
Ennahda tried to attract supporters from various backgrounds with different expectations, 
maintain Qatar’s financial support, and reduce criticism from Tunisian secular parties. Its 
electoral mobilization in 2011 fit with the scenario of success as it acquired overwhelming 
electoral victory and became the largest parliamentary party. There were three areas in which 
Ennahda translated opportunities to its advantage: 1) Ennahda seized the opportunity to run for 
elections as a legal party; 2) it became the party with the largest organizational capacity and 
resources; 3) it presented itself as the defender of the revolution, and showed its willingness to 
make compromise, promising not to let Tunisia return to the authoritarianism of Ben Ali’s era. 
These elements enabled Ennahda to emphasize that it was the best alternative to the old regime 
which was likely to bring benefits at minimal costs for Tunisians. In October 2011, Ennahda 
took the lead in 32 out of 33 constituencies, and received over  37% of the votes and secured 41% 
of the seats in the 217-member parliament (Tunisia Live, 2011; BBC News, 2011b). According to 
research by Gana et al. (2012) based upon electoral outcomes and survey data, Ennahda received 
support from a range of social groups including the middle class and the poor. Meanwhile, the 
research noted that Ennahda was particularly well established in neighborhoods with a large 
youth population and high unemployment rates (Ibid). As the unemployed youth were one of the 
most important protest forces in the revolution, this showed that Ennahda’s rhetoric of defending 
the revolution and its economic platform of reforms helped it attract many voters who might 
have voted for other parties had they not viewed Ennahda as a useful recipient of their votes. As 
NCA’s largest party, Ennahda led a coalition government with Ettakatol and CPR during 
Tunisia’s transition period.  
 
Ennahda in Office 
To comprehend Ennahda’s performance after it was elected to head the government on 
October 23, 2011, it is necessary to note that Tunisia is still undergoing transformation from 
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electoral authoritarianism to democratic pluralism, and is still in the stage of what 
Farmanfarmaian (2014, p. 661) called a “resilient authoritarianism” —a hybrid system of elite 
networks of privilege combined with certain public freedoms. Meanwhile, Ennahda is still in the 
process of adapting to the change in its role from a “protest party” under an autocratic regime to 
a professional competitive force in a free electoral system.  
Viewing Ennahda’s triumph in the 2011 election, many Tunisian secular parties were 
disappointed and decided to join the opposition. Yet, in this context, Ennahda invited secular 
parties to join the government, and formed a troika coalition government with two secular 
parties, CPR and Ettakatol. Subsequent to the formation of this coalition, Ettakatol’s head, 
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, became President of the Assembly, the CPR’s leader, Moncef Marzouki 
became President of Tunisia, and Ennahda’s Secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali, became Prime 
Minister (Arieff, 2011, p. 6). By forming a coalition government with the CPR and Ettakatol, 
Ennahda reassured voters of its moderation given the more secular orientation of the two parties 
it allies with.  
Nonetheless, once in power, Ennahda faced three conundrums. First, although it quelled 
internal disputes and opted to mobilize as many supporters as possible by formulating 
ambiguous slogans and avoiding sensitive topics prior to the 2011 election, it was in an awkward 
position after assuming governance, when it had to take positions on controversial issues and 
found that its previously equivocal stances pleased no side.  
Shortly after it gained power, an important task for Ennahda was to manage the drafting of the 
constitution. Facing pressure from highly conservative members, such as Chourou, Ennahda 
leader proposed Article 3, which stated, “The state…criminalizes all attacks on that which is 
sacred” (Human Rights First, 2013), and Article 28 which stipulated that women were 
“complementary to men” (Marks, 2012). These articles not only aroused criticism from secular 
groups inside Tunisia, but from within Ennahda itself, by members and supporters who 
demanded pluralist values. Abderrahim stated in an interview, “I was against the complementary 
article from the very beginning…I said to Rachid Ghannouchi, ‘Men and women are equal in 
many aspects… We talked about this before the election. I must defend this principle’” 
(Interview, Abderrahim, 2015, Tunis). Subsequently, in 2013, Ennahda had to amend its 
constitutional draft — and delete the blasphemy and complementary clauses, which disappointed 
its more conservative Islamist members.  
As Wolf and Lefèvre (2012, p. 561) notices, how to make a balance between satisfying its 
Salafist supporters and appealing to the wider public was indeed a conundrum for Ennahda. Due 
to Ghannouchi’s concern for inclusion and consensus, and consideration of Salafists as “careless 
youth” who needed to be educated about moderate Islam (Jeune Afrique, 2012), Ennahda tried to 
include them in its net after the 2010-2011 uprisings. Yet, such an attitude became an issue when 
some Salafist currents started to launch violent actions. The first wave of violent attacks was 
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launched against Nessma TV in October 2011 for its broadcast of “Persepolis”. In response, 
Jebali claimed in an interview with Le Monde (2011a) that, “They [The Salafist groups] do not 
really bother us. We assume that there is room for everyone. To fill the prisons is Ben Ali’s 
solution. We should have more democracy and freedom, and I am sure that Tunisian society will 
converge towards the center”. As Ennahda remained to display “a benevolent kind of neglect 
towards” (Wolf & Lefèvre, 2012, p. 562) violent Salafist groups after it took office and delayed 
in designating violent Salafist groups represented by Ansar al-Sharia Tunisie (AST) (Tunisian 
Supporters of Islamic Law) which assassinated Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013 as 
terrorist, it aroused much criticism in society concerning Ennahda’s connivance with violent 
Salafism’s rise which threatened national security (Guazzone, 2013, p. 38; Echourouk Online, 
2013). 
The second challenge for Ennahda was transition from being an opposition party to a 
governing party. Although it had gained experience over the decades in formulating promises to 
attract a wide net of supporters, it, like other Islamist parties at the time (such as Mohammed 
Morsi’s FJP in Egypt), lacked anyone among its membership with practical experience at any 
level in the intricacies of governance. Although Ennahda had ambitious economic development 
plans and specific policies on unemployment, poverty, investment, trade and integration (Saif & 
Rumman, 2012, pp. 5-8), it faced difficulty achieving its goal of 7% annual GDP growth, or 
alleviating citizens’ socio-economic grievances, as no Nahdaoui had ever served as a 
government official or parliamentary representative. Ennahda was entirely unequipped to specify 
how the necessary funds could be obtained to support its plans, or to organize and bring on-side 
other parties in the parliament with different views on economic development (Ibid). Moreover, 
the decision of Ennahda, and other parties, to ensure the Tunisian revolution was bloodless, 
meant the elite networks were still in place, supporting Nidaa Tounes, against an Islamic agenda. 
The fact that old ruling elites were still in power, holding economic strangleholds over the 
economy, even after Ennahda became a governing party, meant that it faced great difficulty in 
promoting its economic programs, no matter how effectively it managed (and it was not 
effective).  
Most importantly, Ennahda faced a complicated and polarized political environment after it 
ascended to power. After witnessing the downfall of its counterpart, the FJP, in Egypt by a coup 
only two years in elected office, Ennahda grew starkly aware that negotiation and compromise 
were necessary within the political structure of pluralist politics, and made the decision to adapt. 
Ghannouchi’s experience of living in London, and witnessing party politics there, was useful in 
this regard. Pressured by its Troika coalition partners including Marzouki’s CPR, and secular 
parties that included ex-RCD members, the Ennahda leadership compromised on the lustration 
law and opposed the stipulation that would have excluded ex-RCD members from government 
(Marks, 2017b). Yet, this compromise ran counter to Ennahda’s electoral promise of preventing 
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the return of the ancien régime. According to Kaarina, a university undergraduate who joined 
Ennahda when it was reconstructed in 2011, large numbers including herself, her brother, and 
many of her friends left Ennahda after it opted to oppose the lustration law, which, in her eyes, 
was a betrayal of the revolution (Interview, Kaarina, 2015, Tunis).  
In this context, many citizens who had joined or voted for Ennahda in 2011 considered that 
the party did not keep its electoral promise of being a better alternative to the old regime, and 
that the benefits they aspired including reduction of corruption, and improvement of economic 
growth and employment were not realized. According to Pew Research, 88% of Tunisians were 
concerned about the economic conditions of the country after the revolution, complaining that 
their lives had become worse. Meanwhile, large numbers of citizens blamed Ennahda for the 
costs of social instability it brought to them, considering that Tunisia faced increasing terrorist 
threats due to the rise of violent Salafist groups after 2012, as was shown in the assassination of 
two secular political activists in 2013 and the Chaambi mountains attack in 2014. The Survey of 
Tunisian Public Opinion published by the International Republican Institut on its website shows 
that a growing number of Tunisian population (from 14% in March 2011 to 67% in June 2014) 
considered their country to be moving in the wrong direction, while a falling proportion of 
Tunisians from 79% to 28% considered it on the right path during the same period. Thus, as a 
party that brought smaller benefits and larger costs to citizens than they expected, Ennahda 
witnessed a decrease of voting share from - 37% in the 2011 election to 31.79% in the legislative 
election of 2014 (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2014). Even so, as the 
most organized party which aimed to draw together supporters, mobilize and command a 
popular agenda, and demonstrated flexibility to reconstruct itself and adapt to the post-
revolutionary setting through negotiation with its secular rivals, Ennahda still became the second 
largest parliamentary party in 2014 and formed a coalition with Nidaa Tounes. In any case, 
Ennahda’s return to Tunisia’s political scene in early 2010s and its 2011 electoral victory was 
exciting news for Islamist parties in neighboring countries and stimulated many to imitate its 
success, including Algeria’s HMS which formed an Islamist coalition in 2012. Nonetheless, as 
the political climate and contexts in the two countries varied greatly, the HMS’ attempt to copy 
Ennahda failed, as discussed below. 
 
Algeria: AAV’s Unsuccessful Trial 
Unlike Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Algeria did not undergo dramatic changes in the early 
2010s, and, with very few exceptions (Del Panta, 2017; Layachi, 2014), is thus neglected in the 
scholarship on North Africa written at the time. A comparison between Tunisian and Algerian 
Islamist parties in the early 2010s raises a central question: why did the Islamist electoral 
alliance led by the HMS fail to enlarge its support base in Algeria whereas the Ennahda 
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succeeded in Tunisia? I try to answer this by elaborating how the context, process and outcomes 
of the HMS-led mobilization via the Alliance de l'Algérie Vert’s (AAV) in 2012 differed from 
Ennahda’s in 2011. The first two parts describe why the protest wave did not significantly affect 
the Algerian regime in the early 2010s and what it meant for political opportunities for the HMS. 
Then, it analyzes the change of HMS’ mobilization strategies when it established the AAV and 
departed from the Presidential Alliance. In the process, it examines why the HMS’ efforts in the 
early 2010s were not transferred to a successful electoral mobilization. 
 
Escaping the Arab Awakening  
In the early 2010s, an important theme in Algerian politics was the country’s escape from the 
Arab Awakening. Here I briefly discuss why protests in Algeria did not lead to the autocratic 
regime’s downfall as happened in Tunisia, and how it affected political opportunities for the 
HMS.    
The few publications devoted to Algeria’s experience of the 2011 uprisings note factors such 
as the rentier regime’s swift curb of price increases (Larémont, 2014, pp. 166-167; Volpi, 2013, 
p. 107), and the inability for a cross-class and cross-ideological coalition to take form (Del Panta, 
2017). Although examining the reasons why Algeria did not experience the same kind of 
upheaval as Tunisia is not the purpose of this study, I contend that three points related to the 
question are worth discussing here, namely, the government’s alleviation of popular demands, 
the lack of prevailing anger at Bouteflika, and the massive effect of the civil war in 1992-2002 
on the collective Algerian psyche which had led to an ongoing fear of social instability. These 
constitute important political contexts in which AAV failed in the 2012 legislative election.  
First, it is worth noting that riots had by then become an established and recognized means of 
attracting government response to maladministration, so once the government responded 
immediately to protests at the end of 2010/start of 2011 over soaring price of sugar and food (Al 
Jazeera, 2011) by reducing 41% of the taxes on sugar and edible oil to reduce the price of staple 
foodstuffs (Le Monde, 2011b), the immediate popular demand had been met and popular 
resistance temporarily melted away.  
Second, Bouteflika was not hated in Algeria as much as Ben Ali in Tunisia, and the image of 
Bouteflika as a hero that saved the country from the civil war not only helped the regime survive 
the 2011 protests, but restricted the mobilization of non-regime parties such as the HMS which 
needed to avoid criticizing Bouteflika directly in its rhetoric.  
Third, in Entelis’ (2011, p. 675) analysis of how authoritarianism was maintained in Algeria, 
he argues “The recent memory of the civil war in the 1990s … hangs over the national 
consciousness serving as a brake to large-scale domestic violence”. As elaborated in Chapter 5, 
the memory of the civil war profoundly affected Algeria and led Algerians to seek to avoid 
another conflict of the same kind, despite the problems of unemployment and corruption they 
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faced. This largely prevented Algerians from making a more organized response to the 
government dysfunction and created important difficulties for the HMS to attract support. 
The spring 2011 events affected Algeria’s political scene and the HMS’ mobilization in two 
ways. First, the demand for rejecting the existing regime was lower in Algeria than in Tunisia. 
This was because the popular aspiration for benefits — change of status quo — was largely 
reduced by the government’s quick response to protests in 2011, and creation of an image of 
Bouteflika as a civil war hero. Also, the collective memory of the civil war following the rise of 
FIS aroused public fear of costs — in the form of social instability — brought by anti-regime 
groups that sought power alternation. This not only explained why there were hardly any slogans 
like “Bouteflika degage!” (Bouteflika step down!) during the Algerian protests (as there had 
been in Tunisia), but why there was less emphasis on any of the three Arab Uprising slogans — 
justice, bread and jobs — in Algeria.   
Second, the Algerian government’s response to 2011 protests limited the political 
opportunities of non-regime parties including the HMS. Unlike in Tunisia where the system 
went through a sudden emancipation, the Algerian protests did not escalate into regime change 
of any kind, meaning that politics simply continued to be controlled from the center. 
Consequently, discourse and elections were now completely different in the two countries, and 
the HMS could not formulate its discourse as freely as Ennahda now could in Tunisia. Moreover, 
though Bouteflika promised in a public statement to promote pluralism by means such as 
ensuring that television and radio cover “the activities of all the parties and … open their 
channels fairly” (L’Expression, 2011b) in February 2011 in response to the protests, he not only 
continued to combine the tactics of controlled inclusion and total exclusion to reduce political 
openness for Islamist parties, but used more covert means to manage opposition, by allowing 
many more satellite parties to be created to split the vote. Among the over twenty newly 
legalized secular political parties, many were created only to support the government (The 
Carter Center, 2012, p. 12). Meanwhile, the regime encouraged the establishment of new 
Islamist parties, such as Front de la Justice et du Développement (FJD), and Front de l'Algérie 
Nouvelle (FAN). Both parties split from MRN due to internal power wrestling. Another newly 
legalized Islamist party was the Parti de la Liberté et de la Justice (PLJ), created by Mohamed 
Saïd Oubelaïd who ran as an independent presidential candidate in 2009. The increase of 
Islamist parties intensified the contest within the Islamist camp. Further, the narrowing of 
political opportunities prompted the HMS to realize that it had little chance to gain ground in 
elections unless it collaborated with other parties.  
 
Formation of Alliance de l'Algérie Verte  
Algerian Islamist parties underwent two changes when the legislative election approached in 
2012. First, pro-regime Islamist parties, particularly the HMS, shifted position from supporting 
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the regime to opposing it. Second, three Islamist parties allied together and formed the Alliance 
de l'Algérie Verte (AAV); vert (green), a traditional Islamic color, indicated it was an Islamist 
coalition. Yet, the organizational deficiencies of the HMS-led AAV soon became clear, as an 
examination of its internal divisions and fragmentation reveals.  
In the literature analyzing why the HMS suddenly left the Presidential Alliance, which had 
offered it ministerial portfolios and formal participation in the government’s decision-making 
processes, scholars note the impact of regional politics. Glenn (2011) argues, in his analysis of 
modern Algerian Islamism, that HMS ended its alliance with secular parties after it was 
encouraged and emboldened by Islamist party electoral successes in neighboring Tunisia, and 
Egypt. This view is shared by Ghanem-Yazbeck (2014). I contend that in addition to being 
inspired by Islamists’ electoral successes elsewhere, three more factors drove it to change its 
pro-regime position. First, the increase in both satellite and Islamist parties reduced political 
opportunities for the HMS, as they not only split votes in elections, but competed with the HMS 
for political resources offered by the regime.  
Second, whereas engagement in the Presidential Alliance had brought Soltani certain benefits 
such as helping him consolidate his position as head of the HMS, he determined that the party 
had become trapped by its need to adopt a pro-regime attitude. The HMS’ support of almost all 
programs proposed by Bouteflika not only aroused doubts from the electorate about its 
intentions to bring any meaningful change, as noted in Chapter 6, but reduced it to a position of 
insignificance as it became impossible to distinguish itself in any meaningful way from the 
regime parties FLN and RND, or the numerous satellite parties that chanted pro-Bouteflika 
slogans. Soltani’s intent to change the situation and gain a stronger showing politically was 
reflected in his statement during a meeting of the Majlis Shura in January 2012, “Continuing to 
deal with the [Presidential] Alliance … means persistence in political mediocrity for us” (Le 
Midi Libre, 2012). 
Third, as disussed in Chapter 6, the splintering resulting from the leadership showdown 
between Soltani and Menasra in 2008, had undermined the HMS’ organizational strength, losing 
it many of its networks, members, and parliamentary representatives, including figures who had 
strong attachments among the electorate. For instance, Brahim Kaouadja and Labiod Rachida, 
HMS activists with influence in the business and women’s fields respectively, took their voters 
with them when they joined MPC/MC (L’Expression, 2009b). Moreover, Soltani was being 
blamed by fellow HMS members for the losses the party had suffered, as many dissidents had 
left because Soltani had marginalized them and joined Menasra’s party (Le Soir d'Algérie, 2009). 
Soltani was thus in urgent need of new schemes to rebuild his authority within the party. In sum, 
the HMS’ departure from the Presidential Alliance was as much an attempt by Soltani to recover 
the political initiative as to provide a different strategy for the party. 
In 2011, Soltani indicated during many public occasions the possibility of the HMS’ 
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departure from the Presidential Alliance. Yet, the proposal was met with much dissent within the 
party. Some members told the Algerian newspaper L’Expression (2011) anonymously that “it is 
politically incorrect to withdraw from the alliance that has been woven around the head of the 
state…”, considering that “we have supported the President since 2004 to implement his 
program”, and that the move might cause the loss of advantages (such as cabinet portfolios) 
gained by taking pro-regime positions and increase the risk of being repressed. 
At the beginning of 2012, the plan was put on the agenda again. Viewing the success of 
Islamist parties in neighboring countries, Soltani believed that to take a more anti-government 
position at the timing of the widespread anti-authoritarianism wave in the Arab world would 
make his party a better supply to electoral desires for greater change (El Khabar, 2012a). This 
opinion was shared by the head of HMS’ Majlis Shura, Abderrahmane Saidi, claimed in an 
interview with an Algerian popular newspaper, El Khabar (2012b), like Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Morocco, “at the time … Algeria needs … a transparent election and Islamist parties’ majority 
victory”. In late January, the HMS leadership not only expressed formally the intention of 
breaking away from the FLN and RND, but proposed the formation of an Islamist alliance. On 
January 30, Soltani began to mobilize other Islamist parties at a political forum organized by El 
Khabar (2012a), declaiming “It’s very important for us to see Islamists take over the majority of 
the seats in the APN [People's National Assembly], to defeat the dominance of FLN and RND”. 
The HMS’ initiative was warmly welcomed by MRI and MRN. Like the HMS, both parties felt 
trapped by the pro-regime strategies they used in the previous decade, as they could hardly 
distinguish themselves from the regime parties, and became marginalized by the increasing 
satellite parties. In an interview with L’Expression (2012) in January, Hamlaoui Akkouchi, 
MRN’s Secretary-general, claimed, “Soltani was right in his act (of leaving the Presidential 
Alliance) … because…the HMS was just an instrument used by the power in place to disguise 
their authoritarianism…There is no difference between us and our friends from the HMS…”. 
Also, witnessing the electoral victory of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia, both MRI and 
MRN considered that they might have a chance to enlarge their support base if they emphasized 
identity politics and self represented as opposition parties. This was reflected in Akkouchi’s 
statement in the same interview, “such victories (of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egpy) that … 
are a dream that I had since I was young…Algeria will hold elections soon, and if God leads the 
people on the right path to choose the Islamists, an era of prestige, stability and peace will await 
us” (Ibid). Yet, as both parties were small in size, they needed to ally with another Islamist party 
with higher organizational strength, and the HMS was a good candidate. In March, the three 
parties officially formed the Alliance de l'Algérie Verte (AAV) (La Tribune, 2012a). As the 
HMS was the largest party and had the highest organizational strength and largest support base, 
it assumed the AAV’s leadership (Ibid). Yet, the HMS also had more to lose than its two allies, 
as it was the only party that held ministerial positions in the government, including the Minister 
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of Public Works, Minister of Trade, and Minister of Tourism. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, a party without charismatic leadership or difference-dettlement 
mechanisms is likely to face conflicts and splits. In early 2012, Soltani’s decision to depart the 
Presidential Alliance and lead an anti-regime Islamist alliance soon provoked an internal debate 
within HMS which centered on its important ministerial portfolios. Aiming to change the party’s 
image from a pro-regime party to an opposition party, Soltani initially considered forcing a 
resignation from the four ministerial positions held by HMS to show its commitment to breaking 
with the Presidential Alliance (BBC Monitoring, 2012). But his proposal was negatively 
received, particularly by the HMS ministers themselves, who had benefited from the 
government’s co-operation over the past decades and did not want to lose their portfolios. Amar 
Ghoul, Minister of Public Works, who had reportedly pocketed kickbacks while managing a 
major highway project, disagreed with Soltani (Al Jazeera, 2010) and refused to attend several 
meetings of the Majlis Shura in December 2011 and early January 2012 (Graine, 2012). To 
prevent his party from splintering prior to the 2012 legislative election, Soltani compromised 
and kept HMS’ ministerial positions in the cabinet. Although his concession temporarily quelled 
the internal debate over ministerial portfolios, it created problems for the party as it had two 
narratives during this time: the HMS was opposing the hegemony of a government in which 
itself was a part. The contradiction was severaly problematic. In April 2012, Soltani stated at an 
electoral rally in Berrouaghia that the party’s approach was “to offer alternatives to the multiple 
problems” caused by “cumulative failures by previous governments” (Algérie Presse Service, 
2012a). In the same month, Ghoul posted pictures on his website and Facebook page of several 
of the projects he was responsible for during his ministerial tenure, to demonstrate his 
achievement as a government official (Liberté, 2012). Meanwhile, to show their disagreement 
with the party’s transformation in order to avoid being marginalized by the government, 
Mustapha Benbada, Minister of Trade, and Samïl Mimoune, Minister of Tourism, refused to run 
for the legislative election, though Soltani called for their participation in a program on Radio 
Algérie Internationale, saying, “I think we have to maintain them [in the electoral lists] because 
of their good performance and popularity” (Le Temps d’Algérie, 2012d). When asked about the 
ministers’ refusal to represent as candidates by the media such as Algérie Presse Service (2012c), 
Soltani had to find an excuse and explain, “they want to make room for young activists”. Yet, 
the fact that the HMS’ main ministerial members did not stand on its lists clearly undermined the 
party’s organizational strength and posed significant mobilizational challenges.  
In the literature of political parties and non-government organizations on inter-group alliances, 
debate focuses on the effects of coalition building. While Gamson (1990), Steedly and Foley 
(1979) view intra-group alignment as likely to strengthen a group’s mobilization capacity and 
engage large numbers of supporters, Saunders, Roth and Olcese (2015, p. 175) argue that a 
negative effect of coalitions across groups is the increase of heterogeneity, as the groups within 
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the coalition might have different expectations and interests. The HMS’ involvement in AAV 
exemplifies the second opinion, and suggests that inter-group coalitions face challenges in 
handling different voices from different groups — and requires strong leadership and party 
management to align what are otherwise centrifigual forces. In the case of HMS and AAV, this 
was clearly lacking.  
Although Soltani realized the necessity to improve the operation mode and better adapt to the 
shift from working individually as a party to working with other parties, the three AAV parties 
never merged their institution, nor developed an efficient mechanism to structure the alliance (Le 
Temps d'Algérie, 2012a). Two months prior to the legislative election, the most important 
decisions of the AAV such as the drawing up of its electoral lists and programs were made on 
several national meetings attended by a number of the three AAV parties’ leaders. Due to a lack 
of transparent and professional decision-making procedure such as voting or consultation, the 
alliance’s decisions had not been fully debated by the three parties’ Majlis Shuras before being 
announced. Consequently, the alliance’s key decisions aroused much criticism and disputes 
within the three AAV parties, especially among rank-and-file members who were not informed 
why and how the decisions were made. The most controversial decisions centered on the 
distribution of candidates on electoral lists and seats gained by the three parties. As the election 
adopted the proportional system which meant that the proportion of votes gained by a list in a 
constituency determined how many candidates on the list could take seats in the parliament, the 
alliance should submit electoral lists before the election. In March, the AAV leaders agreed to let 
HMS head AAV electoral lists in 24 wilayas, MRI in 13 wilayas, and MRN in 11 wilayas (Le 
Midi Libre, 2012a). This decision resulted from negotiation between the HMS leaders, and 
leading members of MRI and MRN who admited that the HMS was the party with strongest 
mobilization capacity and deserved to head more electoral lists, but insisted that the lists headed 
by the HMS should not exceed those headed by the MRI and MRN in total (L’Expression, 2012). 
The agreement soon aroused criticism among the HMS’ rank-and-file members about the HMS 
leadership’s cession of heads of lists to MRI and MRN. In an interview with El Watan, several 
HMS activists in Guelma and Annaba said that “[HMS] always won a seat in these wilayas [in 
previous legislative elections], but the two allies failed the test in [the legislative election of] 
2007”, and that they did not “understand why the leadership of their party let an activist of MRN 
head the electoral list, as it did not really have the proper profile to lead the common list to 
victory” (Le Midi Libre, 2012). 
Members of the MRI and MRN were not satisfied with the lists either. Before the 2012 
legislative election, a new electoral law was introduced requiring between 20% and 50% of 
candidates on the electoral lists be women, depending on the number of seats in the constituency 
(Bąkowski, 2013). According to the MRI and MRN, HMS tried to utilize this law as a ploy to 
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get its own members elected, and neglected the other two parties’ interests. In an interview, an 
elected MRN parliamentarian (Interview, Boucheche, 2016, Algiers) claimed that rather than 
distributing the seats according to the ranks of candidates on electoral lists, the HMS promoted 
the implementation of a policy demonstrating the alliance’s respect for the new law but which in 
effect favored HMS candidates. As the AAV’s electoral lists tended to be headed by male 
candidates, the policy required that once the alliance gained more than two seats in a 
constituency, the second parliamentarian would be a female candidate, even if she was at the 
bottom of the list. “HMS had more women candidates than MRI and MRN”, she said, “and the 
HMS’ tactic, was to reduce the number of seats we could gain, which was why my party, MRN, 
only got five seats total in the end”. These disputes reflected the AAV’s organizational problems, 
which prevented the Islamist coalition from fully unifying to mobilize its resources. Moreover, 
the disagreements between AAV parties appeared to be a public row, as they were reported 
extensively by various media which wrote headlines such as “The Green Alliance Sees its First 
Disagreement” (Le Temps d'Algérie, 2012b), “Anger of the MSP [HMS] Activists” (Le Midi 
Libre, 2012). Such an exposure of the AAV’s structural weakness created the impression among 
many citizens that the alliance lacked the organizational capacity to compete with or replace 
regime parties. This, together with deficiencies in AAV’s platforms as explained below, led to 
its defeat in 2012.  
 
AAV’s Failure  
For the AAV parties, the collapse of autocratic regimes in neighbouring states, and the rise of 
Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt, were both inspiring and encouraging. Hoping that similar 
scenarios would occur in Algeria, the HMS-led AAV presented itself as an alliance that could 
bring the “only alternative” to the status quo (Horizons, 2012a). As indicated in the AAV’s 
electoral program which was proposed one month prior to the 2012 legislative election, leaders 
of the three AAV parties generally agree on five priorities: a new constitution (that replaces the 
presidential system with the parliamentarian system), human being first (contributing to the 
building of the human being through education), developing economy, productive society 
(providing the society with infrastructure, advanced technology, and sophisticated medical 
services), and active diplomacy (enhancing foreign partnership with various countries) (AAV 
Electoral Program, 2012, p. 1). As the HMS did before during electoral campaigns, the AAV 
organized meetings and gatherings in a great many cities (Le Maghreb, 2012; Le Temps 
d’Algérie, 2012c), delivered speeches in TV programs, and conducted door-to-door campaign to 
disseminate its programs (Interview, Benguage Mlouka, 2015, Oran). Yet, its message was badly 
received, as discussed below.  
Academic research (Parks, 2013; Yazbeck, 2014) and media reports (Djamel, 2012; Hafid, 
2012) note that the HMS had become discredited by joining the Presidential Alliance, as 
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analyzed in Chapter 6. This section pinpoints that although the HMS tried to overcome this 
problem by departing the Presidential Alliance in 2012 and forming the AAV, it only made 
things worse. To address how this happened, I examine what exactly the AAV claimed during its 
campaign for the 2012 legislative election. I argue that the AAV’s discourse in 2012 were 
problematic in three ways: (1) The inconsistency of its discourse aroused doubt about its 
intention of bringing “benefits” to voters; (2) It failed to present concrete alternatives to the 
ruling elites through its discourse; and (3) The slogan of “Algeria’s Awakening” did not resonate 
with many voters despite the successes in next door states, as Algerians for the most part still 
feared the potential costs, such as recurrence of the civil war in the 1990s.   
Current scholarship on discourse consistency examines how (in)consistency affects a group’s 
mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 620; Earl, 2010, p. 213; Rudes, 2012, p. 13). This 
tendency has kept political process scholars from asking a wide range of questions about the 
causes of discourse (in)consistency. With this issue in mind, I contend the AAV’s discourse 
inconsistency resulted from its member parties’ changing strategies, a lack of political openness, 
and contests between Islamist groups in Algeria. 
Compared to its counterparts in neighboring countries, the AAV faced a more complicated 
political context and fewer opportunities which affected its formulation of discourse and made it 
hard for it to clarify what exactly it opposed. As Bouteflika survived the protests in 2011 and 
remained prestigious among many Algerians, to attack the President directly could do more 
harm than good for the coalition’s mobilization. Although the military did not have a good 
reputation, the AAV knew precisely how the army’s iron hands would react if it openly 
advocated to exclude the army from the political scene. To criticize the FLN and RND was less 
risky. Yet, as the AAV’s leading party, the HMS, had been an ally of these two regime parties 
for eight years, which meant that to attack them would do little but show that the Islamist parties 
had no consistency. Consequently, the AAV’s rhetoric appeared hollow and blurry, as although 
it emphasized at the beginning of its electoral program that “from the womb of the struggle of 
the Algerian people and the depth of their suffering, [and] bitter struggles… the Green Algerian 
Alliance was born, carrying the banner of peaceful change … to establish a democratic, social 
and sovereign state of Algeria” (AAV Electoral Program, 2012, p. 3), it was reluctant to 
diagnose why Algerians struggled and suffered from socio-economic problems and 
authoritarianism, and who should take responsibility for the government’s dysfunction 
(L’Expression, 2012). This was particularly manifested in the statement of Hamlaoui Akouchi, 
MRN’s Secretary-general, in an interview with El Watan in March 2012, “the creation of the 
Alliance did not target any of the components of the political class, but will work to promote 
democracy, [and] preserve the freedoms” (Info Soir, 2012). 
As shown in Figure 2, the field of Islamist groups in 2012 became more fragmented than the 
previous decade due to the original Islamist groups’ internal disputes and the regime’s 
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encouragement of their splits in Algeria, resulting in acute competition between them. As in the 
2000s, Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya discouraged citizens from confronting the regime. Belaid Bendjebbar, 
an Algerian expert specializing in Salafism, recounted that during the protest wave in January 
2011 against rising prices, the Salafists claimed in their fatwa (religious leaders’ official 
statements), “those who protest are practicing a socialist action but not an Islamic action. If they 
die in undertaking the action, they cannot enter heaven” (Interview, Bendjebbar, 2015, Oran). 
There were likewise other views: During an interview with Le Quotidien d'Oran (2012), 
Abdallah Djaballah, who had always been an outright critic of government policies, condemned 
the AAV, saying “there is no question that the AAV parties … are in submission to power”.  
The HMS also faced competition from Islamist parties that were closer in ideology to the 
AVV, and which for the most part had splintered from one of its component parties, such as the 
FJD, FAN, PLJ and Front du Changement (FC). The FC was the new name of Menasra’s party 
created in 2009 after he left the HMS. In the run-up to the 2012 election, these parties attempted 
to distinguish themselves from the AAV by claiming they were genuine anti-regime parties, in 
contrast to the AAV, which had close relations to the President. In a public meeting in 
Constantine in May, Menasra criticized the AAV’s reluctance to completely cut off its 
relationship with the regime, “Why do they put up the portraits of the President of the Republic 
every time they make speeches or meetings?” he asked. “Sometimes I feel that we are in a 
presidential rather than legislative campaign” (Liberté, 2012).  
 
Figure 2  The Field of Islamic Groups in Algeria, 2009-2012 
Groups accepted by the government Groups repressed by the government 
Islamist parties Non-violent and apolitical 
Islamic schools 
Violent Islamic groups Banned Islamist 
party 
AAV (HMS, MRI, MRN) 
FJD (Derived from MRN) 
MPC/FC (Derived from HMS) 
FAN (Derived from MRN) 
PLJ (A new party created by 
Mohamed Saïd in 2009 to support 








Meanwhile, with the intent to copy Islamist parties’ electoral success in neighboring countries 
by positioning itself as an anti-autocracy alliance, the AAV needed to present itself as ready for 
change, much as the other Algerian Islamist parties such as FC which denounced that 
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“administrative corruption was gangrening the country”, and advocated for a “reform that 
promote the separation of powers” (La Tribune, 2012b). In AAV’s campaign speech in Djelfa in 
April, leaders of the three AAV parties stressed that there should be “a break between the past 
50 years and a new era” (Algérie Presse Service, 2012b). Nonetheless, to compete with Salafiyya 
‘ilmiyya’s non-protest discourses and avoid confronting the regime, it acknowledged on other 
occasions the regime’s achievements and demonstrated that it was still a supporter and ally of 
President Bouteflika. In an interview with El Khabar (2012c), Soltani clarified that the HMS 
supported Bouteflika to seek a fourth term, and that its departure from the Presidential Alliance 
“has noting to do with the policy of the President of the Republic”. Such a discrepancy between 
the discourse of HMS-led AAV aroused confusion about whether it focused on bringing reforms 
and changes to the country or maintaining the status quo of Bouteflika’s era, and thus made its 
self-representation as a political force aiming to bring benefits — and meaningful alternatives — 
for Algerians questionable.  
As explained in Chapter 2, being too complinat is likely to lead the mobilized to regard the 
mobilizer as incapable of bringing successful benefits in exchange for the costs of supporting it. 
The HMS-led AAV in 2012 appeared politicially fickle, and the fact that the HMS acted as an 
opposition party while at the same time itself was still part of the government made it viewed by 
many citizens not as Islamist so much as political, and as a power-seeker that only cared about 
ministerial portfoliso and parliamentary seats, rather than the interests of the society. In his 
analysis of the HMS’ campaign tactics, Djamel (2012), a local journalist focusing on Algerian 
politics, contended that “the citizens are fed up with the two-way speech, knowing that this is the 
HMS’ common practice”. My interviews with 30 Algerian voters from different backgrounds 
corroborated this view. When asked about her impression of HMS, Nabeeha, a post-graduate 
from Tipaza in her twenties, claimed, “I only have confidence in the name of Islam but not these 
people who serve it … you know they… frequently change their tone” (Interview, Nabeeha, 
2015, Skype).  
In addition to discourse inconsistency, another problem also aroused doubts about the 
intentions of AAV to bring citizens benefits, that was its lack of concrete alternative program to 
that of the presidency or regime parties. First, a close look at AAV’s electoral program of 2012 
showed that what it offered to the citizenry differed little from the government’s agenda. For 
instance, the AAV claimed that it would reduce unemployment by providing “financial facilities 
to borrowers in the context of the establishment of small enterprises” (AAV Electoral Program, 
2012, p. 51), provide housing by “preparing a national matrix of residential need…and distribute 
space in hostels for all housing seekers” (p. 42), and increase citizen engagement by “assigning 
the task of supervision and control over the various stages of the electoral process to the judicial 
system…” (p. 12). These solutions were similar to Bouteflika’s proposals put forward in his 
speech to the nation in July 2011 in Algiers:“The five-year program being implemented makes 
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provision for the construction of two million homes of which one million will be delivered 
before 2014”, “the various mechanisms to help the young and jobless willing to start a micro-
business have been enhanced ” , and “all necessary measures will be taken to ensure the 
transparency and fairness of elections, including accepting foreign observers with the approval 
of all legally registered parties” (Bouteflika, 2011). AAV’s inability to produce a genuinely 
alternative program to that of the presidency and its FLN and RND supporters prevented it from 
translating citizens’ grievances into support. 
Second, indeed, the AAV tried to distinguish itself from ruling elites by offering its solutions 
to the current problems faced by the country through an Islamic prism. In an interview with 
Horizon (2012b) in April, the AAV’s campaigning activists explained that “For the economic 
sector, the three parties call for an economic model based on the precepts of the religion of Islam. 
In terms of finance, we propose the creation of the zakat bank…” The alliance’s program also 
stated that it attempted to “encourage the establishment of Islamic banks away from the usurious 
transactions” (AAV Electoral Program, 2012, p. 18). However, it did not clarify why its 
economic method might work better than that of the ruling elites. Specifically, it did not quantify 
in its program what percentage of economic growth and employment increase it aimed to 
achieve, nor specified how this could be made possible by adopting an Islamic economic model 
(pp. 16-19, 21-23), which made the alliance’s promise that it could supply benefits to citizens by 
“leading the country out of the current socio-economic problem” questionable.  
Lastly, the AAV’s labeling itself as a promoter of the “Algerian Awakening” aroused many 
citizens’ fear at the possible costs associated with supporting it. The Arab Awakening and the 
rise of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisa were so encouraging for HMS and its allies that they 
believed similar scenarios could and would occur in Algeria, and assumed the Algerian populace 
might also aspire for an overtly Islamic political environment, like Tunisians and Egyptians. 
This incorrect presumption was strengthened by the fact that Algerian religiosity was growing, 
as reflected in a number of surveys, including Arab Barometer. Its data, for instance, shows that 
the percentage of people who described themselves as religious increased from 54.9% to 81.2% 
between 2007-2011.  
In this context, the alliance not only chanted that “the Algerians are preparing to live their 
spring” (Le Midi Libre, 2012b), but emphasized religious rhetoric by claiming its intention to 
implement Islamic principles in public departments and institutions. The AAV’s electoral 
program stated that the coalition aimed to “embody its objectives by steps and stages to 
complete the construction of the Algerian social democratic and sovereign state within the 
framework of Islamic principles” (AAV Electoral Program, 2012, p. 4). Specifically, the 
program claimed that it would enhance “compulsory education” which should be “derived from 
the essence of our Islamic culture” (p. 45). Yet, what the AAV neglected to note sufficiently was 
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the important difference between Algeria’s history, as affected by its civil war, and that of its 
neighbors: Algerians were more cautious than citizens in neighboring countries about any 
proposals of implementing Islamic laws presented by Islamist parties, because of the 
government’s reaction that had occurred when the FIS had done so. For many Algerians who 
defined themselves as “religious”, Islam was better privatized, something more relevant to self-
practice than politics. This explains why the apolitical discourse of Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya had 
become increasingly appealing. Hence, the AAV’s slogan of Algerian Awakening and its 
religious slogans served to arouse fear among many voters concerned that Algeria would easily 
be mired in a new round of chaos and battle if the Islamic paradigm was not handled with 
sufficient sensitivity. Radicalism, extremisim, even outward Islamic presentation — all were 
worrisome to Algerians who otherwise considered themselves devout. Labeeb, an administrator 
in a transnational enterprise from Oran in his fifties who voted for FIS in 1991 explained that he 
had not voted during any parliamentary elections in recent years. Commenting on AAV parties, 
he said: 
   
We no longer trust the people who lead Islamic parties because we had the experience of the 
“black decade” ... You see many of these people are radical Islamists, they have beards…and 
want to bring us a new revolution. 
                                                                                                    (Interview, Labeeb, 2015, Oran) 
 
Such a sentiment was shared by Algerians of various social groups ranging from the urban 
middle class to the poor living in remote rural areas, as they had all suffered from torture and 
killings during the black decade. This meant that the AAV’s discourse failed to resonate with a 
large proportion of voters from different backgrounds. The result was a fiasco for the AAV on 
an unprecedented scale.  
From a theoretical perspective, the HMS’ electoral mobilization in 1999-2010 can be seen to 
fit with the scenario of unsuccessful mobilization in which an Islamist party’s support declines 
considerably. In this case, it can be attributed to several factors: 1) The increase of satellite and 
Islamist parties within the Algerian electoral authoritarian system in early 2010s reduced 
political opportunities for HMS; 2) The difficulty in party positioning that was both pro- and 
anti-regime, with impact on the ability of the AAV to establish common ground among its three 
member parties and thus coalesce into a strong political entity; 3) The necessity to compromise 
which aroused fresh doubts among the electorate regarding that the credibility of HMS, and its 
ability to lead a coalition to offer a genuine alternative to the current regime; 4) The HMS-led 
Islamist alliance’s unorganized structure, lack of efficient management, and full of internal 
divides created the impression the HMS lacked the organizational capacity to compete with or 
replace regime parties; and 5) The leadership’s innacurate assumption that Algerians were 
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becoming more open to an Islamic regime, and that fears of instability were diminishing. 
Consequently, the HMS-led AAV offered citizens too few benefits with the possibility of large 
costs, and thus appeared unlikely to be an effective alternative to established ruling parties. 
 According to the official outcome of the elections, the AAV gained just 6.2% (475, 049 votes, 
see JORA 2012) in total at the legislative polls, which was even smaller than HMS’ own vote 
share in 2007 (9.7%, 556, 401 votes, see JORA, 2007). In 2012, many more voters chose to 
express their dissatisfaction with the status quo by casting blank votes rather than voting for an 
opposition party. In effect, the invalid votes increased from 965,064 in 2007 to 1,704,047 in 




This chapter compares Ennahda and the HMS’ mobilization in the early 2010s. It argues that 
the inclusive recruitment approach, if not correctly managed, may not only fail to ensure 
commitment to the party and embed its membership, but intensify divisive internal debates.  
In the early 2010s, both Tunisia and Algeria faced protests, and both Ennahda and the HMS 
attempted to benefit from them by standing on the opposite side of the (old) regime and self-
representing as a sound alternative. This strategy worked for Ennahda, where the existing regime 
had been overthrown, but failed for HMS, which operated in a status quo situation. First, 
whereas Tunisia witnessed an unprecedented increase in political openness, political 
opportunities for Algeria’s Islamist parties became increasingly unfavorable. Second, the 
populations in Tunisia and Algeria had different calculations of benefits and costs. Plagued by 
the collective memory of the black decade, and the regime’s response to the small protests that 
took place as the region was swept with uprisings, Algerians responded negatively to the slogan 
of “Algerian Awakening”. Third, internal divisions within the HMS and its partners in the AAV, 
along with its oscillation between being a pro-and anti- regime party, damaged its credibility. 
Interestingly, although Ennahda’s consensus policy helped it quell internal debates temporarily, 
it posed challenge for the party in the long run in satisfying members and supporters that had 











Chapter 8   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarizes the goals and outcomes of the research before elaborating on the 
explanatory power of the findings, and their contribution to research on voting and mobilizing in 
North Africa. It argues that the study’s demand-and-supply framework can enable better 
understanding and analysis of the contemporary dynamics of electoral authoritarianism, the role 
of Islamist parties, the process of opposition mobilization and the nature of the electorate in the 
region. It does so by drawing on the Political Process Theory. It emphasizes Islamist parties’ 
organizational structure, network building and movement strategies, and particularly, political 
opportunities as key factors within the electoral authoritarian systems in Algeria and Tunisia 
from 1989 to 2014. In analyzing how Ennahda in Tunisia, and HMS in Algeria, developed from 
small Islamist movements to formal parties, and how they mobilized support over time in 
response to political openings and closures within the electoral authoritarian regimes under 
which they operated, the study utilized original fieldwork, primary sources including party and 
government documents, and secondary literature, to develop its findings. In the process, the 
study developed new contributions both to theory and for understanding party behavior. These 
include the identification of more specific categories within the existing political opportunities 
framework to analyze different approaches by regimes toward opposition party engagement in 
the political process; likewise, the research locates Islamist parties’ platforms in a broader 
political setting, adding to knowledge on ruling elite behavior by observing how, under certain 
circumstances, they adopt covert means to manipulate the openings for non-regime political 
actors. The study also reveals how in unfavorable political climates, Islamist parties do not 
always collapse, but can operate and even progress in abeyance.  
 
Comparison of Ennahda and the HMS, 1989-2014 
The history of Tunisia’s Ennahda shows it has been an essential political force with important 
impact on different stages of Tunisia’s party development over the past three decades. Ennahda 
effectively mobilized its resources to become Tunisia’s largest opposition party in 1989, 
maintained its structures and operated in abeyance for two decades when it was repressed, and 
then in 2011, reconstructed itself and mobilized a significant support base, returning to Tunisia’s 
political scene as the largest party and head of the Troika coalition in power.  
Unlike Ennahda, the HMS was never a highly popular party in Algeria. It appeared on the 
Algerian political scene in 1991 as an Islamist party with small mobilization capacity. It only 
expanded its support base significantly in the mid- and late-1990s, as the FIS was excluded from 
the political scene, and as the HMS’ moderate stance resonated with citizens’ demands to end 
171 
 
the civil war. At the start of the millennium, the HMS witnessed a decline in support. Its 
mobilization can therefore be understood as taking the form of a bell curve, with only a brief 
period of success, bounded by long periods of marginalism. 
This study comparing the mobilization of Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS yields 
several important findings. First, the political context in which the two parties operated and 
developed differed greatly. Whereas the Tunisian regime under Bourguiba and Ben Ali sought to 
dominate the Islamic sphere by creating official interpretation of Islam to marginalize all other 
interpretations, the Algerian regime has played the role of organizer of the Islamic debate (such 
as on the amendment of the Family Code) by offering controlled inclusion to as many non-
violent religious currents as possible. Consequently, the Tunisian leadership provoked a contest 
between themselves and the Islamists, confronted repeated Islamic challenges to their political 
authority, and deflected a growing demand in society for alternative interpretations of Islam. In 
Algeria ruling elites not only divided Islamic groups into fragmented clusters and encouraged 
fierce competition between them, but strengthened the liberalized autocratic system by creating 
the façade of religious freedom. Such different backgrounds yield different results: Whereas 
Ennahda managed to adapt its discourse to challenge the official ideology and meet Tunisians’ 
demand for alternative religious interpretation, the HMS faced challenges from a great number 
of Islamic groups, and when changing its discourse frequently in competition with various 
interpretations of Islam, it lost disourse consistency and credibility.  
Second, the study reveals that in responding to the constraints of electoral authoritarianism, 
which included controlled inclusion and informal tolerance as well as outright repression, both 
Ennahda and the HMS demonstrated efficiency in supplying Islamic debate, political locations 
of Islamic activism, and an alternative discourse to that of the regime. On the one hand, both 
Islamist parties distinguished themselves from traditional clerics by showing that they were less 
intransigent about the changes to modernity, more interested in entering politics, and better at 
translating people’s needs into political agenda. On the other hand, both parties overall 
performed better than secular opposition parties without their structures, financial organization 
and backing, becoming able at times at least to mobilize large numbers of voters (e.g. even when 
the HMS’ support base declined in the 21st century, it still acquired more votes than secular 
opposition parties) and to influence government (e.g. the HMS’ anti-corruption initiative in the 
first decade of 2000 at least helped cast the topic of anti-corruption into public attention), 
something secular parties seldom achieved.  
Third, it is worth noting that after operating and adjusting their mobilization strategies for a 
long period in electoral authoritarian systems, both Islamist parties risked failure in meeting 
specific voter demands or expectations, did not reduce the costs of support sufficiently, and even 
failed at times in garnering a protest vote. In particular, a comparison of the two cases shows that 
both parties demonstrate more efficiency in supplying resources and discourses than meeting 
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demands for change (e.g. reduction of corruption, increase in employment). In the early 21st 
century, the HMS’ deep co-optation by the regime and participation in the Presidential Alliance 
in exchange for cabinet portfolios, meant it did not meet citizens’ demands for change in the 
status quo, and in fact, aroused their distrust as it failed to promote the government reforms it 
promised, resulting in a significant decline in its support. By comparison, when Ennahda 
returned to Tunisia’s political scene in 2011, it found itself entrapped in the process of 
compromising with differing demands by various social groups (e.g. whereas some members 
prioritized pluralist values, others advocated the implementation of sharia), and ended up 
disappointing citizens by not being able to fully satisfy any of them, leading many activists to 
leave the party.  
Last, the study suggests that mobilizing Islamic politics serves to engage the population and 
insert the articulation of Islamic ideas into the political arena. Yet, the costs were very high to 
the parties, and besides not benefiting from the political opportunity to gain experience in 
governance, the battle with the more powerful regime affected at any time not only their own 
credibility and ability to provide convincing opposition strategies, but two other important 
elements: their organizational strength and capacity to create cooperative alliances with other 
likeminded groups, and their utilization of the discourse of Islam as a political doctrine. 
 
New contributions on Theory, Voting Behavior and Islamist Party Mobilization 
By developing the Political Process Theory in a way specifically useful to this study, new 
insights emerged inductively from the research in three areas: theoretically, and in terms of voter 
behavior and the functioning of Islamist parties. 
 
Theoretical Insights    
The first important contribution of this study is that it points out the limitation of applying 
Political Process Theory to analyzing Islamist parties’ mobilization capacity, as previously 
conducted in a number of works including Alexander (2000), Schwedler (2004), Eligür (2010), 
and Zhang (2016). As such, this thesis elaborates the political process theory in four ways and 
argues for the necessity to combine it with other theoretical frameworks such as protest voting 
and electoral authoritarianism theories when observing Islamist parties’ mobilization in North 
Africa.  
First, it is important to note that more specific categories of informal tolerance and controlled 
inclusion are necessary for understanding the nuances of political opportunity in authoritarian 
contexts. In North Africa, even if Islamist parties are allowed to operate, it does not necessarily 
mean that they enjoy full political openness. Instead, they may be tolerated without being 
legalized (informal tolerance) as was the case with Ennahda during the early Ben Ali years, or 
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included in political institutions under strict state control (controlled inclusion), as was the case 
with Algeria’s HMS since its creation. Although political opportunities of informal tolerance and 
controlled inclusion enable Islamist parties to expand their outreach, they set up a politics of 
ambiguity and push many Islamist parties to adopt adaptation methods and make compromises 
with ruling elites. Examining what Islamist parties can and cannot do in different sub-categories 
of political opportunity is important for political process theorists to understand why and how 
these parties adjust to the shifts in legal and operational positioning.  
Second, the study indicates that when evaluating Islamist parties’ political opportunities, 
political process theorists should not only examine how ruling elites restrict the parties’ activities 
by enacting laws, but note that they can also use covert means to manipulate the openings on 
offer, such as by encouraging inter-group competition to weaken the Islamist field. As was the 
case with Algeria in Bouteflika’s era, ruling elites encouraged as many religious groups as 
possible (except the FIS and violent groups) to participate in the Islamic debate in order to 
provoke inter-group competition. This led many Islamist parties such as the HMS to change their 
slogans and platforms frequently. Understanding this dimension can help scholars engage in 
further research to better structure and conduct in-depth analysis of Islamist parties’ mobilization.  
 Third, this analysis reveals that in unfavorable political climates, Islamist parties can work in 
abeyance and still maintain their structures and networks, in order to ensure their continuance. 
As was the case with Ennahda in 1991-2010 when it was excluded from Tunisia’ political scene, 
the party survived by adopting a number of new tactics: removing its organizational structures 
from Tunisia to the West, centralizing the party’s power in exile, adopting a less inclusive 
recruitment model, creating a rich political culture among Ennahda activists abroad to ensure 
continued member commitment, and improving its mobilization capacity by shifting from 
exclusive emphasis on Islamic principles to laying equal stress on both Islamic and pluralist 
values. An analysis of Islamist parties’ survival and mobilization in abeyance shows that 
political opportunities are not a determining factor of Islamist parties’ mobilization — an 
assertion made by many political process theorists including Kriesi (1995), Gamson and Meyer 
(1996), Alexander (2000), and Schwedler (2004). Significantly, parties can still maintain their 
organizational structure, and improve network building and movement strategies in a worsening 
political environment.  
Moreover, the thesis indicates that using political process theory is not sufficient for 
thoroughly understanding Islamist parties’ mobilization in North Africa. The study here makes 
more complex the analysis by locating the mobilizers (Islamist parties) within the larger political 
context, and relating mobilizers to the mobilized (citizens, especially the ones who are 
dissatisfied with the status quo). This allows me to understand to what extent the Islamist parties’ 




Elaborating Voting Behavior in North Africa 
The second significant contribution of this research, therefore, is that it synthesizes and 
advances a wider scholarly debate over voting behavior in North Africa, in a way that may be 
generalizable to other Muslim countries. Analyzing voting patterns and drivers in an 
environment characterized by authoritarian control and confessionalism, remains difficult, and 
scholars have tended to focus on different positions: the role of theocracy (Gellner, 1981, p. 1; 
Lewis, 2003, p. 97), the role of charitable services (Sullivan, 1994; Clark, 2004; Levitt, 2006) 
and the role of Islamism as a challenge to the secular establishment (Dekmejian, 1980). The 
protest vote framework brings these together, in that voting is understood as an instrumental act, 
in which vote pooling for the party most likely to win may mean voters support a party they 
agree with less, but which represents the most likely winner against the regime (Tessler, 1997). 
This thesis contributes to the debate on voting behavior by developing the protest voting 
framework in two ways. On the one hand, I analyze the mechanisms of protest voting by 
examining why citizens are unsatisfied with ruling elites and what they demand instead. I assert 
that voting decision-making is an outcome of benefits-and-cost-balancing. In political contexts 
characterized by electoral or resilient authoritarianism, anti-regime voters will view benefits as 
constituting a change in the status quo and even a rejection of the regime; costs, by contrast will 
be viewed as the potential loss of individual rights and social stability if an Islamist party wins. 
On the other hand, I specify the factors that determine whether an Islamist party can garner a 
protest vote and contend that the Islamist vote is in fact no different than any other opposition 
vote — leftist, ethnic, etc. Whether an Islamist party (or a leftist or ethnic party) can strengthen 
its mobilization capacity or not depends on whether its supply (e.g. organizational strength, 
network building, and movement strategies) meets citizens’ demands. The thesis shows that an 
Islamist party is only likely to enlarge its support base significantly at the ballot box when 
citizens believe that it possesses the political opportunities, organizational strength, intention and 
legitimacy to change the status quo and that in doing so, the costs will not be excessive. If no 
non-regime parties including Islamist parties seem likely to bring the citizens large benefits with 
small costs, then there will be an increasing number of citizens who show their dissatisfaction 
with the government by casting blank votes or choose not to vote at all.  
 
Understanding the functioning of Islamist parties 
Thirdly, the thesis sheds new light on the functioning of Islamist parties more generally, and 
how they link supply and demand. Said Ferjani, a member of Ennahda’s Shura leadership 
committee, and close colleague of Ghannouchi’s, commented in an interview with Marks (2016) 
in March 2016, “Islamism is … a language of opposition”. This quotation corroborates 
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Dekmejian (1980, pp. 9-11)’s argument in his conceptual analysis of Islamic revival, that Islam 
“constitutes a ‘fall back’ ideology to capture the alienated, the disoriented and the angry”. This 
means that Islamist parties cannot demonstrate high mobilization capacity just by talking about 
the Qur’an and sharia. A religious discourse can only be transformed into mobilization strength 
when tactically used by a political party to convince citizens why and how those religious 
elements can help reject the regime and bring an improvement to the status quo.  
My analysis of Ennahda and the HMS suggests that both parties used Islam as a language of 
opposition, rather than purely as an ideology, to mobilize citizens. For instance, during the 1989 
election, Ennahda used religious slogans diagnostically to convey the message that the 
government’s malfunctioning was caused by not following Islamic values, and the socio-
economic problems, such as unemployment, could only be solved by implementing Islamic 
principles represented by social justice. To cite another example, in the mid-and-late-1990s, the 
HMS used the language of moderate Islam to show that it was different from secularists and 
radical Islamists, who completely rejected each other, and that instead, it aimed to mediate 
between the two sides to end their conflicts and battles.  
    Even so, when using religious elements to express opposition to the status quo, Islamist 
parties themselves face many challenges, notably religious language entrapment, post-success 
setbacks, field competition, internal divisions and the risk of alternative protest voting.  
Religious language entrapment: Declaration of loyalty to Allah and Islam does not ensure 
Islamist parties’ victory in their tug-of-war with regimes over sacral interpretations, because 
Islamist parties themselves are willing participants within the electoral and political process. 
How to identify the role of Islam, search for “cultural authenticity” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 451), 
construct “reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe” (Burgat & Dowell, 1993), and 
handle imported conceptions such as political pluralism, become key challenges which require 
cautious, and sophisticated formulation. The risks faced are various. Too much emphasis on 
tolerance, freedom and pluralism by Islamist parties may downplay their religious discourses. 
Doctrinal interpretations of sharia may trigger popular misgivings about the party’s intention to 
restrict individual freedoms. Moreover, if Islamist parties participate in the decision-making 
process either as governing parties or by joining coalitions, and the state does not drastically 
alter its socio-economic, political and diplomatic policies, then the Islamist parties may be 
viewed as no better than the regime or even as “proxies of the West”.  
Post-success setbacks: Islamist parties in electoral or resilient authoritarianism often find it 
hard to maintain their mobilization capacity after winning an election and obtaining power. This 
would be the case for most opposition parties, regardless of religious dimension, as experience 
in governance has been denied them until that point, leaving them ill equipped for the 
complexities inherent in positions of responsibility. For instance, after Ennahda was elected to 
head the government in 2011, it showed itself inexperienced in negotiating for the funding 
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required to support its economic plans, in managing the parliament’s secular parties with 
different ideologies and development plans, and striking a balance between religious tolerance 
and the radical religious groups that were endangering public security. Moreover, Islamist party 
solidarity, when in opposition, is largely based on shared emotions, sufferings and social 
practices; once the parties replace the old regime, the nature of the resources upon which 
Islamist parties have traditionally drawn is likely to “wane in importance and become 
fragmented among a number of parties”, as Seifeddine Ferjani, son of Said Ferjani, observed in 
an interview (Interview, Ferjani, 2015, Tunis). 
Field competition: Competition within the Islamist political field, as well as between 
confessional and secular opposition parties, prompts some Islamist parties to adopt a more 
institutionalized and pro-regime strategy (McAdam et al., 2001). Tactically, they are driven by 
the need to show that they are no less religious than other Islamic groups, no less modernized 
than secular groups, and no less pro-regime than parties that have chosen to be co-opted by 
ruling elites to avoid being repressed by the regime. For instance, between 2000 and 2010, to 
distinguish itself from other parties, the HMS tried to demonstrate that it was as modern as any 
secular party, such as the FLN and RND, in terms of supporting pluralist principles, as Islamic 
as the Sufi groups and Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya in terms of following religious texts, and as regime-
friendly as Islamist MRI in terms of taking pro-Bouteflika positions. Consequently, the HMS’ 
discourse oscillated between supporting and opposing the Bouteflika 1984 Family Code 
amendment, which aroused suspicions among the citizens about the credibility of the party’s 
rhetoric. What this shows, is that by adapting to both the demands of the mobilized, and political 
competition, party identity can become over-diffused, to the point that it no longer can supply 
credibility to mobilize its core constituency.   
Internal divisions: When an Islamist party confronts continuous challenges to realizing its 
goal of Islamizing the country, despite spending time, money and human resources participating 
in formal politics, internal divisions become likely. In North Africa, Islamist parties’ internal 
divisions are usually alleviated either through charismatic leader-follower relationships or by the 
party’s prioritization of consensus. Yet, both methods have significant negative effects. As 
Willner (1985) notes, in a one-person-call-the-tune structure, followers must unconditionally 
comply with the leader who, in their eyes, is somehow superhuman — ironically not unlike the 
regime leader –– making opposition parties hierarchically similar to the government structures 
they are contesting. Likewise, charismatic leadership tends to hinder the parties’ transition to a 
more institutional system and development of a democratic culture (Rashwān, 2007). Once the 
charismatic leader dies or is imprisoned, the party often face profound fragmentation as the 
successor, though generally elected by the party’s leading activists, may lack the experience or 
prestige, or religious standing, of his predecessor, and find it hard to arbitrate internal divisions 
and control the competing factions striving for dominance, as was the case with the HMS after 
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its founder, Nahnah, died. Consensus policy is also problematic as it means that the party 
leadership needs to keep a vague attitude towards controversial issues to give all party activists 
and supporters the hope that the party will meet their expectations. Therefore, when the party has 
to clarify its position and fulfill its promise after it wins the election and joins the government, it 
risks failing to satisfy specific voter demands or aspirations, and thus loses supporters.  
The risk of the protest vote: Last, protest voting affects parties that don’t have a chance of 
dominating in the election, and hence lose voters to other parties who might. As a significant 
percentage of the Islamist parties’ constituencies are those who dislike the old ruling elites and 
consider Islamist parties to be the only viable opposition force (Ajami, 1981), they are likely to 
be disappointed if Islamist parties fail to “deliver on campaign promises” (Schwedler, 1998, p. 
28) when they actually have a chance to dominate or participate in government. Voters will thus 
translate such disappointment into a new protest vote by supporting another party to replace the 
Islamist party in governance. Ennahda’s experience in office after 2011 offers a good example. 
When it failed to provide a meaningful alternative to the old regime in terms of solving Tunisia’s 
socio-economic problems and demonstrated inefficiency in maintaining social stability, large 
numbers of voters that had supported it in the 2011 election turned away from it and voted 
instead for Nidaa Tounes in the 2014 legislative election, even though many did not necessarily 
like Nidaa Tounes best.  
Overall, a comparison of Ennahda and the HMS shows that both Islamist parties have a 
committed and disciplined core of ideologically motivated voters: Ennahda’s core supporters in 
Tunisia are particularly attracted by Ennahda’s offer of a politics that incorporates tradition, 
Islam, modernism, and pluralism; the HMS’ core supporters in Algeria are attracted by the 
party’s gradualist approach and moderate interpretaions of Islam. These core supporters are 
composed of citizens from various social groups ranging from university students to urban 
middle class. With the support of these strong Islamist supporters who expect policy gains in 
terms of religious values, both Ennahda and the HMS remain to receive more votes than most of 
the secular parties, even when the two parties’ support base declines. Yet, it is important to note 
that the ideologically motivated voters are not necessarily stable in their voting behavior, as 
different Islamist parties may compete with each other for these voters. This is exactly what has 
happened in Algeria, where a proliferation of Islamist parties has divided the voters in the 
Islamist pool with similar platforms and slogans, which has contributed to the decline of the 
HMS’ support base. In addition to relying on the core constituency, Ennahda and the HMS still 
try to lure pragmatic voters who want improvement in socio-economic conditions and reduction 
of corruption by promising practical changes, only to lose when they fail to deliver. This has led 
the two parties to suffer the challenge facing any party in the transition from being an opposition 





  By adopting a demand-and-supply framework which is grounded in the Political Process 
Theory to compare Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS from 1989-2014, the thesis examines 
how Islamist parties in electoral or resilient authoritarian settings develop linkages to 
populations dissatisfied with their ruling elites by mobilizing debates, discourses, and activist 
environments. The study argues that only by strengthening their capacity to accumulate 
resources and ensure Islamic discourse as part of the political process, will Islamist parties be 
likely to demonstrate capacity in incorporating popular views into their agendas, and thus give 
voters alternatives when the opportunity is available for citizens to vote against ruling elites. Yet, 
Islamist parties pay a high price in the process, as adapting their message to accord with the 
different demands of supporters from various backgrounds may undermine the parties’ internal 
cohesion, credibility, capacity to create cooperative alliances, and even the ability to retain 
control over the use of Islamic discourse, thus significantly impacting their supply, and hence, 
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Jabbar, Lawyer from Tozeur in his fifties, 16/11/2015, Avenue Habib Bourguiba, Tunis. 
Alia, High School Teacher in her forties, 23/07/2015, Cité Bahi Amar, Oran. 
Hafez, Gatekeeper in his forties, 05/08/2015, El M’nouaer, Oran.  
Halina, Tunisian, Undergraduate of Medicine from Nabeul in her twenties, Grand Lac, Tunis, 
13/11/2015. 
Hassan, Member of the National Executive Bureau of HMS and Ex-Vice President of the 
parliament, 23/02/2016, El-Mouradia, Algiers. 
Hazem, 2015, Member of Ennahda in 2011-2014 in the Tunis office in his twenties, 19/11/2015, 
Avenue Mohamed V, Tunis. 
Kaarina, Member of Ennahda in 2011-2013 in the Nabeul office in her twenties, 12/11/2015, 
Avenue Mohamed V, Tunis.  
Labeeb, Administrative Staff in a transnational enterprise from Oran in his fifties, 02/08/2015, 
Ibn Rochd, Oran.  
Mustapha, Engineer in his fifties, 16/11/2015, Grand Lac, Tunis.  
Nabeeha, Post-graduate from Tipaza in her twenties, 01/09/2015, Skype Interview.  
Sada, Nurse in her fifties, 25/02/2016, Hydra, Algiers 
